Distribution and sustainable development in a natural resource-based economy by Ram, Justine
1 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution and Sustainable Development in a Natural 
Resource-Based Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justine Ram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Geography and 
Environment of the London School of Economics for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, July 
2012. 
3 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD Degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any 
work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided 
that full acknowledgement is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior 
written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 
any third party. 
 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 55,536 words.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Abstract 
 
There is still some ambiguity about what is sustainable development. From an economic 
point of view it involves maintaining a stock of assets for posterity that is equal to or 
greater than the stock of assets of the current generation. This is the basis of the capital 
approach to sustainable development. To measure how sustainable an economy is, based 
on the capital basis of sustainable development, multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank use wealth accounting combined with the genuine savings approach to 
measure how well economies are saving for the future, net of current asset depreciation. 
These measures are useful for telling policy makers how their policies are contributing to 
sustainability and whether their economies are on a sustainable development path. 
Although these measures tell which assets are being depleted and the level of savings 
required, they do not tell why inadequate savings or inadequate investments might be 
occurring and how these assets are distributed among income groups within the economy. 
These measures are also not linked explicitly with the development prospects of the 
country and the needs of the current generation. This thesis attempts to assess if 
distributional outcomes affect how much countries save and therefore whether this has 
any impact on sustainability. To examine the impact of distribution on sustainability, a 
case study of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) is conducted.  T&T has had a negative genuine 
savings rate for most of the last two decades, primarily due to the excessive exploitation 
of its natural resources (oil and natural gas) without sufficient savings or reinvestment of 
the revenues from these resources. Has the distribution of these resource rents had any 
impact on saving outcomes? An attempt is made to answer these questions by assessing 
how government expenditure is distributed and who benefits most from the exploitation 
of the natural resources.  The analyses contained within the thesis show that expenditure 
on energy subsidies, the distribution of human capital and the overall distributions of 
rents are all regressively distributed. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
This thesis attempts to examine the relationship between sustainable development and 
inequality. The relationship is examined specifically within the context of a small open 
resource rich economy, Trinidad and Tobago (T&T). The reason for examining this 
phenomenon within T&T is that, despite T&T’s vast non-renewable natural resource 
wealth and its ability to monetise that wealth, the country has not transformed these rents 
into adequate savings and investment in other forms of capital, particularly as it relates to 
measures of genuine savings and comprehensive wealth. Does the distribution of resource 
rents matter for sustainability? The resource curse literature by for example Auty and 
Kiiski (2001) and Auty (2007) as well as earlier work on the Plantation economy by for 
example Best (1968), Demas (1971) and Beckford (1972) suggests that inequalities are a 
persistent problem for some resource abundant countries.  However, these theorists along 
with more recent work by for example van der Ploeg (2011) find that in addition to 
uneven distribution of incomes, institutional failures and political economy 
considerations play an important part in the developmental outcomes for these countries.  
Furthermore research by Berry (2006), Buccellato and Mickiewicz (2008), El-Katiri et al. 
(2011) and Freije (2006) have also found that income inequality is a common problem 
among resource abundant countries. The subsequent analyses conducted for this thesis 
also finds this to be true. 
 
I attempt to find the link between savings distribution and sustainability in 
comprehensive wealth measures, the thesis does not provide a full distributional 
assessment of all of the factors related to genuine savings, because of the lack of 
available data and the difficulty in estimating some factors such as ecosystem services 
and environmental services.  However, this thesis attempts to begin the process of 
examining the overall savings distribution for Trinidad and Tobago to help provide policy 
recommendations that could help resource abundant countries that consistently have 
negative genuine savings rates and subsequent growth collapses and staple trap problems.   
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Furthermore research pioneered by the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DfID) on sustainable livelihoods, suggests that at the individual and household levels, 
access to various capitals such as human capital, physical capital, social capital, financial 
capital and natural capital along with people’s vulnerabilities and their interaction with 
institutions and the culture around them can play an important part in their life outcomes, 
DfID (1999) and Bebbington (1999).  So while this thesis begins to look at the impact 
that access to capitals and the general distribution of assets can have on sustainability, it 
is apparent that there are many other microeconomic interactions such as the quality of 
institutions, access to decision makers and rent seeking behaviour that are important in 
determining sustainability outcomes and which become apparent in the subsequent 
analyses. So while distribution is an important consideration for sustainability and 
sometimes a disincentive for poorer households to invest for the future, Birdsall, 
Pinckney and sabot (2001), tackling political inertias and institutional failures are also 
important. 
 
Background 
Although T&T had economic growth for various periods of its history (the latest period 
being from about 1998 to 2008) fuelled by oil and natural gas exploitation and high 
export prices, a casual observation of the economic conditions for the vast majority of the 
population reveals that pockets of substantial poverty and inequality still exist; the 
official poverty rate stood at 16.5 per cent in 2005 (Henry, 2008), although unofficial 
estimates from the University of the West Indies put the rate at 27 per cent of the 
population in 2008 (Sookram, 2008). Depletion estimates provided in Chapter Three of 
this thesis reveals that economic growth has been associated with exploitation of natural 
resources and the consumption of the rents from the sale of these natural resources. This 
has also recently been confirmed by the World Bank in its 2006 and 2011 publications on 
the national wealth of nations. The World Bank’s latest publication, World Bank (2011), 
also suggests that if T&T had invested more of its rents rather than consuming them, the 
so-called Hartwick rule, the level of per capita produced capital in 2005 would have been 
11 
 
about three times higher than actual estimates.
1
 This, it would seem, is also true for a 
number of other countries that also rely on natural resource exploitation for economic 
growth, such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Gabon, Nigeria and Democratic 
Republic of Congo, to name a few. 
 
While there have been in the past many development theories that describe why countries 
that are reliant on natural capital exploitation for their economic growth do not perform 
as well as others, such as theories about Rent-seeking, the Resource curse, Dualism 
within dualism
2
, Dutch disease and the Mechanism of the open petroleum economy, none 
of these have examined how inequality within these societies may be leading to these 
perverse outcomes. However, more recent literature on sustainable livelihoods (for 
example, Pantin (1994), Farrington et al. (1999), Dixon et al. (2001) and Di Stefano 
(2010) and the literature which examines the link between poverty degradation and the 
environment have touched on this concept (see, for example DFID (2000)). Literature on 
social accounting matrices also makes an implicit link between resource use and 
distribution, such as Thorbecke (1995) and Chander, Gnasegarah, Pyatt & Round (1980) 
and Adger & Winkels (2007). 
 
Comprehensive measures of savings, such as adjusted net saving rates, calculate how a 
country performs amongst a series of key indicators including conventional net savings 
rates, investment in education, depletion and depreciation of natural assets and the 
amount of pollution produced by the economy.  The rationale behind this measure is that 
a country’s future prospect relies on its level of current wealth, since as Hicks (1946) 
explained; net national product should be exactly the rate of return on a country’s capital 
base.  Thus calculating this correctly means including as many dimensions of savings so 
that the analyst gets a clearer picture of true net national product and wealth of a country. 
Solow (1974, 1986, 1992 and 1993) and later Hartwick (1977 and 1990) have also 
theorised that a country cannot afford to consume the proceeds from one form of capital 
                                                 
1 The World Bank estimates counterfactual savings rates had T&T followed the Hartwick rule. 
2 Although Barbier (2005) in his theory about ‘Dualism with Dualism’ speaks about frontier land 
degradation by the rural poor, he believes that it is inequalities in wealth between households even at the 
rural level that has an important impact on resource degradation processes. 
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indefinitely without using some of those proceeds to build up the stocks of other forms of 
capital. If this reinvestment of rents, particularly from non-renewable assets is not 
achieved, it becomes apparent that the future economic prospects of the country will be 
precarious, as the country will have a diminished asset base upon which to generate 
income. However, none of these theories explicitly state how the distribution of these 
savings may also affect the final outcome. Although the ANS rate is a good estimator of 
sustainability, other frameworks such as sustainable livelihoods also provides interesting 
commentary and also suggest that individual capital endowments are important but that 
vulnerabilities and structures such as government and the private sector also play an 
important part.  Institutions and policies as well as culture are also important factors.  
Many of these issues are reviewed further in chapter two.  Although this thesis does not 
measure the distribution of all forms of capital and the additional factors that might affect 
sustainability, the subsequent analyses begin this process by measuring human capital 
distribution which is important from the sustainable livelihoods approach and for the 
genuine savings measure.  Proxy indicators of resource use distribution are also 
estimated.  However, the thesis leaves some questions unanswered such as how to 
measure the distribution of pollution or physical capital depreciation, which are areas for 
future research.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) 
The analysis of how some of the  savings and investment generated primarily from the 
exploitation of natural resources are distributed is focussed specifically on T&T. T&T is 
a republic made up of two main islands,
3
 Trinidad being the larger island with a 
population of about 1.25 million and also being where the country’s industrial base is 
situated. Tobago is the smaller of the two islands with tourism as its economic 
infrastructure and with a population of about 50,000. The islands gained independence 
from Britain in August 1962 and became a full republic in 1976. As most island states, 
exports have always driven economic growth and although The American Merrimac Oil 
Company drilled what is said to be "the first successful oil well in the world" at La Brea 
in Trinidad in 1857, only in the last forty years has oil and later natural gas become the 
                                                 
3 There are also five smaller islands which are part of the Republic of T&T. 
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dominant industries of the economy, with petroleum contributing 48 per cent of GDP in 
2008. Although the petroleum sector contributes almost half of national output, it only 
accounted for about 3.5 per cent of total employment in 2008. However, since the 
petroleum sector accounts for over half of government revenues (57.1 per cent in 2008), 
how these rents or proceeds are distributed could be very important for overall 
development and the eventual level of savings and investment within the economy. 
 
Driven primarily by the petroleum sector’s output and revenues, T&T’s GDP per capita 
has trended higher over the last four decades, peaking at US$19,475 in 2008 in nominal 
terms
4
 (US$14,562 in 2005 constant prices). From 1970 to 2009, the overall growth in 
per capita GDP has been about eighteen-fold, although the average over this period was 
about US$7,858 in constant 2005 prices, but within this time there were massive 
variations or swings depicted by the standard deviation of US$2,688 with, for example, 
an increase of 14 per cent in 2003 and decreases of 12 per cent in 1983 (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Per capita GDP (constant 2005 prices) 
-
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
U
S
$
 (
2
0
0
5
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
p
ri
c
e
s
) 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
A
n
n
u
a
l 
g
ro
w
th
 r
a
te
GDP per capita (2005 Prices)
Annual growth rate
 
Source: UN Statistics 
                                                 
4 This has since dropped to US$15,782 in 2009. 
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Figure 1.2 below shows the trends in government revenues from the oil and gas sector 
from 1970 to 2007 and estimates of total rents from the sector. Although total 
government revenues have increased during the last decade due primarily to high 
hydrocarbon prices in the last decade (oil and natural gas prices), the general trend before 
1999 was a decline in the percentage of rents captured. Thus from 2001, there would 
have been scope to capture much more rent through better regulation of royalty and tax 
rates (Ram, 2005).  However, on the other hand, the effectiveness of the government’s 
deployment of those rents to achieve sustainable growth and adequate investment in all 
other forms of capital is also important.
5
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Oil and gas rents and government revenues 
-
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
 a
n
d
 R
e
n
ts
 U
S
$
 m
il
li
o
n
s
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
re
n
ts
 a
n
d
 r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
Total Oil and Gas Rents US$M
Government Revenues US$M
Average Government revenues US$M
% of Rents Captured
Average % of rents captured
 
 
The importance of this policy is laid bare when adjusted net savings rates for T&T are 
estimated. Using estimates from the World Bank for Adjusted Net Savings (ANS), which 
is calculated as net national savings plus education expenditure minus energy depletion, 
                                                 
5 This is the focus of the thesis. 
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mineral depletion, net forest depletion, and carbon dioxide,
6
 T&T, although exploiting 
successfully its petroleum resources, has not been investing sufficiently for the future and 
in doing so has been consuming too much of its captured rents and also not capturing a 
sufficient amount of those rents.
7
 Figure 1.3 shows that for the period 1970 to 2008, 
T&T’s estimated average ANS was -4 per cent of gross national income indicating that 
the country has not been saving sufficiently given the rapid depletion of its non-
renewable resources.  Although the average ANS rate was negative 4 per cent of GNI 
over the period 1970 – 2008, the rate did fluctuate over this period. Much of the change 
has been driven by fluctuations in the price of oil and the level of extraction of 
hydrocarbon reserves, e.g. the significant decline in the ANS rate in the latter years is a 
function of the increased production of natural gas since 1999 which has led to the 
natural gas reserves to production ratio declining from 65 years to about 12 – 15 years. 
From a policy perspective and for sustainability how have adjusted net savings or 
comprehensive wealth been distributed? Given the importance that access to capital plays 
for sustainable life outcome in the sustainable livelihoods framework, has uneven 
distribution impacted on sustainability?  Figure 1.4 shows the main factors associated 
with estimating ANS, namely; gross savings, capital depreciation, education expenditure, 
resource depletion and pollution damages.  The distributional analyses that follow in 
chapters four, five and six, do not estimate the distribution of each of these factors but 
only begins the process of measuring total distribution. Estimating the distribution of 
some of these factors such as renewable resource rents and pollution could be very 
difficult because of data availability and cost and have not been explicitly measured as 
part of this thesis. 
 
 
Structure of Analysis 
For T&T what’s the underlying cause of these negative savings? Since in T&T there has 
been some investment of the natural resource rents in education and infrastructure and in 
                                                 
6 This series excludes particulate emissions damages. 
7 Particularly from the monetising of natural gas through liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
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consumption opportunities through subsidies; who has benefitted from these expenditures 
and has this distribution affected overall savings rates? 
 
This thesis examines what seems to be a major discrepancy of the concept of sustainable 
development (SD) and its primary international measurement (ANS), i.e. its focus on 
intergenerational equity and not enough focus on intragenerational equity.  Does 
intragenerational equity also matter for sustainability? If a country has an insufficient 
ANS rate, does equality and distribution matter?  While this question has not been 
answered entirely in this thesis, the analysis that follows begins to assess this issue by for 
example analysing the distribution of human capital and approximately assessing the 
distribution of the benefits associated with resource exploitation or depletion.  An 
assessment of the distribution of fuel subsidies, could also act as an indicator of the 
distribution of energy use and by extension carbon and pollution emissions.  The 
distribution of the other components namely capital formation and other environmental 
assets are difficult to estimate and are areas of research that could be assessed or 
examined in the future. 
 
If sustainable development depends on sufficient investment in a portfolio of assets 
including environmental, social, man-made and human assets then the relationship a 
society has with each of these asset types becomes important for sustainable 
development, i.e. how these assets are distributed will foster greater trust among 
communities, instil better stewardship of the environment, and the rates of return on man-
made and human capital will be more evenly distributed (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). 
This is also the prediction of the sustainable livelihoods framework which looks at the 
problem at a micro level in terms of outcomes. However, institutional and policy failures 
are also important factors to consider and although not explicitly measured in this thesis, 
they become extremely important in the conclusions that arise from the analyses. 
Furthermore the empirical evidence and research of the development policy of some 
Asian economies have shown that governments in these Asian countries e.g. Republic of 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong specifically focused on equitable 
development, which allowed the even distribution of the benefits of development and 
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which has been a major factor influencing their overall economic performance (Page, 
1994 and Birdsall & Sabot, 1993). 
 
Earlier and recent research have also shown that income inequality has a debilitating 
effect on social outcomes, health outcomes, trust and general wellbeing of all members of 
the population within an unequal society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  Added to this, 
the disadvantaged within society become highly vulnerable to environmental threats and 
pollution (and themselves pose threats to the environment through, for example, frontier 
land expansion), are affected more negatively by health inequalities and also crime due to 
a lack of social capital caused by the breakdown in trust in community relationships 
(Barbier, 2005). While this is only an assertion and has not been measured entirely within 
this thesis, an important consideration for policy makers would be the measurement of 
distribution and the ability to ascertain which groups within society are benefiting the 
most or the least from savings. Depending on these distributions, many of the recurring 
policy conclusions may not be entirely correct for development; Pantin et al. (1999), 
Dixon et al. (2001), Di Stefano (2010) and Pyatt & Round (1980). 
 
Figure 1.3 Adjusted Net Savings for T&T 
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It is therefore safe to say that inequalities, despite savings, will have negative 
consequences for longer-term sustainability. Thus for a country like T&T, with an 
economy dependent on natural resource exploitation, adequate savings and investment of 
the proceeds from natural resource exploitation in other forms of capital is an imperative; 
not only at the macro level but also at the individual and household levels, DfID (1999).  
However, unless those savings and investments and the rents from natural resource 
exploitation, are equitably distributed or lead to a more equal distribution, it is likely that 
sustainable development will not be attained. Thus the measure of ANS or genuine 
savings on its own does not explain or provide enough guidance on the exact policy 
remedies to attain sustainable development. Even if a country is saving sufficiently and 
therefore on an apparent path towards sustainability, if gross inequalities still exist, then 
sustainability is threatened. The opposite may also be true; a country that is not saving 
enough and consuming too much of the rents from its natural wealth may be doing so due 
to its unequal distribution, which may affect consumption patterns, rent-seeking 
behaviour and political motivations for the spending or dissipation of those rents, see 
chapter four and six. 
 
Figure 1.4 shows a stylised description of how ANS is calculated for T&T. The figure 
clearly shows, diagrammatically, how ANS is calculated by using gross savings as the 
base and then subtracting depreciation of fixed capital, adding educational expenditures, 
and then subtracting depletion of natural resources and pollution damages. 
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Figure 1.4 Calculating Adjusted Net savings for T&T, 2008 
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Figure 1.4 clearly shows that T&T had a negative genuine savings rate in 2008. However, 
from a policy perspective for individual countries, there would be gainers and losers. 
Therefore, knowing which societal groups are benefitting or not saving enough or 
contributing more to depletion of natural resources or pollution damages could lead to 
more refined policy responses to help achieve sustainable development. To do this, it 
would be necessary to have economy-wide input-output models with household 
distributions and resource flows to see how each of these factors or components of 
genuine savings are distributed among the different income groups within society. For 
example, how are educational expenditures and therefore human capital distributed, who 
are benefitting from expenditures on tertiary education and who are benefitting from 
depletion of natural resources and perhaps contributing most to pollution damages? This 
analysis could notify policy makers whether particular consumption patterns or the 
structure of the economy, unfair competition (such as monopolies) or leakages are having 
a negative impact on savings and what specific policies may be required to alleviate this. 
This thesis attempts to calculate some of these distributions for T&T in greater detail.  
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This analysis contained within this thesis examines the distribution of education 
expenditure and depletion of non-renewable natural resources.  A proxy of pollution 
distribution can also be deciphered from an assessment of fuel subsidies conducted in 
chapter four. 
 
Structure and contribution of thesis  
The thesis begins with a literature review which first examines the literature on 
sustainable development and determines that there is a gap linking the concept 
(sustainable development) with development economics and that; furthermore, there has 
been little or no research on how inequalities may actually affect sustainable 
development. However, other literature on sustainable livelihoods, the environment-
poverty nexus and social accounting matrices delves further into this topic. These 
literature strands are also reviewed but the review shows that the literature on sustainable 
development and its measurement does not necessarily account explicitly for 
distributional outcomes and what impact this may be having on sustainability.  
 
Chapter Three then looks at different depletion estimates for T&T to determine if T&T 
has been saving adequately from the proceeds of the exploitation of the country’s oil and 
natural gas resources. This chapter examines rents and depletion estimate of Trinidad’s 
non-renewable energy resources (oil and natural gas). Estimates of the rents and 
magnitude of the depletion of T&T’s energy resources are compared against Gross 
National Income (GNI) and investment as well as to other comparator countries. This 
chapter makes it clear that T&T has not been saving adequately and confirms the World 
Bank’s estimates provided in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.  From this, I then ask, how are these 
proceeds distributed and does this have an impact on depletion and savings rates?  Is it 
possible to measure this distribution? 
 
Chapter Four begins the process of examining the distribution of government revenues 
which are primarily made up of revenues from the petroleum sector.  This chapter looks 
at how consumption opportunities financed by government revenues from the 
monetisation of oil and natural gas are distributed. This is done by examining the 
21 
 
distribution of fuel subsidies using household budget surveys and input output modelling. 
Within this chapter I examine the magnitude of the opportunity cost of fuel and energy 
subsidies within T&T and its distribution. These estimates have not been done previously 
for T&T and they show that fuel and electricity subsidies, which are meant to protect 
households’ purchasing power, are regressively distributed since richer households 
benefit substantially more from these subsidies. Since subsidies are a ‘bad’ use of 
resource rents in terms of efficiency and fiscal imbalances, an important question that 
arises here; is why do governments still persist in providing them? 
 
Chapter Five examines the distribution of investment by looking at the distribution of 
human capital. This has not been done previously for T&T and it uses a novel, adjusted 
Jorgensen & Fraumeni (1989) and Jorgensen & Fraumeni (1992) approach to show how 
investments of government revenues (here educational expenditure) are distributed and 
which income groups within society are benefitting most from it. Although the stock 
estimate is for one year, using an adjusted Jorgensen and Fraumeni approach along with 
household budget data provides a unique insight into the distribution of human capital 
across income groups. I also use a simple Mincerian approach to estimate human capital 
for two periods to assess trends in human capital accumulation. 
 
Chapter Six examines the structure of the economy and how revenues from the oil and 
gas sector are distributed among different households and the government. To do this, I 
use partitioned matrices, a methodology first developed by Miyazawa (1976). This 
methodology allows for the tracking of consumption revenues and income throughout the 
economy and also allows for the construction of inter-industry and inter-relational 
multipliers to examine how income is accrued to one group (households and government) 
and how expenditures by these groups are distributed. It therefore allows for the 
observation of economy-wide distributions and leakages that may be leading to unequal 
outcomes and lower saving rates. The Miyazawa approach allows for a less data intensive 
assessment of how petroleum revenues are distributed without the need for the detailed 
assessments required by conventional social accounting matrices (SAMs). 
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Chapter seven is a concluding chapter that summarises the findings of the thesis. 
Although the analysis does not cover all aspects of government expenditure of rents, the 
evidence, calculations and estimates suggest that T&T’s economic structure, 
consumption patterns, government spending, leakages such as imports and taxation and 
the distribution of human capital are all contributing to a legacy of maldistribution and 
which might lead to insufficient savings rates for the attainment of sustainable 
development. It is also evident that political economy considerations and institutional 
failures continue to play an important part in the underdevelopment of T&T. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
This thesis examines the relationship between intra-generational equity and sustainable 
development in resource rich economies. It focuses on the impact that inequality and 
poverty mighty have on sustainable development, thereby contributing to the debate 
about what is the best development path or transformation option for underdeveloped 
resource abundant economies. This literature review begins by examining the definitions 
of sustainable development and how sustainability is linked to economics. It then 
examines the current measures of sustainable development as well as a brief overview of 
the development theories related to resource rich economies and their development. 
There is also an examination of the relationship between poverty and the environment or 
the so-called ‘poverty-environment nexus’. This review also examines the apparent lack 
of concern for the welfare of the least well-off in contemporary society and implies that 
the welfare of the impoverished or those living in poverty should be a pillar of 
sustainable development.
8
  The review also examines the impact that political economy 
can have on developmental outcomes. 
 
The next section outlines the background and motivation of the research. It begins with 
an overview of the main theoretical debates on sustainable development and the role of 
economics in that debate. Omissions or gaps in the literature with respect to 
intragenerational equity and the concern for the poor are also discussed. The apparent 
link between the poor and sustainable development is alluded to throughout the review. 
 
2.1 Background and motivation: Empirical and theoretical debates on 
sustainable development 
 
The concept of sustainable development is not new. This section provides an overview of 
the concept, from its historical roots to the economist’s definition of sustainability. Since 
                                                 
8 The Brundtland Commission did recognise the welfare of the least well-off in society. 
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the publication of the report by the Brundtland/World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) in 1987, as well as the United Nations’ Rio conference in 1992 on 
sustainable development, the term “sustainable development” has come to be associated 
primarily with balancing economic development with environmental preservation. The 
Brundtland Commission report at the time provided the best definition of what is 
sustainable development – “development that meets the needs of current generations 
without compromising the needs or ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs”. However, to say that the concept or the pillars of sustainable development have 
only been in existence for about twenty years since the Brundtland report would be 
inaccurate.  Economists have attempted to incorporate the environment into their models 
for many years. Early in the twentieth century, Pigou (1920) wrote about pollution and 
economic efficiency and by the 1960s there was a growing concern about conservation 
and the environment, and much of the disparate and different aspects have come together 
under the rubric of sustainability or sustainable development (Bromley, 1998). 
 
For economists, the idea of sustainability was conceived from the notion of having 
growth without compromising or impoverishing future generations. Thus, many 
economists have attempted to answer the question of how growth can be accommodated 
without leaving a depleted or degraded stock of natural resources. Bromley (1998) 
suggests that many of the propositions about sustainability from leading economists are 
quite similar.  Thus for Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1977), the problem is really one of 
intergenerational equity.  Solow sees this primarily as the level of consumption of future 
generations not being less than the consumption levels of current generations. This can be 
assured if the total stock of capital; natural and man-made, is sufficient to provide this. 
Pearce and Atkinson (1993) also support a similar position. Pezzey (1989) sees the 
problem as non-declining welfare over time, and Howarth (1995) argues that it is the 
Kantian imperative, while Bishop (1978) advocates a safe minimum standard of 
conservation.
9
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Cited in Bromley (1998). 
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2.2 Income, prices, utility and compensation in sustainable development 
Of course, for many of these approaches, sustainable income is considered a measure of 
sustainable welfare. Solow states that “if we talk about the economy in a more sensible 
and accurate way, we might actually be able to conduct a rational policy in practice with 
respect to natural and environmental resources”, Solow, (1992). He goes on to argue that 
traditional measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product 
(GNP) are not bad for studying fluctuations in employment or analysing the demand for 
goods and services. However, these measures, because they pay little attention to capital 
depreciation, do not provide an accurate picture of welfare. Hence national statisticians 
also compile the Net National Product (NNP) which accounts for depreciation in fixed 
capital. For Solow (1992) this principle should also apply to natural capital and the 
environment. Thus true NNP measures the maximum current level of consumer 
satisfaction that can be sustained forever; it is therefore a measure of sustainable income 
Solow (1992). Therefore, net national product measured by the ‘right prices’ can be 
considered a proxy of human satisfaction or welfare in the current period. Investment 
would include depletion of natural resources and if participants in the economy are not 
myopic, then the “right prices” would reflect future productivity and would also make 
full allowances for future concerns. “Properly defined and properly calculated, this year’s 
net national product can always be regarded as this year’s interest on society’s total stock 
of capital” ,Solow (1992). Capital must therefore be interpreted as all things tangible and 
intangible, which the economy can invest and disinvest in, including knowledge. Thus 
the interest rate that capitalises NNP will be the real discount rate. 
 
Pezzey (1995) argues that, contrary to Solow, non-declining wealth is not a measure of 
sustainability. For even if society is accumulating and maintaining its capital using 
arbitrary prices or conventional optimal development path prices, this capital cannot be 
equated to knowing that society’s welfare will be sustained forever. 
 
Thus the traditional approach by economists to the issue of sustainability usually begins 
with utilitarianism. The focus is therefore on capital, consumption, utility and welfare, to 
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name a few, over time. The utilitarian approach has added clarity but sometimes not 
enough coherent operational solutions (Bromley, 1998). 
 
Howarth (2007) argues that depletion of the natural resource stock is morally legitimate 
only when particular and well characterised steps are taken to compensate future 
generations for invasions of their just entitlements. Thus for Howarth, the issue of 
sustainability is a rights-based concept, and he argues that utilitarianism which focuses on 
a welfare function that balances the interests of each member of society is at odds with 
the rights-based framework of democratic governance and the pursuit of self-interest in 
markets. 
 
Although Solow’s approach is appealing to a framework of welfare economics which can 
be operationalised by charting the course of a utility index over generations, there may 
be, according to Howarth, some conceptual problems, the main one being that 
preferences of future generations cannot be known with certainty, due to technological 
evolution, institutions and cultures.   
2.3 Net Investment Rule 
The literature on natural resource accounting and subsequent additions to this literature 
have made some attempts to find solutions to this problem by suggesting that natural 
capital contributes to the production of market goods and services and that the Net 
Investment Rule should apply, Howarth (2007); Neumayer (1999); Hartwick (2000); and 
Pezzey 2004). The Net Investment Rule states that a dynamic economy will maintain a 
constant or increasing level of per capita utility only if investments in manufactured 
capital exceed the monetary value of natural resource depletion on an economy-wide 
basis, Howarth (2007). 
 
However, Howarth dismisses the practicality of the Net Investment Rule since it only 
holds if economies satisfy the following three assumptions: 
 
1. Population, technology and preferences must all be held constant. 
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2. The economy must be closed or terms of trade must be held constant. 
3. Resources must be allocated in a totally efficient manner under conditions of 
perfect foresight. 
 
For Howarth, it is apparent that the Net Investment Rule has some impracticalities since 
most societies have growing populations and the Rule would understate the required 
investment if per capita utility is to be maintained over time. He also points out 
Pezzey’s10 observation of a “Hedonic treadmill” whereby economic growth and the 
alteration of preferences means that increasing consumption levels are required to sustain 
wellbeing.  This has been proven by other research in the USA, Europe and Japan which 
have shown that increases in material wealth have not been matched by the same level of 
growth in life satisfaction, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), Kahneman (1999), Oswald 
(1997) and Easterlin (1974) 
 
Thus from a policy standpoint, the issue may be how to sustain or improve opportunities. 
It seems that sustaining or improving human opportunities should come first and then 
manufactured capital will follow. 
 
2.4 Sustainable development or optimal development? 
Pearce (1993) attempts to provide an overarching definition of sustainability by first 
distinguishing between sustainable yields and sustainable economies. Sustainable yields 
refer to the management of resources in such a way that the output and the resource are 
maintained over time for future generations. For example, the sustainable exploitation of 
a fishery would require a level of harvesting that would not lead to the disappearance of 
fish stocks and would reduce or eradicate the need for moratoria on fishing. While one 
can also argue that extinction of a fish stock may not matter since fish can be exploited 
elsewhere, in many instances this would be impossible. Extending this argument to 
economies seems fairly logical, and we would simply need to ensure that the output of 
                                                 
10 Pezzey (1992). 
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the economy and the underlying resource base that gives rise to that output is sustained.   
Pearce (1993) argues that economies are reliant on more than renewable resources; thus 
the link between sustainable yield and sustainable economies is insufficient for 
sustainability.   Economies also rely on non-renewable resources like iron and oil to 
enhance human wellbeing. However, the requirement for sustainability would suggest 
their use but with substitution into renewable resources as reserves are depleted. It would 
also require their use in a manner that reduces their environmental impact. 
 
However, is substitution of non-renewable resources the only requirement of sustainable 
development? According to Pearce, some opponents of this idea argue that substitution 
alone cannot compensate for scarcity. Instead, what is needed is a change in lifestyle so 
that we use fewer resources. Thus economic growth is not good for sustainability since 
increases in GNP leads to greater use of natural resources. However, Pearce suggests that 
this is an untenable solution since GNP and wellbeing are inextricably linked. Thus his 
definition or philosophy of sustainable development embraces economic growth and is 
really about reducing the ratio of resource use to GNP and encouraging greater use or 
transition to renewable resources. Therefore, technological change is important for 
sustainability. 
 
Further arguments against encouraging sustainability come from free market economists, 
who would argue that prices would signal scarcity and alternatives or substitutes would 
be encouraged and new technologies would be phased in naturally over time. The 
problem with free-market approaches to sustainability is that many resources that are 
most threatened, such as capacities of the oceans and the atmosphere, are not traded in 
markets, and most markets are not environmentally benign, Pearce (1993). I would also 
add that, in cases where there are global prices for the resource, this global price may not 
adequately reflect local scarcity (particularly if the local supply contributes only a small 
per cent of global output), unless a net local price approach (say, market price less local 
cost of extraction) is used as the proxy of scarcity. 
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In circumstances where there is no apparent scarcity in the resources, then ‘resource 
optimists’ suggest that concern for sustainable development is unnecessary, since there 
are expanding resource discoveries and declining trends in prices. However, as Pearce 
notes, this again refers to marketed resources, and we are unsure how efficiently the 
market works. 
 
Thus the notion of sustainable development is to be considered in a broad context, where 
both inputs and outputs are being sustained. Sustainable development’s concern with 
output is broader than just GNP; it also embraces social goals. Equally, the concern for 
inputs is broader than natural resources; it also focuses on all forms of capital, Pearce 
(1993). 
 
This notion of sustainable development according to Pearce (1993) is consistent with the 
Brundtland Commission definition of sustainable development; that is, as ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs’ and in addition: 
 the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to 
which overriding priority should be given; and  
 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation 
on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. (WCED, 1987). 
 
This brings us to the idea of sustainable development versus optimal development. Pearce 
argues that optimal development which seeks to maximise present value wellbeing over a 
specific time may indeed be unsustainable as wellbeing may fall after the specified time. 
A sustainable path, on the other hand, may lead to a better future but may make current 
generations worse off. So how do we choose between the two, or is this choice 
unnecessary? 
 
If we are concerned with the current living conditions of the poor, and the best way to lift 
people out of poverty is to engage in ‘dirty industrialisation’, how does this conflict with 
our concern for the state of the environment that is being left for future generations? 
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Would optimal development which maximises the sum of individual wellbeing achieve 
this? According to Pearce (1993) it would not, since there is no guarantee that the poor 
will not get poorer. However, if the objectives are changed so that we maximise 
wellbeing subject to the poor not getting poorer or that the poor in the future can be no 
poorer than they otherwise would have been, then there may be very little difference 
except in judgment between sustainable development and optimal development. See also 
Box 2.1 below adapted from Pearce (1993) which summarises some of the main 
arguments for and against sustainability. Those who argue for sustainability are primarily 
concerned with the welfare of future generations. Therefore, the current generation 
should not harm the prospects of future generations. However, these proponents of 
sustainable development are convinced that current generations are harming the 
wellbeing of future generations. However, the opponents of sustainability argue that the 
wellbeing of future generations should not be a primary concern and, if it is a concern, it 
is less important than the wellbeing of the poor in the current generation.  
 
Box 2.1 Arguments for and against sustainable development 
For and against sustainable development 
Sustainability requires two assumptions: 
1. FACT: Current generations are adversely and significantly affecting future 
generations’ wellbeing. 
2. VALUE JUDGEMENTS:  We ought not to be unfair to future generations. 
 
Opponents of sustainability require one of the following: 
1. Current generations are not harming future generations (in which case a moral 
issue does not arise). 
2. The wellbeing of future generations is not a moral concern. 
3. The wellbeing of future generations is a moral concern but it is less important 
than the wellbeing of the poor now, and the two conflict. 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Pearce (1993) 
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2.5 Measurement and policy relevance 
For these arguments to have any policy relevance, how sustainability and depletion of 
natural resources are measured becomes extremely important from a policy perspective. 
 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) were struck by the ambiguity of the early green 
accounting studies that were published in the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the 
pioneering study by Repetto et al. (1989).  The studies did not appear to signal whether 
an economy was sustainable or not. Thus the work by Pearce and Atkinson (1993) tried 
to link assets with sustainability so that changes in asset values measured by net saving 
rates should signal if an economy is on a sustainable development path. While this work 
was rudimentary and was closely linked to the intuition of earlier theorists like Solow, 
refinement was needed so that a truly practical indicator could be defined. Hamilton 
(1994) coined the term “Genuine Savings” and this is the term, together with “Adjusted 
Net Savings” and “Comprehensive Wealth” that describe the most widely used 
methodologies that assess an economy’s relative sustainability. These measures try to 
estimate the changes in overall wealth that occur during the economic transactions within 
an economy during the course of a year. These measures build on traditional economic 
estimates of welfare. Therefore, besides the conventional measures of savings, 
depreciation of man-made and natural capital are assessed and added along with 
investments in human capital and the impact on the environment from economic 
production and consumption. To augment traditional indicators of wellbeing, the 
measurements of the depletion of natural resources and environmental degradation are 
important if these overall measures are to become meaningful indicators. Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2007), in their review of the literature during the ten years from 1997 to 2007, 
suggest that progress has been made, particularly in measuring the depletion of non-
renewable resources and valuing environmental degradation.   
 
The genuine savings indicator is defined as: 
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This implies that social welfare V is equal to the present value of utility and that Genuine 
Savings G is equal to the instantaneous change in social welfare measured in money 
values. Hamilton and Clemens have shown that negative genuine savings implies 
unsustainability or that future utility will be less than current levels. However, positive 
savings at a point in time does not imply sustainability, so genuine savings is considered 
a one-sided test.
11
 
 
For Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) the weak versus strong sustainability debate still 
exists, but they concede that if some amount of nature must be conserved (I would also 
add some amount of social capital as well) then the savings models need to incorporate 
the shadow price of the sustainability constraint, and there is still work to be done on the 
implications of ecological thresholds for measuring sustainable development. They also 
claim that genuine savings is not only a measure of weak sustainability.
12
 
                                                 
11 Note that Hamilton and Withagen (2007) demonstrate that in a competitive economy,  maintaining 
positive genuine savings rates that are growing less than the interest rate will lead to increasing 
consumption at each point in time. 
12 The ‘constant capital rule’ is also known as the ‘weak sustainability rule’. This interpretation of the rule 
suggests indifference to the type and form of capital that is passed on. What becomes important for 
sustainable development is the total capital stock that is passed on and that it should be no less than what 
currently exists, which is similar to Solow’s and Hartwick’s notion of sustainability. 
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2.6 Poverty and sustainable development 
This section outlines the link between poverty and the environment, and reviews the 
literature as it relates to the role of poverty in sustainable development. At the moment, 
there seems to be little consensus on the role or link between poverty and the 
environment.  Some authors suggest that poverty is a major cause of environmental 
degradation and that, if it is not reduced, it will pose a serious risk to sustainable 
development. Others believe that it is the environment that contributes to poverty when 
people live in vulnerable natural conditions that do not foster stability or encourage 
sustainable livelihoods. Thus the linkage between the environment and poverty, and 
indeed between poverty and sustainable development (which is broader than simply 
concern for the environment), is a complex one and it is quite possible that the forces at 
work in this nexus operate in many directions and have various impacts on sustainable 
development. To examine this complex interaction and relationship, I begin by looking at 
how the poor interact with the environment and how their vulnerability may be 
exasperated by this interaction. 
 
2.6.1 What is the real link between poverty, the environment and sustainable 
development? 
As mentioned above, theorists and policy makers are uncertain about the exact 
relationship between poverty and the environment. Does poverty lead to environmental 
degradation or is the causal effect the reverse; i.e. do degraded environments lead to 
poverty? In many ways, I believe this dualism is too simplistic to understand this 
complex interaction, and I believe the real focus should be on the relationship between 
poverty and sustainable development, which encompasses more than concern for the 
environment, but which also encompasses concern for those living in the current 
generation but with unequal circumstances. Poverty, more often than not, is a symptom of 
unequal access to resources, which include wealth and opportunities, see also Bebbington 
(1999), DfID (1999) and World Bank (2003). This sometimes leads to poorer households 
having negative impacts on the environment. Although it is now widely known that the 
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poor have less impact on the wider environment than the rich do particularly when 
emissions and pollution are accounted for, Jehan and Umana (2003). This section 
therefore examines this complex relationship and its implications for sustainable 
development. 
 
Should we even be concerned with the link between sustainability and distribution?  
Economists have always argued for the separation between efficiency and equity.  
However, according to Heal and Kristrom (2007), as far back as McGuire and Aaron 
(1969) and later Brown and Heal (1979), the assumption that these two parameters should 
be separated needs to be fully scrutinised. In terms of environmental degradation, 
Zimmerman (1986) found that environmental damage and the net cost of environmental 
policy are all regressively distributed. Further analysis by Maler (2007) on social 
accounting matrices (SAMs), DfID (1999), Bebbington (1999) and Adger & Winkels 
(2007) on sustainable livelihoods also adds interesting insights to the debate. 
 
Barbier (2005) examines the so-called environment poverty trap and why it seems to be 
so entrenched in many poor rural areas. Barbier sees the problem as being associated with 
two types of dualism. The first dualism, the one that tends to get the most focus in 
poverty-environment studies concerns aggregate resource use and dependency in 
developing countries and is associated with widespread land conversion and 
environmental degradation caused by the rural poor. However, for Barbier, there is a 
second dualism which reinforces the first. This dualism concerns the tendency of 
resource-based development in low and middle income countries to be correlated with 
poor economic performance. 
 
As mentioned previously, there have been alternative approaches used to assess the link 
between poverty and the environment and, by extension, sustainability. Green accounting 
through the use of SAMs has been one way of doing this. SAMs are a comprehensive 
economy-wide data framework for a country which represents the economy of a country. 
A SAM is really a square matrix with each account represented by a row and column. 
The incomes for each account appear along the row and expenditures down its columns.  
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Double entry accounting is the main principle behind SAMs and ensures that total 
revenues (row totals) equal total expenditure (column totals). A SAM consists of various 
accounts which represent various activities performed in the economy by different sectors 
such as households and government. SAMs have been used more often to assess the level 
of poverty and distribution within an economy, such as Pyatt and Round (1988) and 
Thurlow and Wobst (2003). There have also been attempts to use SAMs to trace the flow 
of resources throughout the economy and to measure the impact on distributions (Maler, 
1991; Horan et al., 2003). SAMs, through the use of computable general equilibrium 
models, have been a useful tool for analysing some of these impacts. Work by Lange and 
Motinga (1997) and Lange et al. (2003) on green accounting with southern Africa have 
shown that revenues associated with resource use can be unevenly distributed, with the 
poor reaping an insufficient proportion of resource rents. 
 
The sustainable livelihoods debate has also provided some interesting insight into the 
links between poverty and the environment. This debate is linked closely with Sen’s 
thesis on capabilities and opportunities. Much of the literature on livelihoods have 
suggested that where households have the incentive to invest in the natural environment, 
since there is an economic return, possibly through property rights, sustainable 
livelihoods can be an effective way of reversing any negative impacts that poverty might 
have on the environment (Bebbington, 1999). In fact, where vulnerability from the 
natural environment arises, sustainable livelihoods can also improve households’ 
resilience. Adger and Winkels (2007) have argued that the distribution of income and 
access to resources represent fundamental determinants of capability and vulnerability. 
However, they have also stated that inequality plays a role in environmental degradation, 
particularly when wider concepts such as marginalisation and resilience are examined.  
They have found that global economic change and access to resources tend to undermine 
social resilience and create circumstances where the only response of the vulnerable is 
resistance. Social resilience can only be enhanced or undermined depending on the 
institutions of the state (formal), the outcomes of democratic governance and the legal 
framework of property rights. Reducing vulnerability and improving the resilience of the 
marginalised within society can have significant implications. Improving resilience and 
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improving sustainable development for the marginalised are, in the words of Adger and 
Winkels (2007), a moral and political imperative. The priority placed on poverty 
reduction and preservation of the natural environment within the millennium 
development goals may go some way in addressing this. 
 
The sustainable livelihoods framework of the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DfID) suggests that there are dynamic linkages between 
people’s assets, their vulnerability to environmental change and the structures and 
processes surrounding them such as government, institutions and culture.  This 
framework suggests that any analysis of the poverty and environment nexus should be 
people focused and begin with a simultaneous investigation of their assets, their 
objectives i.e. the outcomes that they seek and the livelihood strategies employed to 
achieve those objectives.  The framework is shown in the following diagram, which 
shows that there are important feedbacks between the transforming structures and 
processes and overall vulnerability as well as between livelihood outcomes and 
livelihood assets. 
 
Figure 2.1: Sustainable livelihoods framework 
 
Source: DfID 
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In the wider context, peoples livelihoods and the availability of assets are affected by 
trends, shocks and seasonality over which they have limited or no control.  Thus in 
analysing the relationship that the poor might have with natural assets, it is important to 
assess people’s vulnerability since this might have a direct impact on their asset status 
and the subsequent options that are open to them in pursuit if beneficial livelihood 
outcomes.  Vulnerability refers to vulnerability to trends such as population and resource 
trends and economic trends as well as shocks such as natural shocks, conflict and crop 
shocks and seasonality trends such as prices, health or employment opportunities.  While 
the effects of shock might not always be negative it is important to remember that these 
complex influences are directly and indirectly responsible for many of the hardships 
faced by the poor. 
 
In addition to people’s susceptibility to shocks, trends or seasonality, the livelihoods 
approach seeks to gain an understanding of people’s strengths; i.e. their assets and 
endowments and how they use these or convert them into positive outcomes. By 
examining the assets base of people we are able to assess whether particular types of 
initial asset endowments can help people escape poverty and provide guidance on where 
livelihood support should be given.  This analysis also allows policy makers to assess if 
some assets can be substituted for others given circumstances, so there can be 
compensation if for example there is a lack of financial assets.  There is therefore an asset 
pentagon that changes shape based on different endowments.  There are five main capital 
assets identified by DfID and these are; human capital, social capital, natural capital, 
physical capital and financial capital.  Human capital is seen as being important and of 
intrinsic value and is important for making use of the other four asset types and so 
necessary for the achievement of positive livelihood outcomes.  Social capital is 
important for mutual trust and reciprocity and lowers the costs of working together.  
Therefore it can improve the efficiency of economic relations and reduce free rider 
problems associated with public goods and facilitate innovation and sharing of 
knowledge. Natural capital is extremely important for those who derive all or part of their 
livelihood from nature.  However, it also has other important benefits for those who do 
not rely on it directly for their livelihoods such as people’s interactions with complex 
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ecosystems and environmental services. Access to physical capital is seen as being 
important for breaking the cycle of poverty e.g. a lack of particular infrastructure is 
considered a core dimension of poverty, DfID (1999).  Inadequate access to water and 
energy could lead to a deterioration of health and unproductive use of time in the 
collection of water and energy. Financial capital is the most versatile of the asset types 
since it is easily convertible into other types of assets.  However, it is the form of capital 
that is least available for the poor.  The lack of financial capital is also the reason that the 
other types of capital are so important for the poor. 
 
The sustainable livelihood framework also shows that capital assets are important at the 
individual level for sustainability.  The Hartwick rule reviewed earlier suggested that the 
total assets base was important if a country was to maintain consumption levels.  
However, it also seems that access to assets among people is also important for their 
livelihoods and consumption.  Although the framework does not allow for the 
quantification of changes it still allows for the analysis of the indirect linkages between 
activities and assets, Ashley (2000) Bebbington (1999).  It is clear from various analyses 
that natural capital plays an important part in sustainable livelihoods and equality.  
However, there are other forms of capital that play equal roles in achieving this outcome 
such as human capital, financial capital, social capital and physical capital.  From a 
genuine savings perspective it is difficult to assess how each of these forms of capital are 
distributed primarily due to data availability and the resources to measure them.  Since 
human capital is seen as the most integral for the use of the other types of assets, later in 
this thesis an attempt is made to measure human capital and its distribution in Trinidad 
and Tobago. Chapter six of the thesis also attempts to trace the flow of financial benefits 
coming from the primary sector to different household income groups. 
 
Jehan and Umana (2003) are convinced that inequality is the major problem facing the 
poor and hence their relationship with the natural environment. Examining the 
environment-poverty nexus, they have found that achieving the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and sustainable development are mutually 
reinforcing, particularly as poverty reduction is key to achieving the MDGs. They have 
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found that inequality and its negative consequences affect primarily the poor. Thus 
productive resources are dominated by the rich and the poor lack access to cleaner and 
efficient energy, such as kerosene and electricity; for example, about two billion people 
in the developing world are without access to electricity. Social exclusion which 
primarily affects the marginalised and the poor can also have implications for sustainable 
development by; 
 Denying groups of people the ability to contribute to the development process. 
 Excluding people from participating in decisions that affect their lives. 
 Raising the fear of human insecurities. 
 
Thus the relationship between the poor and the environment is complex. While the 
environment affects the poor by contributing to their livelihoods, impacting upon their 
health and their vulnerability, the poor may impact upon the environment by encouraging 
countries to promote economic growth at the expense of the environment and by inducing 
societies to downgrade environmental concerns; Jehan and Umana (2003). This can be  
considered if the political class in resource abundant countries tries to appease the poor 
(if the poor are not receiving an adequate share of resource rents) by turning a ‘blind eye’ 
to land degradation on frontier lands that the poor might be engaged in for their 
livelihoods. However, it should be noted that such a phenomenon might be as a result of 
insecure property rights and general lack of opportunities in the labour market for the 
poor or when productive landholdings might be monopolised by wealthier income 
groups, Demas (1971) and Barbier (2005). Thus Jehan and Umana agree with Barbier’s 
assessment that the poor are sometimes pushed to the periphery, the most ecologically 
fragile of lands, and this may increase their vulnerability further. They also agree that the 
poverty-environment nexus does not only stem from low incomes but also property 
rights, the strength or weakness of local communities, the way people cope with risk, the 
use of scarce time and poor people’s entitlements that also affect the environmental 
behaviour of the poor. It is also clear that, irrelevant of income, in fragile ecosystems, 
people minimise risk and do not maximise output. 
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Boyce (2003) posits that there are many dimensions between inequality and 
environmental degradation.  From his three main questions asked he elicits some useful 
conclusions. He asks three questions:  
1. Who benefits from economic activities that degrade the environment? 
2. Who bears the cost of environmental degradation? 
3. Why are winners able to impose environmental costs on the losers? 
He finds that this depends significantly on the relative power of winners and losers so 
that social decisions on environmental protection favours the more powerful, which 
suggests that greater inequality in the distribution of power leads to lower environmental 
protection and therefore greater environmental degradation. Boyce (1994) also 
successfully argues this point by suggesting that inequality tends to raise the valuation of 
the benefits reaped by the rich and powerful relative to the costs imposed on the poor and 
less powerful.  This inequality also raises the rate of time preference for both the losers 
and winners by increasing their poverty and insecurity respectively.  
 
A report by Oxfam (2012) suggests that environmental degradation intensifies social 
inequalities since the impacts of degradation fall mostly on the poor. This sequence of 
events occurs by impacting negatively on the livelihoods of poor people who depend on 
natural resources and social conflict over resource use through the lack of secure property 
rights which tends to over time limit their use of resources such as land, water, forests 
and fishing grounds since elites eventually secure the rights and access. 
 
These arguments also therefore suggest that reducing inequalities could reduce 
environmental degradation by not only limiting the impact that the poor might impose on 
the environment but also limiting the impact that the powerful can wield and therefore 
foist greater environmental burdens on the less powerful and the poor.  
 
Related to many of these arguments is the relationship that population growth has on 
economic growth. Das Gupta et al. (2011) review of the evidence have confirmed that 
while policy and institutional settings are important for economic growth and poverty 
reduction,  the rate of population growth is also an important factor.  Lower dependency 
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ratios particularly as fertility rates decline can enhance productivity, savings and 
investment for future generations.  Lower fertility rates are also associated with better 
child health, child education and provide women with more opportunities to participate in 
the labour market. Das Gupta et al. (2011) have also found that rapid population also 
places pressures on the natural environment as market forces, innovation and human 
ingenuity might not keep pace with its growth.  The impact on common property 
resources could be particularly worrying as they are impacted by activities that support 
rising consumption for growing populations.  Their review of the World Bank (2010) 
found for example that estimates “to meet the growing demand for food between 2005 
and 2055, agricultural productivity will need to rise by 64 percent under the assumptions 
of the ―business as usual scenario and by a further 80 percent under the assumptions of 
projected stresses arising from climate change . Yet the model indicates that if population 
remained constant at the 2005 level, agricultural productivity would need to rise only 
25%”, Das Gupta et al. (2011).  They have argued that managing global environmental 
problems which have been exacerbated by rising consumption and growing populations 
might be easier managed by reducing humans’ ecological footprint by reducing fertility 
rates. 
 
Scott (2006), however reconfirms the multidimensional relationship between poverty and 
the environment, she identifies that while environmental vulnerability is an important 
factor when looking at the dynamics of poverty; “environmental factors though, do not 
operate in isolation”.  Scott suggests that there are also social, economic and political 
dimensions which, when operating together, produce chronic disadvantage for some 
people. Therefore some in society are more susceptible to the adverse impacts of 
environmental hazards because of their position within society. ‘They are more exposed 
to these hazards and also have lower sensitivity and resilience because of the unequal 
distribution of assets, access to natural resources, and of information and knowledge 
across social groups. Whether the aim is to reduce poverty or to ensure environmental 
sustainability, the ‘environment’ and ‘society’ cannot be treated as separate entities’ Scott 
(2006). 
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For Barbier, there is a ‘cumulative causation’ that links the two dualisms referred to 
earlier, and he refers to this as a ‘dualism within dualism’ pattern of resource use. Thus 
entrenched policies and the status quo reinforce a pattern of resource exploitation in low 
and middle income countries, where resource exploitation for commercial and export 
oriented economic activities is mainly carried out by wealthier members of society. I 
would also add that in the case of resource exploitation that requires substantial capital 
investment, such as mining and oil exploitation, the major beneficiaries are relatively 
wealthier households with better access to education, formal credit markets, higher 
incomes and accumulated wealth. 
 
Although it is a commonly held view that the rural poor are responsible for resource 
degradation such as conversion of forests, wetlands and other natural habitats, Barbier 
believes that it is inequalities in wealth between households even at the rural level that 
has an important impact on resource degradation processes. Government policies that 
favour wealthier households in key resources such as land also worsen the problem. 
These complex interactions are also reinforced by the sustainable livelihoods framework, 
DfID (1999). 
 
The pattern of resource exploitation in low and middle income countries and the benefits 
from resource conversion that are inequitably distributed do not necessarily lead to 
sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation. In fact, unequal distribution of 
benefits leaves the poor on marginal lands and exasperates the conditions for ‘frontier’ 
resource expansion and degradation (Barbier, 2005). 
 
Barbier shows that this ‘dualism within dualism’ is present in many developing low and 
middle income countries. As an indication of resource dependency, he uses a measure of 
the share of primary products in total exports. Thus a country with a share of primary 
products in excess of 50% of total exports would be considered to be highly resource 
dependent and susceptible to the dualism of resource dependence and poor economic 
performance. 
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The second dualism of aggregate resource use and dependency, and thus the uneven 
distribution of resource use benefits, can be indicated by the share of total population 
living on fragile lands and the share of rural population living in absolute poverty. 
Barbier combines these two measures to give an indication of the degree of rural poverty 
resource use dualism. He calls this the 20–20 rule, whereby if a country has 20% or more 
of its population living on fragile land, and if 20% or more of the rural population is 
living in absolute poverty then this country exhibits signs of the poverty and resource use 
dualism. 
 
The following table adapted from Barbier (2005) shows 72 low and middle income 
countries, with 56 having a high dependence on primary products as a percentage of 
exports (in excess of 50%). All 72 countries have 20% or more of the rural population 
living on fragile land and all but 7 have 20% or more incidence of absolute poverty in 
rural populations. Therefore, almost all the countries exhibit Barbier’s 20–20 rule and 
satisfy the dualism of high poverty-resource degradation linkage within the economy.  
Strikingly, all but 2 of the 56 highly resource-dependent countries satisfy the 20–20 rule 
and thus have the ‘dualism within dualism’ characteristics. 
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Table 2.1 Selection of Countries Displaying Barbier’s ‘Dualism with Dualism’ 
1990/1999 Share of population on 
fragile land ≥ 50% 
Share of population on 
fragile land 30–50% 
Share of population      
on fragile land 20–30% 
Primary product 
export share ≥ 90% 
Burkina Faso (61.2), Chad 
(67.0), Congo Dem. Rep 
(NA), Laos (53.0), Mali 
(72.8), Niger (66.0), Papua 
New Guinea (NA), 
Somalia (NA), Sudan 
(NA), Yemen A.R. (19.2) 
Algeria (30.3), Angola 
(NA), Benin (33.0), 
Botswana (NA), Cameroon 
(32.4), Comoros (NA), Eq. 
Guinea (NA), Ethiopia 
(31.3), Gambia (64.0), 
Guyana (NA), Iran (NA), 
Mauritania (57.0), Nigeria 
(36.4), Rwanda (51.2), 
Uganda (55.0),  
Ecuador (47.0), Congo, 
Rep. (NA), Liberia (NA), 
Zambia (88.0) 
Primary product 
export share 50–90% 
Egypt (23.3), Zimbabwe 
(31.0) 
Central Ad. Rep (66.6), 
Chad (67.0),  Guatemala 
(71.9), Guinea (40.0), 
Kenya (46.4), Morocco 
(27.2), Senegal (40.4), 
Sierra Leone (76.0), Syria 
(NA), Tanzania (51.1) 
Bolivia (79.1), Burundi 
(36.2), Cote d’ Ivoire 
(32.3), El Salvador (55.7), 
Ghana (34.3), Guinea-
Bissau (48.7), Honduras 
(51.0), Indonesia (15.7), 
Madagascar, (77.0), 
Mozambique (37.9), 
Myanmar (NA), Panama 
(64.9), Peru (64.7), Togo 
(32.3), Trinidad & Tobago 
(20.0) 
Primary product 
export share < 50% 
 Costa Rica (25.5), Haiti 
(66.0), Lesotho (53.9) 
Nepal (44.0), Pakistan 
(36.9), South Africa (11.5), 
Tunisia (21.6) 
China (4.6), Dominican 
Rep. (29.8), India (36.7), 
Jamaica (33.9), Jordan 
(15.0), Malaysia (15.5), 
Mexico (10.1), Sri Lanka 
(20.0), Vietnam (57.2) 
1990/1999 Share of population on 
fragile land ≥ 50% 
Share of population on 
fragile land 30–50% 
Share of population      
on fragile land 20–30% 
 
Source: Barbier, E.B. (2005). “Natural Resources and Economic Development”. Cambridge University 
Press. New York. 
Key: Parenthesis indicates level of rural poverty. 
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The obvious questions arising out of this is why resource-based development does not 
yield widespread benefits? If natural capital is important for sustainable development, 
why is development that is dependent on resource exploitation seemingly a failure for 
low and middle income economies? The answers to these questions stem from the failure 
of resource-based economies to adequately capture the rents from resource exploitation, 
particularly where the rents are low, and to reinvest these rents in other productive 
activities in the economy. Another aspect of this apparent failure is that frontier land 
seems to serve as an outlet for the rural poor. Thus the type of marginal mainly 
agricultural activity performed by the poor on frontier lands generates very little rents and 
provides limited opportunities to improve their livelihoods.  
  
Buccellato and Mickiewicz (2008) examine the case of hydrocarbons and regional 
inequality in Russia and have also posited that ‘local economic structures that are 
dominated by oil rents endowed business elites with enormous resources for state capture 
and for the corresponding distortion of democratic processes.  This state capture tends to 
affect income distribution through its detrimental effects entry and entrepreneurship.  
This in turn crowds out entry by entrepreneurs and closes a critical route out of poverty 
and low income traps.  If big new players were allowed to enter the market this could also 
be beneficial for the labour market and for wages.  Furthermore, their analysis shows that 
within Russian regions, oil and gas continue to play a significant role in explaining 
inequality, with oil and gas enriching the highest quintile of the population the most. 
 
Berry (2006) also seems to confirm that unequal income distributional outcomes tend to 
follow high mineral rents partly because they widen the possible growth outcomes and 
rents can be channelled in ways that could worsen or improve distribution.  Freije (2006) 
examination of the Venezuelan economy has found that over three decades income 
distribution and redistribution have not changed fundamentally because the production 
structure and tax system has not changed. In fact he finds that the tax system is 
moderately progressive and the social security system is mildly regressive in Venezuela. 
It is therefore apparent that existing institutions and political economy challenges such as 
rent seeking, economic structures and historical legacies such as plantation economy also 
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play a significant role.  Although a country like Kuwait according to El-Katiri et al. 
(2011) seem to suggest that there are mechanisms available such as generous public 
services and the provision of public employment to redistribute the benefits of oil income 
so that the entire population benefits. 
 
 
2.6.2 The dangers of rent-seeking behaviour 
Rent-seeking behaviour by wealthier households might also exasperate a negative 
economic outcome. A policy climate and lack of governmental controls that are 
conducive to rent-seeking means that wealthier households, with greater access to credit 
and education tend to exploit natural resources but ignore the resource degradation 
problems inflicting poorer households.  Rent-seeking behaviour can ensure that natural 
resource assets including land are not managed for the benefit of all and may only benefit 
wealthier households.  Thus rent-seeking exasperates the problem of unequal distribution 
of the benefits of resource-based development and shows that lack of proper policies to 
limit it tend to reinforce the linkages between inequality, rural poverty and resource 
degradation. 
  
In a situation where resource rents are available and rent-seeking activity is not regulated 
by proper government policies, there are greater incentives for the wealthy to engage in 
rent-seeking to the detriment of economic development and deepen inequalities within 
society. This reinforces the ‘dualism within dualism’ structure of many poor economies.  
Inferior policies tend to foster the capture of resource rents by wealthier households. The 
poor are unable to compete in markets and are also unable to influence policy decisions 
as it relates to the distribution of resource rents. This, in turn, confines poorer households 
to marginal lands to eke out their existence and livelihoods (Barbier, 2005; Seers, 1964; 
Pantin, 1980; and Pantin, 2005). 
 
Inequality and poverty can have severe consequences for the environment and hence 
sustainable development. Barbier (2005) suggests that the reasons for this negative 
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consequence on the environment by the poor are not the obvious ones but rather are due 
to the anomalies of resource dependence and economic underperformance as well as the 
glaring inequalities faced by poorer households which forces them to live on marginal 
lands and degrade frontier territories. Inequality of opportunities for poorer households 
tends to manifest itself through their lack of ability to compete with wealthier households 
in land markets, lack of property rights to sustain ownership in frontier lands (also related 
to lack of access to formal credit markets) and poorer households’ inability to influence 
resource management policies that are favourable to them.   
 
The lack of access to formal credit markets tends to play an important role in this 
relationship. Their inability to access credit means that poorer households are unable to 
invest in more productive inputs and are unable to secure property rights to their land, 
meaning that they are currently forced to move to frontier and marginal lands leading to 
more environmental degradation. Unequal distribution of assets or endowments has been 
shown to play a crucial role in whether or not citizens of an economy have their basic 
needs met. Thus as Dasgupta (1993) confirms, if there is a significant proportion of the 
population that are assetless then markets on their own would be incapable of providing 
people with an adequate diet. Dasgupta (1993) refers to this phenomenon as ‘economic 
disenfranchisement’ or the inability to participate in the labour market, and suggests that 
it is a direct result of inequitable distribution of assets in the economy. By consequence, 
this economic disenfranchisement leads more and more of the assetless poor to exploit 
common property natural resources, which leads to overexploitation of environmental 
resources and problems of land degradation in marginal frontier lands. Thus inequalities 
manifest in limited education, inadequate institutional and physical infrastructure, 
inefficiencies in labour, land and financial markets means that poorer households are 
forced to rely on less productive forms of agriculture on ever-increasing marginal lands 
to eke out a livelihood. So lack of outside economic opportunities particularly in the 
labour markets may exasperate the problem of environmental degradation and hence 
sustainable development. Although this is important for sustainability, the impact that the 
poor might have on the environment or the impact that the environment has on life 
outcomes of the poor, have not been explicitly measured in this thesis. Only in chapter 
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six when resource rents are traced through the economy to help understand which income 
groups benefit from non-renewable resource exploitation in Trinidad and Tobago are 
these links indirectly examined. 
 
What are some of the reasons driving perverse outcomes in resource abundant countries 
and why are many poorer household not benefitting from resource exploitation? 
 
2.6.3 Political Economy considerations and the peculiarities of the Caribbean 
Economy 
 
Transformation of resource abundant countries like Trinidad and Tobago into sustainable 
economies requires more than just an understanding of the prerequisite economic 
conditions.  This transformation also requires an understanding of the political economic 
inertias that might be present.  Some of these have been hinted at previously, however 
Caribbean theorists have also provided narrations that are specific to the Caribbean 
context.  These and other relevant theories are reviewed in the following section. 
The English speaking Caribbean has a unique history and a commonality that stems from 
its past, in particular the plantation economic system that the region’s inhabitants have 
inherited from their colonial past.  Beckford (1972)13 speaks of the misallocation or 
resources in plantation economies which for various reasons lead to the underutilisation 
of resources alongside under consumption and poverty.  There is an inherent problem in 
plantation economies where land owners monopolise land to deprive the majority of 
workers access to independent livelihoods which ensures a supply of labour for the 
plantations.  However, the nature of plantation work is such that labour cannot be fully 
utilised all of the time.  This combined with the land monopoly situation prohibits 
independent work by labourers.  This therefore leads to a situation where there is limited 
economic advancement for the majority of people; leading to under consumption and 
perpetual poverty.  The plantation economy therefore leads to the following 
diseconomies: 
1. Persistent and expanding unemployment 
                                                 
13 Republished in 2005. 
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2. Relatively low levels of national income 
3. A most unequal distribution of what income is produced 
4. Gross underutilisation of land and  
5. Extreme under consumption generally. 
 
 For Beckford, unemployment and underutilisation of land are structural phenomena of 
the system and are areas that should be focussed on more, when under employment and 
unemployment are being analysed across developing countries.  So the usual explanations 
of unemployment; low economic growth, high population growth or low absorptive 
capacity of industry to name a few are according to Beckford superficial explanations.  
Beckford asks the question of why do people in plantation economies have nothing better 
to do with their time even when their consumption falls short of what is desirable from 
their point of view and why is peasant agricultural productivity low even though they 
aspire to higher incomes?   The plantation system ensures that the supply of resources is 
structurally unadjusted to the demand for their use.   Thus the supply of land is largely 
limited to the small planter class and the demand for the use of the land is concentrated 
among the landless peasant class.  Likewise the demand for labour resides with the 
planter class and the supply of labour is with the peasant class.  Thus the structure of the 
plantation economy leads to low productivity levels among the peasant class since they 
are denied an opportunity to exercise their managerial and entrepreneurial abilities due to 
the lack of available land and capital.  For Beckford, there is excessive entrepreneurship 
in the peasant sector since there was evidence that productivity was respectable although 
they cultivated marginal land with limited capital.  Because of these structural 
deficiencies in plantation economies even policies that aim to provide credit and to 
modernise the peasant farming sector will fail since additional capital inputs will yield 
close to zero return on the poor quality of land then held by peasants. Furthermore in 
plantation economies, government policies are geared to maintaining the status quo.  
Subsidies provided by the government tend to help the rich and inflict social costs on 
those least able to afford it, Beckford (1972). Although Beckford’s work on the 
plantation economy referred to colonies around the world before they gained 
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independence, Demas (1971)14 found that many of the structural characteristics of the 
plantation economy were maintained after independence particularly in the English 
speaking Caribbean.  Demas therefore thought that per capita income growth was an 
insufficient measure of development.  He therefore articulated a distinction between 
growth and development; arguing that neither growth nor development can be defined in 
‘value free’ technical terms.  For Demas economic growth can only be measured if we 
make certain assumptions about income distribution, since it is distribution of income 
that determines the relative prices associated with the weights to be attached to different 
goods and services making up national product.  For Demas, development does not only 
mean growth, but economic growth that is driven from within a country and growth that 
results in economic diversification and interdependence between industrial sectors and 
domestic activities.  This issue is examined further for Trinidad and Tobago in chapter 
six. 
 
Demas also goes further and adds three other elements that are important for 
development;  
1. A satisfactory level of employment, 
2. A fairly equal distribution of income and  
3. The greatest possible participation by the people of the country in the economy. 
Institutional and attitudinal deficiencies tend to negate against transformation in the 
English speaking Caribbean.  For Demas, reliance on international corporations for 
investment and development is a flawed paradigm.  Penetration of international 
corporations into key sectors of underdeveloped countries leads to growth accompanied 
by continued underdevelopment, Demas (1971).  These corporations tend to be located in 
key sectors and control the use and allocation of the resources of the economy and 
integrating it into a worldwide production and distribution of goods.  This domination by 
international corporations leads to cramped economic initiative and entrepreneurship, 
                                                 
14 Republished in 2005. 
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forward and backward linkages are not created and inappropriate capital intensive 
technology is used ensuring that the country fails to develop its own technology or that it 
fails to adapt imported techniques to wages and salaries levels that are unrelated to 
productivity in other sectors of the economy.  Demas also identified the trade union 
movement as engaging in activities that while represented the struggle for economic 
emancipation they also restricted the capacity of employment opportunities by inhibiting 
agricultural and rural development by bidding up wages in all sectors without consequent 
increases in productivity.  The mass media was also identified by Demas as an institution 
that needed reforming if there was to be meaningful development in the English speaking 
Caribbean.  For Demas since the mass media was an instrument for selling 
“metropolitan” goods, they were vehicles for promoting foreign tastes and therefore 
fostering a lack of backward and forward linkages in the economy.  The fourth 
institutional failure according to Demas refers to the educational system, that although it 
produces high literacy rates, it produces graduates that have an orientation to the 
metropolitan and not toward the local environment, who shy away from agriculture and 
self-employment. For Demas there is as much a problem with what is taught and how it is 
taught, which leads to; not necessarily to the lack of the wrong skills but the incorrect 
values.  At the bottom, the educational system fails to impart a new value system 
appropriate to a society seeking economic and cultural independence, Demas (1971).  
Birdsall et al (2001) have also alluded to this wider problem in resource abundant 
countries and why education becomes a consumption good and not investment, which 
leads to a breakdown in the virtuous circle of development.  This theory and the 
educational system in Trinidad and Tobago are examined further in chapter 5, when 
human capital estimates are provided. However, for Birdsall et al. (2001), education 
expenditure by the political class is seen as a means of appeasing the masses in resource 
abundant countries.  Blanket spending on education without regard for the quality of the 
education being taught is meant to be like an insurance against discontent by those in 
society who might feel that they are not receiving their fair share of resource rents. 
Education therefore becomes a consumptive good and is not seen as investment for the 
future since the incentives for a good education are not available such as adequate well-
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paid jobs.  This together with Dutch Disease effects lead to a break down in the 
developmental virtuous circle, see chapter five. 
Demas also postulated that the history of a country tends to lead to certain attitudes and 
values which influence the behaviour of people as producers and consumers.  This also 
tends to influence government’s perception of problems and opportunities.  This mixture 
leads to a peculiar Caribbean attitude towards consumption and production which hinders 
independent economic development.  This attitude leads first and foremost to consumer 
tastes that are aligned to those in metropolitan countries particularly in North America.  
This tends to weaken balance of payments and reduces the potential for capital formation.  
This can also lead to unrest as the rural and urban dispossessed seek to emulate the 
consumption patterns of richer households.  For Demas this was an interesting problem 
since economic growth could only be achieved through progressive integration of the 
economy into the North American economy.  Thus Caribbean people were trying the 
emulate the consumption and production patterns of the North American economy 
without understanding that the consumption patterns of the American economy were not 
only a technical necessity of the functioning of that country’s economic system but also 
‘the product of centuries of hard work derived from the Puritan ethic’, Demas (1971).  
This overall problem of attitude has a particularly crippling effect on the production side 
and hampers overall productivity. For Demas the economic alienation of some workers is 
derived from historical and cultural factors such as colonialism and slavery and the 
control of savings by international corporations.  This therefore leads to a situation where 
some workers do not see work as something that benefits one’s self, one’s family or one’s 
country but rather ‘work’ means toiling for someone else’s benefit.  This lack of Puritan 
ethic and the premium placed by lower income groups on a lack of steady effort led 
Demas to comment at the time that the Co-operative could be a relevant instrument of 
economic organisation.  Interestingly Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) in their work on the 
benefits of equality have also suggested the merits of Co-operatives as vehicles for 
greater equality albeit in more advanced economies. 
Many of these political economic problems become magnified in petroleum type 
economies as discussed by Seers (1964).  A normal feature of petroleum economies is the 
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fast rise in exports as the price of crude oil rises and the relative inelastic demand for 
energy in importing markets.  Thus wage increases in the primary sector can be conceded 
by the exploiting companies since labour costs are a small component of overall costs.  
However, as wages in the petroleum sector rise, unions in other sectors also seek higher 
wages and in an expanding economy, neither the government nor other domestic 
producers offer any great resistance.  Therefore the impetus of rising exports is absorbed 
mainly by higher wages by those already in employment rather than an increase in 
employment. As rural folk move to the cities in search of work attracted by higher wages, 
disguised unemployment becomes real.  However, real wage rates become high by 
international standards and the relative productivity of the workforce.  This aggravates 
the problem of unemployment as imports become relatively cheaper.  Income inequality 
rises as only part of the population benefits from the boom.  For Seers, the usual policy 
prescriptions were not available such as devaluation since many sections of society who 
are politically powerful are opposed to devaluation.  This includes the employed, 
importers and shopkeepers.  While industrialists who might favour devaluation are weak 
since their income is relatively small compared to the primary sector.  Thus in petroleum 
economies, many of these problems do not show up immediately as balance of payment 
crises but rather as unemployment, Seers (1964).   
Many of these problems eventually manifest themselves as growth collapses particularly 
if the price of the resource falls and expenditures that were agreed to during boom times 
are ‘sticky’ and difficult to reduce when revenues begin to fall off, Auty (2001) and Auty 
and Kiiski (2001). 
The underperformance of resource abundant countries and the subsequent inequality 
within these societies are therefore intrinsically linked to political economy. Van der 
Ploeg (2011)  suggests that countries with a large share of primary exports in GNP have 
bad growth records and high inequality, see also Auty and Evia (2001), Auty and Gelb 
(2001) and Auty (2001).  While this is not a new conclusion some of the reasons 
articulated by van der Ploeg are.  He suggests that negative genuine savings rates of 
resource abundant countries are as a result of poor institutions, badly functioning capital 
markets, corruption or the anticipation of better times.  It is this anticipation of better 
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times that can induce negative saving rates.  Van der Ploeg, finds that a nation saves less 
if it expects world interest rates or the price of the resource to increase in the future. The 
country saves less and postpones extraction.  The nation also saves less if it expects 
advances in extraction technology.  In cases where extraction costs are close to zero and 
the resource price follows the Hotelling rule, the country should save marginal rents less 
the imputed interest on the value of natural resource reserves, this sustains a constant 
level of consumption.  For van der Ploeg (2011) countries with abundant resources and 
where resource rents are less than the imputed rent on the value of the resource reserves, 
these countries should run current account deficits.  Therefore the problems of political 
economy and the perceived values of imputed rents in relation to better times means that 
achieving sustainable development and greater equality requires more than simple 
savings rules and policy fixes, it also requires the shifting of attitudes and the promotion 
of productive and shared ownership organisations such as Co-operatives to provide the 
correct incentives for educational investment among the poor, see also chapter 5.  I return 
to many of these themes and additional literature in subsequent chapters. 
 
                      
2.7 Lesson from the Literature Review and Concluding Remarks 
The literature review on the definitions and economics of sustainable development has 
shown that there is disagreement about what is meant by ‘sustainable development’ and 
therefore what is important for achieving this. It is immediately apparent that the concept 
of sustainable development is not new, but the definitions and what is important for 
achieving it is still ambiguous. However, sustainable development seems to be focused 
primarily on the welfare of future generations without explicit concern for the welfare of 
current generations. Of course, the economists’ definition of non-declining welfare 
implies that current welfare is important since we would like to maintain this into the 
future. Although the welfare of the current generation is implied in the definitions, there 
is very little to suggest that we may need to lift the welfare of some members of the 
current generation or those living in poverty today. It is very difficult for some societies 
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to invest for the future if a significant proportion of the current generation is living in 
poverty and subsequently have high discount rates. 
 
There are disagreements about how societies could achieve sustainable development and 
the two major approaches are the capital approach and the rights-based approach to 
sustainable development. By proposing the capital approach to sustainable development, 
some economists argue that, ultimately, welfare is associated with the ‘interest’ earned 
from its wealth, i.e. the capital imbedded within society. Thus for sustainability to occur 
(not guaranteed), each generation should leave a set of wealth or assets that would allow 
future generations to sustain their wellbeing. Those opposing the capital approach to 
sustainable development have argued that a rights-based approach is more practical, that 
each generation should have a right to certain forms of capital thus ensuring that 
sustainability occurs.  
 
Similarly, there are disagreements between those advocating weak sustainability or the 
substitutability of assets and those who suggest that substitution is not possible or the 
strong sustainability approach. All of the intellectual positions have merit and seem to 
apply at different stages of development paths as well as to different assets. It is easy to 
conceive that there are critical forms of capital that provide services that could never be 
replicated in full by other forms of capital. These may include localised capital, such as 
ecosystem services provided by ridge to reef watersheds e.g. flood protection and habitat 
maintenance. There may also be globalised forms of critical capital, such as the earth’s 
atmosphere which helps to regulate the global climate. Just as important as critical natural 
capital, there may be some forms of critical social and human capital, which may include 
the rule of law, property rights and an educated workforce. It is possible that some 
societies may experience unsustainable development if there has been insufficient 
investment in critical forms of social and human capital, even though there was 
substantial investment in man-made and natural capital. This has been alluded to by 
Pearce (1997). 
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Since there is merit to each reviewed definition of sustainable development, it is 
conceivable that the development path that provides the greatest probability of 
sustainable development is one that allows for adequate investment in all forms of capital 
and that places special emphasis on critical forms of capital which are both unique to 
individual societies and shared among all (“global commons”). This definition allows us 
to also focus on the ‘rights’ of future generations, since we will ensure that critical forms 
of capital are left intact for the benefit of their livelihoods and welfare. However, another 
emphasis should also be on raising the welfare of the least well-off in contemporary 
society. This would be quite pertinent to Solow’s argument that, for some countries, 
welfare maintenance is an insufficient goal of sustainable development; there needs to be 
an increasing level of welfare. Therefore, sustainable development should also focus on 
inequality within society and of raising the welfare of the marginalised within society. It 
also seems to be an issue that is ignored in the mainstream definitions of sustainable 
economic development. Unless this is explicitly stated in the sustainable development 
definition, we are at risk of having development that is unequal and even confirming that 
poverty is sustainable.  
 
Additionally, recent estimates of genuine savings (GS) rates by the World Bank in 2006 
and 2011, build on the work done by Pearce and Atkinson (1993) and Hamilton (1994). 
The results show that GS rates vary by country and region. The GS rates can also be used 
as a useful policy tool, particularly as an indicator of sustainability and to incorporate 
environmental and resource issues in a manner understandable by finance ministers. It is 
evident that resource-rich countries have the potential to achieve sustainable development 
if resource rents are invested wisely. However, too many countries and governments are 
not reinvesting sufficiently. 
 
Some criticisms of GS have already been presented. However, as an indicator of 
sustainability it lacks a connection with intragenerational equity, in particular poverty 
reduction in the current period as well as implicit assumptions or measures that show that 
some assets are unsubstitutable. Perhaps many of these issues that are overlooked by GS 
are preordained by the definition of sustainability which it satisfies. This is an area of the 
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literature which can be built on since GS is an excellent starting point, but its social 
relevance must be improved if it is to be taken seriously by decision makers. 
   
Previously, it was made clear that sustainable development would necessitate the 
investment or maintenance of ‘critical capital’. The point has been reemphasised by 
Dasgupta (2008) when he speaks about a country’s inclusive wealth and the 
heterogeneous nature of similar assets depending on location and prevailing economic 
circumstances.  Thus sustainable development will be location specific but more 
importantly will depend on where along the development path the country may be. 
 
However, Maler’s thought-provoking thesis on substitution may yet signal that further 
refinements to user cost approaches may also be needed. User cost estimates provide 
policy makers with useful guidance on what should be invested for the future from the 
current use of the natural resource. If we need to compensate future generations for non-
use of the resource, we must be clear about what services are currently provided by the 
resource so we can be sure what substitution is required. Understanding the true value of 
the resource’s input in the social utility function would therefore be critical to 
understanding what compensation would be required and hence what level of user cost 
would be acceptable. Where poverty exists in the current generation, current use of 
resource rents to alleviate poverty might increase the probability that the welfare of future 
generations would ultimately be higher.  
 
The ‘dualism within dualism’ concept put forward by Barbier shows clearly that the 
assetless poor (rural) are dependent on frontier land conversion or outside economic 
opportunities for sustenance. If the outside economic opportunities are not available then 
they are forced to overexploit available natural resources, migrate to other areas (perhaps 
urban) or move to ‘frontier’ regions. This bizarre situation tends to exist in many 
resource-dependent low and middle income economies because of inappropriate policies 
that foster rent-seeking behaviour and ensure that resource rents benefit mainly the 
wealthier households of society and do not contribute towards sustained economic 
growth or poverty alleviation. It is therefore likely that sustainable development will be 
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hampered because of inequality in opportunities and the particular problems faced by the 
assetless poor. While a combination of policies are required to deal with this problem, a 
concerted effort is required to reduce inequalities and poverty and to improve 
opportunities for the poor, which may include increasing their access to and acquisition 
of assets. Dealing explicitly with inequality may have a very direct impact on a society’s 
ability to attain sustainable development. The research on SAMs and sustainable 
livelihoods also project similar concerns for the poor.  
 
These complex interactions between the poor and the environment therefore dispute other 
theoretical connections between affluence and the environment, which include the 
concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which suggests an inverted ‘U’ 
relationship between some environmental ‘bads’ and economic growth. However, the 
evidence from the above may suggest that changes in policies such as internalisation of 
externalities, fostering property rights for the poor and removal of harmful subsidies 
could change the relationship between levels of income (economic growth) and levels of 
environmental degradation.
15
 However, disputing the EKC hypothesis and other similar 
theories does not imply that growth is not needed for sustainable development, but rather 
it should be pro-poor and resource efficient and ensure that benefits are equitably 
distributed. 
 
It is clear that resource-based economic development by its nature can lead to many 
economic problems for these types of economies. The problems are typical of the Dutch 
Disease and Resource Curse phenomenon where resource boom revenues can lead to 
massive fiscal and inflationary pressures. These inflationary pressures, in turn, can make 
domestic manufacturing and their exports uncompetitive. This may lead to labour and 
entrepreneurs moving away from innovative industries and into rent-seeking activities 
which become more profitable during resource booms (Auty, 2007). Seers (1964) has 
also indicated that higher wages in the resource sector, particularly in petroleum 
exporting countries, leads to the request for higher wages from workers in other sectors 
of the economy, which in turn fuels inflation and its negative consequences on export 
                                                 
15 Assessment of the Beckerman (1992) hypothesis also leads to similar conclusions. 
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competitiveness. Despite these problems, Botswana in southern Africa, a resource-based 
economy, has been able to implement many fiscal and other governmental policies to 
help deal with excessive revenues during resource booms. These policies, which include 
expenditure controls, sterilisation of excessive foreign exchange revenue in offshore 
accounts as well as strict parliamentary approval for government projects, have been 
proven to help reduce possible Dutch Disease impacts in Botswana. However, while the 
fiscal measures have been successful and Botswana invests in other types of capital to 
satisfy the Solow and Hartwick rules of reinvestment and improves its genuine savings 
rate, the country has intolerable inequalities in terms of poverty and unemployment 
(Sarraf and Jiwanji, (2001) and Barbier, (2005). Lange and Wright (2003) have indicated 
that in the mid-1990s approximately 38% of households lived in poverty
16
 and Table 2.1 
showed that half of the population lived in rural areas and 30–50% of the population 
lived on fragile landscapes. 
 
Botswana undoubtedly has economic success but structural imbalances exist, such as its 
reliance on public sector investment and ill-fated attempts of government investment in 
agriculture; Lange & Wright, (2003) and Barbier, (2005). Since agricultural employment 
accounts for 70% of the labour force, there will be significant implications for welfare as 
indicated by the statistics shown above. While Botswana has managed to avoid the 
‘resource curse’, it still possesses the characteristics of Barbier’s ‘dualism with dualism’, 
which is worrying to say the least and suggests that inequality should be considered a 
vital sign of sustainable development. Lop-sided development that may have economic 
success but where the benefits, particularly the benefits associated with resource rents, 
are not shared evenly, should be a concern for policy makers wanting to provide their 
societies and countries with the best opportunity for achieving sustainable development. 
Achieving the UN’s MDGs, where poverty reduction is essential, means that our current 
measures of sustainable development (SD) that ignore the problems for SD emanating 
from unequal rights, access and opportunities may indeed be portraying an incomplete 
picture of SD.  Poverty on its own is simply a symptom of inequality. Therefore, the 
                                                 
16 Equivalent to 47% of the population living in poverty. 
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essential challenge for this thesis is how to include inequality reduction as a central 
component of SD. 
 
It seems that most mainstream definitions of sustainable development and subsequent 
attempts to measure it ignore the challenges of intragenerational equity and the possible 
impact this can have on intergenerational equity. Thus even for a country like Botswana 
with a relatively good genuine savings record, suggesting that it is on a sustainable 
development path but at the same time having relatively high income inequality and 
unemployment is an odd description of success. Therefore the current definitions and 
measures of sustainable development would suggest that poverty, income inequality and 
unemployment are sustainable.   
 
Even the measures of user costs associated with the current use of natural resources 
attempt to only measure costs incurred by future generations with little or no relevance or 
connection to the prevailing social conditions. As a result, as with the measures of 
sustainable development, user costs measures have no link to intragenerational equity and 
to the needs of the least well-off in current generations.  
 
Thus since the implication (intentionally or not) is that poverty is indeed sustainable, 
these measures ignore the three pillars of sustainable development; economic, 
environmental and social longevity and fairness, put forward by the Brundtland report 
(1987) and Pearce (1993). Many of the mainstream measures of sustainable development 
are based around the capital basis approach with an implicit assumption of weak 
sustainability i.e. the substitution of different forms of capital for one another. However, 
it is abundantly clear that some forms of capital, particularly some natural and social 
capital, have no substitutes. Thus as Maler (2007) suggests, there are some resources that 
have no substitutes in consumption or the consumption utility function. Therefore, if the 
good being produced by the unsubstitutable resource has no substitutes in the 
consumption utility function then there can be no substitute for these factors. 
 
61 
 
Political economy implications particularly among resource abundant economies are also 
important to consider if we are to provide meaningful solutions to these problems.  
Sustainability rules that do not account for political considerations such as policies that 
favour the wealthy or well connected, the breakdown in the virtuous circle associated 
with educational incentives and the inadequate outcomes of current institutions are bound 
to lead to inadequate outcomes. 
 
A revised definition of sustainable development and subsequent measure must therefore 
explicitly state that some forms of capital have no substitutes and should receive stable 
investment flows to ensure their sustainability. It seems to follow that if some forms of 
capital are critical, then future and current generations should be entitled to or have 
entitlements as a right. Thus if we are concerned that we have no less entitlements 
enjoyed by the current generation for the next, we should also be seeking to improve the 
allocation of the least well-off in the current generation as this would imply that we are 
leaving a better world for the next generation. As a result, sustainable development in 
developing economies dependent on natural resource exploitation must invest in the 
welfare of the least well-off in society to be assured that these societies leave economies 
and environmental assets that are better for future generations. This fits in well with 
Solow’s notion that sustainability is hardly a useful concept for developing countries, and 
that we should be striving for welfare improvements along the way, particularly where 
poverty levels may be high. In instances where discount rates may be high and thus 
saving for future generations seems to be a luxury and thus avoided, a policy of reducing 
income inequality and poverty may thus reduce discount rates making investments for the 
future more viable.  Sustainable development must also account for political economy 
inertias that could easily reverse initial policy gains. 
 
A derived definition of sustainable development would be: Sustainable development is 
current status dependent; it depends on where the particular society is on the 
development path. Sustainable development means that welfare is dependent on all forms 
of capital, but there should be greater emphasis on investing in ‘critical’ capital which is 
unique to each society and ‘critical’ capital that is of global importance. Equitable 
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distribution of the proceeds from development is also important for development, thus a 
reduction in numbers of the marginalised within contemporary society is important if we 
are to ensure that the welfare of all members of future society have a right to a 
meaningful life. Political economy inertias must also be reformed in order to maintain 
the sustainability outcomes.  
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Chapter Three: Natural Resource Depletion and 
user costs 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the sustainability of the rate of extraction of non-renewable 
resources in T&T. To do this, rents as defined below are measured as well as the user 
costs or depletion estimates associated with this extraction. 
 
Accounting for user costs is an important economic factor in determining the 
sustainability of current resource extraction patterns along with the fiscal regime 
associated with the resource and the use of the revenue emanating from the exploitation 
of the resource.  Estimating user costs or “Hotelling rent” is also known as “depletion” 
costs. This assumes that non-renewable resources are an important asset for the economy 
and therefore its depletion, while contributing to consumption also contributes to asset 
depreciation or user costs. According to the Hartwick rule, estimating depletion gives 
policy makers an indication of sustainability since it is important that savings or 
investments match the level of depletion if the economy is to be on a sustainable path. 
Therefore, over a set period of time, usually a year, the reason for estimating depletion is 
to provide evidence about the rate of extraction, the amount of resource stock remaining 
and what proportion of revenues or rents associated with the extraction could be safely 
consumed and what proportion should be reinvested or saved to ensure that the 
economy’s total wealth is non-declining due to the extraction of the resource. 
 
Depletion estimates are integral to assessing whether a country is on a sustainable 
development path.  For many natural resources dependent countries it is an integral 
component of genuine savings since it is a measure which determines how much of a 
country’s natural resources have depreciated over the course of one year. A review of the 
methodologies used to estimate depletion is given in section 3.2.  Besides being able to 
measure user costs or depletion correctly, another important problem that policy makers 
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must deal with is the insufficient reinvestment of user costs in many resource abundant 
economies.  Thus the Genuine saving estimates calculated by the World Bank (2006), 
shows that countries with a high percentage of mineral and energy rents in GNI, also 
have lower genuine saving rates.  Thus as Van der Ploeg (2011) states, many resource 
rich countries become poorer each year despite the presence of large natural resources. 
For example, Nigeria and Angola which are heavily dependent on natural resources have 
genuine savings of minus 30 per cent. This signals that these countries are impoverishing 
future generations despite having some economic growth. This is also true for the 
Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Thus many 
countries are consuming too much of their natural resource rents rather than reinvesting 
the rents in alternative forms of productive assets. A positive saving rate takes on even 
greater significance in the face of population growth.  Van der Ploeg (2011) argues that 
countries with population growth can have positive genuine saving rates but wealth per 
capita still declines.   These countries therefore need to create new wealth to maintain 
existing levels of wealth per capita.  Many countries because there is significant depletion 
of their natural resource stock are facing substantial saving gaps, which usually range 
from 10 to 50 per cent of GNP. For Nigeria and Congo the savings gap is as high as 71 
per cent and 110 per cent respectively, Van der Ploeg (2011). 
 
Admittedly saving alone might be insufficient. Gelb (1988) found that during the periods 
after the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979, six oil producing countries including Trinidad 
and Tobago, Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria and Venezuela invested about half of 
the windfalls domestically, but this did not stop prolonged periods of exchange rate 
appreciation and negative growth.  What the rents are invested in is also important and so 
many of these early mistakes were due to governments investing in socially undesirable 
public investment projects.  Van der Ploeg (2011) however, suggests that even without 
poor public investment decisions it might be optimal for resource abundant countries to 
save less than their resource rents if world resource prices are expected to increase and 
there are anticipated improvements in exploration technology.  He calls this the 
‘anticipation of better times’ and says that this might also induce negative savings.  Van 
der Ploeg (2011) models this process and finds that like the Hotelling rule, marginal 
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resource rents must increase at a rate equal to the world interest rate.  Likewise an 
anticipated positive rate of increase in the world resource price or in the rate of technical 
progress in extraction technology induces resource depletion to be postponed.  He finds 
that resource abundant countries will exhaust their resources slowly if interest rates are 
low and the rate of increase in the world price is high.  His results suggest that marginal 
resource rents which are measured as the world resource price minus the marginal cost of 
extraction are saved, so that depletion of natural reserves must be compensated by 
increases in foreign assets.  The anticipation of better times in his model suggests that the 
nation saves less if it expects the interest rate or the price of the resource to increase in 
the future.  The nation saves less and postpones extraction.  The nation also saves less if 
it expects positive technical progress in extraction technology.  Saving marginal resource 
rents minus imputed interest on the value of natural resource reserves can sustain a 
constant level of consumption, Van der Ploeg (2011).  The catch line here is that 
countries with abundant reserves of exhaustible resources should run current account 
deficits if resource rents are less than the imputed rent on the value of the resource 
reserves, this leads to a negative genuine savings rate, Van der Ploeg (2011).  Thus 
countries with large natural resource reserves should save less than a country with almost 
no reserves because it makes sense to sell more of the reserves in the future when the 
price will be higher.  Thus for Van der Ploeg (2011) he is unclear if negative genuine 
saving rates are due to poor institutions, badly functioning capital markets, corruption, 
general mismanagement or anticipation of better times. 
 
Thus political economy considerations of user costs are also very important to 
understanding this.  For a county like Trinidad and Tobago with relatively  low level  of 
resource reserves, particularly of natural gas since the country began exporting liquefied 
natural gas in 1999, it is important to understand the level of user costs and what the 
country should be saving to help maintain per capita wealth and to boost sustainable 
growth. 
 
In addition to the reasons put forward by Van der Ploeg, political economy and the need 
to appease voters could also be a major reason why resources are depleted quickly.  
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Seers’ theory on MOPE suggests that governments and companies push for quick 
extraction to boost revenues to spend on wages and inefficient public investments.  If 
however, we are concerned with sustainability in a resource abundant country, knowing 
how much of the resource has depreciated throughout the course of one period is 
important.  Knowing this depreciation provides an indication of the amount that re must 
be reinvested to maintain future consumption.  This also begins the process of 
understanding why insufficient rents are reinvested. 
There are many approaches to estimating depletion. However, the literature on depletion 
is ambiguous about which methodology is correct, since they all give different levels of 
estimates. This chapter therefore examines depletion estimates for T&T’s natural gas and 
oil exploitation using a variety of methodologies. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief review of what are rents, including a review of Ricardian 
and Hotelling rents. A review of depletion methodologies then follows along with a 
discussion about the suitability of the different methodologies. Estimates of depletion for 
T&T using four depletion estimate methodologies are then provided. Estimates of 
depletion in three other countries; the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Barbados and 
Indonesia are also calculated as comparators for T&T. The chapter then ends with a look 
at alternative measures of wealth and welfare to gauge how these countries are comparing 
and whether depletion and the use of the revenues from depletion are having any impacts 
on these alternative indicators. 
3.1 What are rents? 
The production and sale of commodities, in particular mineral and hydrocarbon 
commodities, can be marginally profitable and at times can be very profitable. Profits 
referred to here are revenues less costs. This profitability of mines tends to raise 
questions about how these riches associated with natural resources should be distributed, 
particularly when they are based on a country’s geology. According to Otto et al. (2006), 
these issues are closely related to the economist’s concepts of economic rents, equity and 
their distribution. 
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Here, economic rents refer to payments or monetary returns to the owners of factors of 
production that will not alter their economic behaviour. Typically, firms earn rents when 
the prices they receive for the goods or services that they produce exceed the price that 
initially attracted them to the industry or the price that allows them to maintain their level 
of output. Therefore, economic rent is the difference between the price that is actually 
paid and the price that would have to be paid in order for the good or service to be 
produced, Stiglitz (1996). Economic rent may also be referred to as the price that is over 
and above the reservation price that owners of the goods or services are willing to accept, 
or the difference between an existing market price for a commodity and its opportunity 
cost (Otto et al., 2006). 
 
Since economic rent is a surplus, Cordes (1995) suggests that this additional financial 
return is not required to motivate desired economic behaviour. For Cordes (1995), this 
implies that the issue of economic rent is one of distribution and not resource allocation. 
Therefore, all rents could be taxed away and this would not alter the pattern of 
consumption or production.  Cordes (1995) highlights the fact that owners would still get 
acceptable returns so output and consumption levels would not change since producers 
are unable to shift the tax burden under competitive conditions. 
 
3.1.1 Ricardian rent 
 
One type of economic rent is Ricardian rents, named after the British economist David 
Ricardo, who wrote about rents in the 19th century. Ricardo wrote about agricultural 
production and population growth to highlight the fact that more fertile soil will attract 
economic rents as less fertile tracts of land are brought into production as population 
grows.  For Ricardo, the most fertile tracts of land are cultivated first. However, as 
population grows, less fertile tracts of land must be cultivated in order to feed the 
growing population. Prices must therefore rise in order to cover the costs of production 
on the least productive land. As a result, the owners of the most productive land will 
enjoy economic rents, or what is now referred to as Ricardian rents. It is easy to see that 
mineral mines or oil wells may also be ranked according to production costs and hence 
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the level of Ricardian rents they accrue. Economic rents or, by extension Ricardian rents, 
are ‘gifts’ to which the recipients contributed nothing, particularly when it is associated 
with mineral deposits. Thus Ricardian rents are used to justify special taxes on mining 
(Otto et al., 2006).
17 
 Figure 2.1 shows the different types of rents that make up Ricardian 
rents. Costs represented by OCb are the minimum variable costs associated with this 
mine. As long as price is at or above this, the mine managers have an incentive to keep 
the mine open at least in the short run. If price is at P2, then the mine is earning 
substantial Ricardian rents, which according to Tilton (2004), can be divided into three 
categories: 
 Quasi-rents reflect the mine’s costs of capital and other fixed inputs; these exist in 
the short run. If the mine does not recover its cost of capital and a competitive rate 
of return, it will not invest for the long run and will cease to operate in the long 
run. 
 Other rents are created for a number of reasons including business cycle 
fluctuations in the price, which provide additional rents in the short term. 
However, these rents are required to offset low prices and revenues during 
recessions. 
 Pure rents occur since the mine is exploiting a low-cost or high-quality deposit, 
when compared to the marginal mine (which may have higher costs as per 
Ricardo’s explanation). It is argued that pure rents can be taxed away without 
distorting impacts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Otto et al. (2006) also refer to long run rents (the difference between price and average costs) which may 
be different to short run rents. Therefore, taxation methods need to be aware of this to ensure sustainability 
of the mine. 
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Figure 3.1 Rent categories associated with a mine 
Price/Costs
P2
Pure Rent
Other Rent
Cb Quasi rent
Government's share of rent
Minimum possible variable costs
0
Mine Capacity  
 
Source: Tilton (2004) 
 
 
 
3.1.2 User costs, Hotelling rent and scarcity rent 
 
Harold Hotelling, writing in 1931, referred to the opportunity cost that firms incur while 
mining for mineral commodities. Due to the non-renewable nature of mineral resources, 
producing an additional unit of output today reduces the amount of output that is 
available for production at a later date. Hotelling identified the opportunity cost as the net 
present value of future profits that are lost because mineral resources are reduced by an 
additional unit of output. This is commonly referred to as “scarcity rent”, “user costs” or 
“Hotelling rent”. Therefore, if prices do not cover user costs plus current costs of 
production, the owners of the mine will have an incentive to leave the mineral in the 
ground for future use (when prices should have risen). User costs are true costs and not 
economic rents. Therefore, according to Otto et al. (2006), their confiscation may alter 
economic behaviour and lead to undesirable outcomes. It is perhaps worthy to note that 
user costs may have more of a social significance than a private one, hence empirical 
evidence suggests that most mine managers take little account of it when making 
decisions about extraction. Some studies have even suggested that user costs are 
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negligible and may never enter the decision-making matrix, or should not be considered a 
goal of revenue capture mechanisms. 
 
3.2  Depletion estimate methodologies 
The literature on depletion has resulted in many different methodologies for estimating 
the monetary value of depletion when a country’s exhaustible natural resources are 
exploited or taken out of the ground. These depletion estimate methodologies are now 
discussed. 
 
Recent literature by Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) provides some useful analysis about 
the practicalities of valuing natural assets and in particular subsoil assets, an area that is 
integral to the sustainable development debate, since the value of these asset bases and 
their depletion is critical.  
 
The present value of economic profits over the life of the resource is the asset value and 
depreciation should be measured as user cost. Atkinson and Hamilton claim that if there 
were markets for these values then they would be observed in market transactions, but 
since most subsoil assets are owned by governments and contracted out to companies 
who pay royalties to the owners, these market transactions cannot be observed. However, 
it is not clear that even these market prices or transactions would provide the right 
accounting prices or shadow prices to accurately measure scarcity or provide the right 
signals for sustainability. Nonetheless, their overview of the different approaches to 
measuring user costs is useful and provides an insight on the relative pros and cons of 
each. 
 
Estimating user costs 
 
If there is a homogenous resource discovered in a single deposit of known extent, 
furthermore, if the resource will be exploited over N+1 years and there is extraction 
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quantity, qi, extraction costs C(qi) and a constant discount rate r, then the value, V, of the 
resource is the present value of the sequence of profits, 
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c(qi) is economic cost of extraction in period i, which includes a normal return on 
investment.  Thus, total stock, St, is: 
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The user costs to be deducted from genuine savings are: 
 
UCt = Vt – Vt-1 
 
According to Atkinson and Hamilton (2007), these expressions are fraught with 
difficulties, (these are primarily the need to forecast prices and quantities). There are five 
main approaches, and three of them (the total rent approach, the marginal rent approach 
and the exhaustion approach) all assume that the extraction path of the resource is 
optimal.  A sixth approach, the real asset value approach, has since been formulated.  
This method is also reviewed below. 
 
The different approaches to estimating user costs are now examined. 
 
Total rent approach 
 
The total rent approach or net price method used by Repetto et al. (1989) requires little 
data, but assumes that extraction costs are fixed and that the Hotelling rule
18
 applies 
                                                 
18 The Hotelling rule implies a rising resource price: Δp/(pt – c*t) = r. 
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(which empirical data does not support since even petroleum prices have been flat over 
time). 
 
Thus user costs become equal to total rents: 
 
UCt = pqt – c*qt 
 
Where: 
UCt – User Costs 
p – price 
q – quantity extracted 
c* – costs 
 
 
Therefore, for the total rent approach to work, optimality is required via the assumption 
of rising prices. Hence the ability to forecast future prices is an important impediment to 
calculating user costs using the total rent approach. 
Marginal rent approach 
 
The marginal rent approach tries to overcome the assumption of rising prices by 
assuming instead that there are constant prices, but with rising extraction costs, thus the 
application of the Hotelling rule implies that user costs are:
19
 
 
UCt = pqt – c’(qt)qt 
 
This is the marginal rent for a fixed price. Once again, the problem with this approach is 
that it requires an optimal extraction path, which is not necessarily true in real life. 
 
Exhaustion method approach 
 
                                                 
19 See Hartwick and Hageman (1993). 
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The exhaustion method uses the same assumptions as the marginal rent approach; i.e. of 
optimality, constant prices and rising extraction costs. This variant has the following 
equation: (p-c’(qt))(1+r)N = p where N is number of years. With an optimal extraction 
path user costs are: 
)1( r
N
pqt
UCt

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El Serafy or the simple present value approach 
 
The simple present value method developed by El Serafy (1989) avoids the problem of 
forecasting prices and quantities and also has no optimality constraint. It is assumed that 
total rents in each period are constant at level pq-c and thus the user cost is calculated as: 
 
)1( r
N
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UCt
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Where: 
N – Time to exhaustion 
r – Discount rate  
 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) call El Serafy’s approach the simple present value 
method, where N declines as in each period as the resource is extracted if there are no 
discoveries.  El Serafy’s simple present value approach does not require the assumption 
of optimisation. This is a major problem since it implies that resource owners are holding 
assets with no value suggesting that maximum liquidation of the asset in the current 
period would be a rational extraction option. 
 
Vincent’s quasi-optimal approach 
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The fifth approach, Vincent’s quasi-optimal approach adds an isoelastic extraction cost 
function assumption. In this assumption there are increasing marginal costs defined as; 
q
a
qc


)(
 
 
User costs are defined as: 
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Where: 
ε – elasticity, for a > 0 and elasticity ε >1.   
 
The only quantity assumed to vary over time is the quantity extracted, q. Thus marginal 
extraction cost is c’(q) = εc/q. Note that c/q is average extraction costs. 
 
Vincent’s acknowledged inconsistency of constant resource prices, the Hotelling rule and 
increasing marginal extraction costs imply that quantities extracted must fall over time.  
Since Vincent defines N as reserves to production ratio, the lifetime of the reserve is 
understated and therefore the user cost is overstated (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2007). 
 
Real asset value 
 
Hamilton and Ruta (2009) have built on ideas explored by Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) 
to derive yet another depletion estimate methodology. Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) had 
questioned the usefulness of using marginal rental values since mines in the real world 
are not managed optimally. Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) have also argued that the El 
Serafy approach gleans low asset values since there is no attempt within that approach to 
maximise the value of the resource asset, thus leading to low depletion estimates. 
Hamilton and Ruta (2009) have therefore suggested that the real asset value approach 
should be used as the measure of depletion since it is measuring the change in the value 
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of the stock in real terms and is rooted in the theory of wealth and social welfare.  The 
traditional theories of measuring the depreciation of exhaust extraction measure the 
change in total asset value as the appropriate measure of depletion. However, for 
Hamilton and Ruta (2009), these approaches do not answer another important question 
which is, how has social welfare changed with the resource extraction? The real asset 
value method tries to measure the change in real wealth and not the change in total wealth 
associated with extraction since the wealth accounting and social welfare literature 
(Hamilton & Clemens, 1999 and Pezzey, 2004) shows that it is the change in real 
wealth
20
 which has welfare significance.   
 
The change in real asset value using accounting prices becomes: 
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Where 
P – accounting price 
S  – change in resource stock (S) 
n  – constant unit rent 
R  – constant per period extraction 
r – discount rate 
T-t – time to exhaustion  
N – p.S – value of the resource stock 
 
 
Hamilton and Ruta, in effect, derive a hybrid formulation which measures the change in 
real wealth using the accounting price. They find that commonly used methods, such as 
the El Serafy method and those presented above, are measuring the change in total value 
of the resource asset when the resource is extracted and this is lower than the change in 
the value of the stock in real terms. If traditional approaches to resource accounting are 
measuring savings as ∆K + ∆N, then these approaches are overstating the change in 
                                                 
20 Usually measured as adjusted net saving or genuine saving. 
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social welfare (∆K is change in capital stock and ∆N is the change in value of the 
resource stock). Their estimates show that using the El Serafy and real asset value 
approaches gives very different results; e.g. T&T in 2005 had depletion estimates of 23 
per cent and 37 per cent of GNI using the El Serafy and real asset value approaches 
respectively. In 2005, using the El Serafy method leads to a positive 2 per cent of GNI 
genuine savings rate compared to negative 12 per cent using the real asset value 
approach. 
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise that main assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of each 
depletion method described earlier. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of methods to estimate depletion or user costs 
Method Formula Assumptions 
Total Rent qtcpqtUC t *  
 
Constant unit extraction cost 
c*, Hotelling rule: Δp/(pt – 
c*t) = r 
Marginal Rent 
qtqtcpqtUC t )('  
 
Constant price, increasing 
marginal extraction cost, 
Hotelling Rule 
Exhaustion 
)1( r
UC Nt
pqt

  
Constant price, increasing 
marginal extraction cost, 
Hotelling Rule 
Simple Present Value (El 
Serafy method) )1( r
N
cpq
UCt



 
Constant total rent 
Quasi-Optimal (Vincent 
method) 
 
  r
cpq
UC Nt



111 
  Constant price, isoelastic cost 
function with increasing 
marginal costs, ‘near-optimal’ 
path for extraction and 
marginal rents 
Real Asset Value 
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Accounting prices, constant 
unit rent 
 
Source: Adapted from Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) and author’s analysis. 
 
Table 3.2 summarises the main benefits and weaknesses of each of the user cost 
methodologies discussed above. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of main strengths and weaknesses of user cost methods 
Method Strengths Weakness 
Total Rent Simple to calculate Estimates tend to be very high and 
are unrealistic 
Marginal Rent Simple to calculate, theoretically 
correct 
Marginal costs are difficult to 
estimate 
Exhaustion Simple to calculate, theoretically 
correct 
Marginal costs are difficult to 
estimate 
Simple Present Value (El Serafy 
method) 
Simple to calculate and avoids the 
need to forecast prices 
Provides low estimates 
Quasi-Optimal (Vincent method) Theoretically refined approach that 
uses a good proxy for cost increases  
Assumes optimality, which is 
unlikely in the real world 
Real Asset Value Has some relation to prevailing 
welfare conditions of country 
Determining the accounting or 
shadow prices could lead to some 
ambiguity. 
 
 
 
3.3 Evaluation and discussion of user cost methodologies 
Hamilton and Atkinson (2007) have evaluated the various approaches by examining the 
different results from each method in a number of oil-extracting countries. They 
calculated user costs for the year 2000 for 21 oil-producing countries using the World 
Bank’s genuine savings database, British Petroleum’s geological data and current world 
prices. Using each of the methodologies they found that each provided different results 
for user costs. They are convinced that the exhaustion approach gives the most erratic 
results and given that empirical evidence suggests that the total rent approach and the 
simple present value approaches provide divergent results, it is the quasi-optimal 
approach that provides estimates closest to the median. The quasi-optimal approach 
provides estimates that are in the middle of the total rent and simple present value 
approaches. 
 
It is evident that there is little or no consensus on how natural resources should be valued 
and this poses a serious problem for any policy maker trying to measure sustainable 
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development, particularly in resource-dependent economies. Atkinson and Hamilton 
(2007) clearly show that each technique provides differing results. However, they 
concede that Vincent’s quasi-optimal approach provides the most intuitive results since 
its estimates normally lie in between the total rent and El Serafy measures, the measures 
considered to be on the high and low end respectively of the user cost estimation 
approaches.   
 
Hamilton and Ruta (2009) have since attempted to value the stock of the remaining 
reserves in real terms and to ensure that their estimates are rooted in both wealth 
accounting and social welfare economics. 
 
However, it is apparent that these measures of user cost are not providing practical 
guidance to policy makers in resource-dependent countries since they seem to have little 
or no connection to the social realities in these countries. While the discount rate may 
provide the social link to intergenerational equity, there seems to be very little focus on 
intragenerational equity within any of the measures since the user cost estimates can help 
societies determine what proportion of rents should be consumed, invested or saved. To 
determine the amount of rents that should be consumed, invested or saved, there needs to 
be an understanding of the present needs within society, such as poverty alleviation, 
dependence on the resource for foreign exchange earnings and therefore the need for 
diversification as well as possibly what vision is held for future society. It is certainly true 
that most societies are concerned with the level of poverty that currently exists, since it 
impacts directly on their conscience as well as having indirect economic, environmental 
and social impacts. Thus the level and type of investment or savings from natural 
resource rents must in some way deal with this issue. Most definitions of sustainable 
development are concerned with future wellbeing and this seems to suggest that we 
should leave a stock of capital or entitlements that are not less than those enjoyed by the 
current generation. Now, while the current stock of wealth or entitlements may be a 
sufficient minimum level as a bequest in some societies for their future generations, it is 
also true that the level of current entitlements for some members of societies, primarily in 
poorer countries (but not limited thereto), may be insufficient to leave as a bequest to 
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future generations. It seems only reasonable that to achieve sustainable development, we 
would like to have non-declining utility over time and, as Solow (1992) suggests, even 
increasing utility in developing economies. Thus improving the wellbeing of the least 
well-off in current society by improving their entitlements could lead to higher wellbeing 
in the future, since the level of bequest is higher. The apparent disconnect with 
intragenerational equity in the current measures of sustainable development, including 
user cost measures, could actually be improved if these social considerations are 
explicitly taken into account. This is an area of focus which has been neglected within the 
sustainable economic development debate and an area, if included, that will help bridge 
the gap between theory, policy implications and implementation by in-country decision 
makers.   
 
Therefore, it seems appropriate that the method used to estimate depletion should have a 
connection with the level of ‘wants or needs’ within society ideally measured by the 
poverty rate as a measure of societal deprivation. As a result, depending on the level of 
poverty within a country, it makes sense for that country to exploit its natural resources 
for immediate consumption and not be overly penalised by wealth accountants.  The 
reason being that for individuals within society who have current consumption needs i.e. 
measured by the relative poverty level, their current consumption should not be at the 
expense of depleting natural assets. Therefore, the suggestion is for depletion estimate 
purposes, that user costs be adjusted based on the needs within society. These needs 
specifically refer to the needs of those individuals living in poverty. If, for example, the 
EU’s measure of poverty threshold is used, i.e. 60 per cent of median income measure of 
poverty is used as the poverty threshold, then user costs adjusted for current consumption 
needs becomes:
21
 
 
Depletion = UCt  - PTCt 
 
UCt – user costs in period t 
PTC – Poverty Threshold Consumption rate in period t 
                                                 
21 www.ec.europa.eu. 
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With: 
PTC = Ppov * (WPov – Ypov) 
 
Ppov – Total population living on less than poverty threshold income. 
Wpov – Per capita 60% median income wage. 
Ypov – Average per capita income of individual living in poverty i.e. below 60 % of 
median income. 
 
Thus for a country exploiting natural resources with conventional user costs of, say, $100 
million in year t, if 20% of population or 100,000 people are living on income less than 
the poverty threshold, the poverty threshold wage is $1000 per annum and the average 
wage for someone living in poverty is $400 per annum. The adjusted user cost estimate 
becomes: 
 
100 million – {100,000 *(1000 – 400)} = $40 million 
 
Thus user costs are adjusted based on the prevailing poverty rates and the consumption 
needs of those living in poverty within the country. Conversely, if the poverty rate was 0 
per cent then the country must account for all of the resource depletion in its adjusted 
accounts. 
 
A simple estimate of this for Trinidad and Tobago is now presented for the year 2007.  
Using data from the latest available household budget survey of the Central statistical 
office of Trinidad and Tobago, it is possible to determine that about 27 per cent of 
households are living on incomes that are less than 60 per cent of the median income.  
The median income was TT$7,427 per month. With 60 per cent of the median income 
being TT$4,456 per month.  This gives a consumption gap of TT$2,971 per month or 
TT$35,652 per annum.  If it is assumed that this is the average income required by the 
households living below the poverty threshold then this means that ‘consumption 
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investment’ in the least well off would amount to about TT$3.7 billion or US$588 
million in 2007.  These estimates are presented in the table below. 
 
 
Table 3.3 User cost poverty component estimates for Trinidad and Tobago 
Poverty User Cost calculations 2007 
median income 7,427 
60% of median 4,456 
Consumption gap 35652 
Total households 384,879 
Households below median income (27 %) 103,917 
Consumption user cost component TT$ million 3,705 
Consumption user cost component US$ million 588 
 
 
The measure of poverty represented in this formula is simple and easy for policy makers 
to comprehend but is designed to be relative and reflective of the prevailing social 
conditions within the economy. Besides political economy considerations or anticipation 
of better times presented by Van der Ploeg (2011) another important reason why 
countries do not save sufficiently is the prevailing level of want within the society. High 
levels of poverty or needs within society might negate against the need to invest or save. 
Boosting the level of consumption of the least well off in society might be considered a 
form of investment, since it is possible that this might eventually improve the 
productivity of this cohort of the population. This amendment to the user cost 
methodology does not deny that there needs to be a reinvestment of the rents in 
productive assets, but rather in some societies a productive use of the rents might be to 
use some of the rents to improve the living standards of the poorest members. 
 
This provides an indication of which countries are justified in exploiting their resources 
for consumption and which should be saving or conserving more depending on their 
immediate social needs. 
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3.4 Depletion estimates 
The rest of the chapter focuses on estimates of depletion for T&T and three comparator 
countries. For the purpose of this chapter, four methodologies have been used to provide 
a range of estimates of depletion in T&T. These are: 
 
 Total rent approach 
 El Serafy method (simple present value) 
 Quasi-optimal approach 
 Real asset value 
 
Actual estimates for T&T and some comparator countries are now provided. Table 3.4 
shows the estimates of depletion of the oil and gas resources of T&T for the period 1970 
to 2007. Not surprisingly, the total rents approach provides the highest estimates. 
However, the estimates from the El Serafy method (which is a relatively popular 
methodology for estimating rents and depletion) are the lowest – which could have 
serious implications when estimating the relative sustainability of T&T, which will be 
discussed later on. 
 
Figure 3.2 provides visual evidence of the trends in depletion for the period of analysis. 
All of the depletion estimates have shown increased depletion from 1970 to the early part 
of the 1980s when resource depletion was primarily dominated by oil, and this also 
coincided with the oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s. However, depletion remained 
flat for the rest of the 1980s and 1990s until about 1999/2000 when production of natural 
gas increased significantly with the start of liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing in 
1999. LNG production led to an increase in gas production in 1999 of 36 per cent over 
the 1998 level. 
 
Figure 3.3 clearly shows that depletion during the early years of the analysis was 
dominated by oil extraction and rising prices. However, the sudden increase in depletion 
during the latter years of the analysis has coincided with an average annual increase of 19 
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per cent in gas production and extraction for the period 1999 to 2007. The sudden 
increase in natural gas production for LNG has resulted in a sharp decline in the time to 
exhaustion of natural gas reserves, which in turn have increased depletion significantly. 
Figure 3.4 shows these changes in time to exhaustion. It is worth noting that over the 
analysis period, the time to exhaustion has stayed fairly constant for oil, whereas for gas, 
the time to exhaustion has decreased tremendously. By examining the period 1998 to 
2007, the contrasting depletion of oil and gas can be shown. Although in 2007 oil 
production increased by 15 per cent over the 1998 level, the time to oil exhaustion 
remained at 15 years, indicating that discoveries of oil were matching extraction. 
However, the case of gas is rather different. In 1998 and at then current production levels 
there were 65 years of production left. This has since fallen to 12 years in 2007 as natural 
gas production increased by 351 per cent from 1998 to 2007. This significant reduction in 
the time to exhaustion of natural gas is the single largest driver of the increase in 
depletion estimates in recent years. This suggests that the user costs associated with LNG 
production in T&T are high; see Ram (2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
Table 3.4  Oil and gas depletion estimates for T&T (1970-2007) US$ millions 
 Total Rent El Serafy Quasi-Optimal Real Asset Value 
1970 109 9 40 35 
1971 124 9 44 39 
1972 148 15 63 51 
1973 224 35 122 92 
1974 842 183 550 406 
1975 953 277 695 519 
1976 1,043 325 775 583 
1977 1,231 451 954 736 
1978 1,279 501 986 778 
1979 2,631 1,105 2,107 1,673 
1980 3,031 1,370 2,443 1,982 
1981 2,674 1,077 2,049 1,638 
1982 2,366 782 1,656 1,308 
1983 1,975 655 1,337 1,081 
1984 2,023 679 1,379 1,117 
1985 1,942 637 1,325 1,065 
1986 995 299 606 507 
1987 1,106 314 721 573 
1988 889 231 540 439 
1989 1,063 281 668 536 
1990 1,420 401 935 747 
1991 1,253 342 790 646 
1992 1,148 321 735 600 
1993 1,031 233 589 489 
1994 984 233 552 466 
1995 1,042 212 551 459 
1996 1,405 233 654 555 
1997 1,263 196 559 477 
1998 876 102 308 290 
1999 1,189 152 489 437 
2000 2,770 275 1,026 967 
2001 2,551 191 836 830 
2002 2,399 216 943 847 
2003 4,498 735 2,636 1,999 
2004 5,493 1,022 3,455 2,570 
2005 9,522 2,103 6,452 4,760 
2006 11,099 3,227 8,418 6,220 
2007 11,387 3,234 8,534 6,311 
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Figure 3.2  Depletion estimates US$ million 
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Figure 3.3  Production of oil and gas in T&T 
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Figure3.4 Time to exhaustion for oil and gas in T&T (R/P ratio) 
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Pearce and Atkinson (1993), Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and many other theorists 
have argued the significance of depletion to sustainability. Of course, the significance of 
this depletion depends extensively on the depletion methodology used for the 
sustainability calculations as well as the general relationship between depletion and 
national income indicators. Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between total oil and gas 
depletion and gross national income (GNI). All of the depletion estimates as a per cent of 
GNI have the same trend. However, the magnitudes are different. In 2007, depletion as a 
per cent of GNI ranged from 16 per cent under the El Serafy methodology to 55 per cent 
under the total rent approach. These methodologies have consistently provided the lower 
and upper boundaries respectively. However, the quasi-optimal and real asset value 
methodologies provide ‘middle-ground’ estimates.  In 2007, as a per cent of GNI, the 
quasi-optimal and real asset value estimates of depletion were 41 per cent and 30 per cent 
respectively. Each of the depletion estimates suggest that the extraction of oil and gas is 
at a level that will quickly erode the stock of total wealth in the economy unless a 
significant amount of the revenues generated are reinvested or saved. 
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Table 3.5 shows depletion as a per cent of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) which is used 
as an indicator of investment for the whole economy. With the exception of the total rents 
methodology, GCF has on average exceeded depletion in the three decades beginning in 
1970 and ending in 1999. However, for the period 2000 to 2007, the quasi-optimal and 
real asset value estimates suggest that, on average, depletion has exceeded investment 
measured by GCF, suggesting that most of the revenues from the recent boom in oil and 
natural gas prices were consumed rather than saved or invested, with possible downside 
risks to long-term sustainability. 
 
Figure 3.5 Depletion as a per cent of GNI 
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3.5 Discussion on depletion estimates 
It is clear from the evidence provided in Figure 3.5 that all of the depletion 
methodologies used in this chapter tend to follow the same trend and are affected in the 
same way by extraction rates, prices and the varying times to exhaustion. The real 
difference between each is the magnitude of the estimates provided. The range of 
estimates falls between the low estimates provided by El Serafy’s simple PV method and 
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the high estimates provided by the total rent method. It is therefore safe to assume that 
the real value of depletion lies in the middle, therefore discounting the applicability of the 
total rent and El Serafy estimates. However, I think these estimates are still useful since 
they could give an indication of the range of depletion possibilities. 
 
This brings me to the central estimates provided by the quasi optimal methodology and 
the real asset value methodology. Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) have argued previously 
that the quasi-optimal approach seems to provide the most realistic assessment of 
depletion given that it is does not assume that resources are optimally extracted and that 
the estimates provided by this method have been mid-range estimates even for values 
provided in their paper. What’s also interesting about the quasi-optimal approach, as 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2007) have suggested, is that the estimates of depletion are 
inversely related to deposit size, which is more or less intuitively correct. 
 
This brings me to the real asset value methodology derived by Hamilton and Ruta (2009). 
They have argued convincingly that most of the estimates of natural resource depletion 
used in the green national accounting literature tend to value the change in the value of 
the resource stock after depletion – interpreted as the change in total asset value when a 
resource is extracted. However, according to Hamilton and Ruta, one glaring omission by 
most of the literature has been the lack of clarity on not only how the value of the asset 
has changed but also on how social welfare has changed with the extraction of the natural 
resource. The authors have shown with simple models that the change in total wealth will 
exceed the change in real wealth at each point in time. Conversely, they have also argued 
that the commonly used methods, like the El Serafy method, tend to measure the change 
in the total value of the asset when it is extracted and that these estimates tend to be lower 
than the change in the value of the stock in real terms, which tends to underestimate 
depletion and hence overstate the change in social welfare. Therefore, using an approach 
that attempts to combine changes in the value of the asset with changes in social welfare 
associated with extraction seems to be reasonable and the most appropriate way to value 
depletion. However, the only concerns I have with the real asset value method are the 
assumptions associated with welfare that are incorporated with the calculations and 
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whether these are correct and whether these make the results more uncertain or less 
factual.   
 
To summarise, the methodologies used to provide estimates of depletion give a range of 
values that are applicable for policy. However, the range can be large and may even 
change the sign of the genuine savings indicator for a particular country depending on 
which estimate of depletion is used. It is reasonable to assume that the real asset value 
and quasi-optimal estimates, due to their mid-range values, provide a better gauge of real 
life depletion. The quasi-optimal approach seems to be the most practical. However, the 
association that the real asset value method, as with social welfare, may be more 
meaningful, albeit with some level of uncertainty. 
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Table 3.5 Depletion as a per cent of Gross Capital Formation 
 Total Rent El Serafy (Simple 
PV) 
Quasi Optimal Real Asset Value 
1970 51% 4% 19% 16% 
1971 41% 3% 14% 13% 
1972 44% 4% 19% 15% 
1973 66% 10% 36% 27% 
1974 189% 41% 123% 91% 
1975 143% 42% 104% 78% 
1976 170% 53% 126% 95% 
1977 147% 54% 114% 88% 
1978 119% 47% 92% 72% 
1979 197% 83% 157% 125% 
1980 159% 72% 128% 104% 
1981 137% 55% 105% 84% 
1982 100% 33% 70% 55% 
1983 99% 33% 67% 54% 
1984 109% 36% 74% 60% 
1985 140% 46% 96% 77% 
1986 96% 29% 59% 49% 
1987 119% 34% 78% 62% 
1988 151% 39% 92% 75% 
1989 148% 39% 93% 75% 
1990 203% 57% 134% 107% 
1991 145% 39% 91% 75% 
1992 153% 43% 98% 80% 
1993 157% 35% 90% 74% 
1994 98% 23% 55% 47% 
1995 94% 19% 50% 41% 
1996 101% 17% 47% 40% 
1997 73% 11% 32% 28% 
1998 43% 5% 15% 14% 
1999 83% 11% 34% 31% 
2000 202% 20% 75% 71% 
2001 108% 8% 35% 35% 
2002 118% 11% 46% 42% 
2003 158% 26% 93% 70% 
2004 249% 46% 156% 116% 
2005 407% 90% 276% 203% 
2006 450% 131% 342% 252% 
2007 408% 116% 306% 226% 
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Table 3.6 Depletion as a per cent of total savings 
 Total Rent El Serafy (Simple 
PV) 
Quasi-Optimal Real Asset Value 
1970 135% 11% 50% 43% 
1971 120% 9% 43% 37% 
1972 222% 22% 95% 77% 
1973 110% 17% 60% 45% 
1974 167% 36% 109% 81% 
1975 112% 33% 82% 61% 
1976 155% 48% 115% 87% 
1977 167% 61% 130% 100% 
1978 149% 59% 115% 91% 
1979 260% 109% 208% 165% 
1980 160% 72% 129% 105% 
1981 138% 55% 105% 84% 
1982 197% 65% 138% 109% 
1983 544% 180% 368% 298% 
1984 313% 105% 214% 173% 
1985 306% 100% 209% 168% 
1986 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1987 691% 196% 450% 358% 
1988 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1989 617% 163% 388% 311% 
1990 226% 64% 149% 119% 
1991 565% 154% 356% 291% 
1992 684% 191% 438% 357% 
1993 1851% 418% 1057% 877% 
1994 138% 33% 78% 66% 
1995 115% 23% 61% 51% 
1996 167% 28% 78% 66% 
1997 239% 37% 106% 90% 
1998 127% 15% 45% 42% 
1999 188% 24% 77% 69% 
2000 274% 27% 101% 96% 
2001 143% 11% 47% 46% 
2002 228% 21% 90% 81% 
2003 193% 32% 113% 86% 
2004 189% 35% 119% 88% 
2005 201% 44% 136% 101% 
2006 136% 40% 103% 76% 
2007 175% 50% 131% 97% 
Note: Total savings = private savings + public savings 
 
3.6 How do other countries compare? 
This section of the chapter compares T&T’s depletion with three comparator countries 
with respect to the depletion of their oil and natural gas reserves. Depletion estimates 
have been calculated for Barbados, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Indonesia 
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and compared against the estimates provided earlier for T&T. The depletion estimates for 
the comparator countries have been calculated using the same methodology used for 
T&T. The comparisons show depletion as a per cent of GNI and Gross Capital 
Formation.  The countries have been chosen as comparators for the following reasons: 
 
 Barbados – Small island Caribbean state similar to T&T.  However, oil and gas 
extraction accounts for a relatively small proportion of GDP. 
 The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a Latin American country and at its 
closest point is just seven miles from Trinidad. However, like T&T, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s economy is highly dependent on oil and gas 
extraction. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is, however, a much larger 
producer of oil and gas responsible for 3 per cent of world production and is a 
member of the oil cartel, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
and its reserves are much larger than those of T&T. 
 Indonesia is a relatively large producer of oil and gas. However, it has a much 
larger and more diversified economy than T&T. 
 
For the comparisons, two methods of depletion have been analysed: the El Serafy and 
real asset value methodologies. The depletion estimates from both of these have then 
been compared to GNI and GCF respectively. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show depletion as a per 
cent of GNI for the El Serafy and real asset value methodologies respectively. Both the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Barbados depletion as a per cent of GNI are 
negligible at about zero per cent per annum. This result is quite surprising for the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela since it produced about 3 per cent of world crude oil 
output and 1 per cent of natural gas output in 2008.  However, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela’s relatively large reserves and current production levels translate into about 91 
years of crude oil production and 181 years of natural gas production remaining which 
means that depletion is not a significant problem for the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela. 
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The charts, however, show that Indonesia’s depletion as a per cent of GNI is above zero 
per cent, although much less than T&T. Under the El Serafy calculations, Indonesia’s 
depletion averages about 2 per cent of GNI compared to about 8 per cent for T&T, while 
the real asset value approach produces average estimates of about 5 per cent for Indonesia 
and 16 per cent for T&T. 
 
Figure 3.6  El Serafy depletion as a per cent of GNI 
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Figure 3.7  Real asset value depletion as a per cent of GNI 
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Figures 3.8 and 3.9, which show depletion as a per cent of GCF, have similar trends to 
those of the GNI except at different magnitudes. Once more, depletion as a per cent of 
GCF for both Barbados and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are negligible and 
close to zero. Examining the El Serafy and real asset value depletion estimates as a per 
cent of GCF reveals that over the period 1970 – 2007, T&T’s depletion is much higher 
than Indonesia. For example, over this period the highest ratios of depletion to GCF 
recorded for Indonesia have been in 1979, when depletion was 23 per cent and 71 per 
cent for the El Serafy and real asset value methods respectively. In contrast, T&T has 
recorded depletion in excess of investment measured as GCF. For example, in 2006, the 
depletion ratio as a per cent of GCF was 131 per cent and 252 per cent under the El 
Serafy and real asset value approaches respectively. 
 
When compared to the three comparator countries, T&T seems to be performing less well 
against countries with varying economic structures. T&T as a country has been depleting 
its resources very rapidly. However, it has not been saving or investing enough of the 
revenues to meet the Hartwick or genuine saving rules for sustainability. T&T’s depletion 
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estimates ratios are consistently higher which immediately raises questions about the 
country’s fiscal regime and its ability to deal with windfall revenues from oil and gas 
exploitation as well as the incentives the current governing structure provides for 
expenditure and savings. 
 
 
Figure 3.8  El Serafy depletion as a per cent of GCF 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
%
 o
f 
G
C
F
Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados
Venezuela
Indonesia
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Figure 3.9  Real asset value depletion as a per cent of GCF 
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3.7 Alternative Indicators of Wealth and Welfare 
In this section, alternative indicators of welfare and wealth are provided to give 
comparisons to the depletion estimates given earlier. The United Nations (UN) ranks 
countries according to its Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI attempts to 
provide an indicator of development that goes beyond measures of income by 
incorporating measures of life expectancy, education and income. According to the UN’s 
HDI report for 2007, T&T is considered to be a High HDI country ranked 64th with a 
score of 0.837 out of 182 countries. Norway is the top-ranked country with a score of 
0.971. Incidentally, Barbados was the highest ranked Caribbean country; it was ranked 
37th, while the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was ranked 58th and Indonesia was 
ranked 111th. T&T has experienced annual growth of 0.19% in its HDI over the period 
1980 to 2007. 
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The UN also produces the Human Poverty Index which tends to focus on the proportion 
of people who are below certain thresholds for each of the HDI indicators. T&T had an 
overall HPI rank of 27 out of 135 countries and this compares to a rank of 4 for 
Barbados, 28 for The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 69 for Indonesia.  
Examining the HPI further and looking at the proportion of people that may not survive 
to age 40, the proportion in T&T was 8.4%, while in Barbados it was 3%, and in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Indonesia it was 6.7%. 
 
The World Bank’s 2006 report on the Wealth of Nations also gives an indication of the 
general welfare of countries. Table 3.7, with data extracted from World Bank (2006) for 
the year 2000, shows per capita wealth in US dollars for the comparator countries. 
 
Table 3.7  Per capita wealth USD (year 2000) 
  Subsoil 
Assets 
Timber 
Resources 
NTFR PA Cropland Pastureland Natural 
capital 
Produced 
capital 
and 
Urban 
Land 
Intangible 
capital 
Total 
Wealth 
T&T 30,279 42 46 112 444 54 30,977 14,485 12,086 57,549 
Barbados 988 0 0 0 190 210 1,388 18,168 127,181 146,737 
The 
Bolivarian 
Republic 
of 
Venezuela 
23,302 0 464 1,793 1,086 581 27,227 13,627 4,342 45,196 
Indonesia 1,549 346 115 167 1,245 50 3,472 2,382 8,015 13,869 
NTFR – Non-Timber Forest Resources 
PA – Protected Areas 
 
Table 3.7 shows that Barbados has considerably more wealth, although its natural capital 
wealth is much less than the other countries. Intangible capital in Barbados is much more 
prominent in the wealth estimates when compared to the other countries including T&T. 
 
Genuine Savings (GS) indicators for 2000 show a stark contrast to the other indicators 
and tend to corroborate the earlier depletion estimates. Genuine savings is an overall 
indicator of savings within the economy and accounts for gross national savings and 
depreciation within the economy including natural resource and environmental depletion 
as well as fixed capital depreciation and investment in human capital. In the year 2000, 
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Indonesia had a GS rate of 1.3%, while T&T had a rate of -11.4% and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela had a rate of -2.7%. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
The following chapters take a closer look at the T&T economy to discern how 
government expenditure is distributed and determine if this has any bearing on overall 
sustainable development and saving rates. The depletion estimates calculated in this 
chapter show that Trinidad has been extracting too much of its non-renewable resources 
and not investing or saving sufficiently the rents from these resources. The subsequent 
analyses begin the process of determining why T&T has not used its resources wisely, 
why with all of its natural capital wealth, it is considered to be an unsustainable economy 
and why the inequalities present within society tend to linger despite these resources? 
 
However, an important question raised by the analysis of depletion estimate 
methodologies is whether they are accounting for the social and economic realities of 
countries. Based on these realities, what proportion of rents should be consumed and 
what proportion should be attributed to asset depletion, given the possible immediate 
need for consumption if poverty levels are high? This particular question has not been 
answered entirely; however, a modification of the user cost methods has been suggested 
whereby countries with high poverty rates are not penalised for using their resource rents 
for current consumption. The distribution of resources rents via government expenditure 
will be examined in the following chapters. 
 
Conventional estimates of user costs or depletion  that are used for resource planning and 
measures of genuine savings, while useful from an intergenerational perspective ignores 
the current consumption needs of the least well off in society.  Figures 3.7 and 3.8 clearly 
show that Trinidad and Tobago has been saving or investing an insufficient amount of the 
rents from the exploitation of its oil and natural gas reserves. This implies that the 
country has been consuming too much of the rents.  However, although the country has 
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consumed too much of the rents according to the Hartwick rule, there are still high levels 
of poverty as much as 27 per cent of the population in 2008 according to Sookram 
(2008).  While it is clear that political economy considerations, such as rent seeking and 
the resource curse (Seers, 1964 and Auty, 2009) are important reasons behind why there 
is insufficient savings of resource rents, the high levels of poverty could also justify using 
rents for satisfying some consumption.  It is this basic point that user cost methodologies 
have failed to grasp and which sometime makes it a policy mechanism that is 
disconnected from reality and therefore ignored by politicians and policy makers in their 
decision making. 
 
An important improvement that could be made to these methodologies is to incorporate a 
distributional component that accounts for current generational needs and that makes user 
costs or depletion estimates sensitive to reinvestment (the intergenerational component) 
and to consumption of the poorest members of society (intragenerational component).  If 
this is accounted for, then it could also go a long way to explain why resource rents are 
sometimes not saved.  Earlier an estimate for Trinidad and Tobago was given as US$588 
million for 2007. This represents about 9% of total user costs (US$6311 million) if the 
real asset value estimate of depletion for 2007 is used.  
 
It is likely that savings do not occur due to political economy, anticipation of better times 
and current consumption needs.  If user costs account for current consumption needs, 
then it is likely to be a policy mechanism that is adhered to by resource abundant country 
policy makers. 
 
An area of  further research would be to test this hypothesis for resource abundant 
countries to see if poverty also drives low saving rates, and if depletion estimates that 
account for poverty reduction is better gauge of true depletion.  
  
The next chapter examines the distribution of the rents produced by the oil and gas sector 
with particular focus on energy subsidies. There is an examination in greater detail of 
how rents are distributed within the economy via energy subsidies to determine whether 
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this may be having an impact on the level of savings and depletion (as shown in this 
chapter) and the overall sustainability of the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
Chapter Four: Calculating the distributional 
impacts of savings and expenditure in T&T: the 
case of fuel subsidies 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the scale and distribution of energy subsidies within T&T. The 
focus of the analysis will be on the opportunity costs and distribution associated with 
petroleum products subsidies within the economy. Fuel subsidies because they are 
usually untargeted and lead to over consumption of a scarce resource are sometimes an 
inappropriate use of resource rents. Angel-Urdinola et al. (2006), Keener & Ghosh 
Banerjee (2006) and Coady & Newhouse (2006) have all suggested that energy subsidies 
should be reformed since they lead to unsustainable fiscal expenditure items and the 
benefits of untargeted subsidies can be regressively distributed. 
 
Government control of domestic petroleum prices commonly occurs in developing 
countries. Governments sometimes control domestic distribution, prices and import 
levels. Often there is a pricing formula which anchors domestic prices to levels that are 
less than the import prices. Fuel subsidies are the difference between a reference price, 
usually the border price, and the actual price paid by consumers for each petroleum 
product. For oil-exporting countries, domestic petroleum subsidies are sometimes seen as 
a way for governments to protect household incomes and to distribute rents associated 
with the export of the resource. Governments often control prices by imposing fuel 
subsidies which reduces domestic prices to below the border price. Coady et al. (2006) 
have shown that fuel subsidies often exceed 2 per cent of GDP in 2005 in a number of 
countries, including Bolivia (3.1 per cent), Ecuador (3.6 per cent) and Yemen (9.2 per 
cent). A more recent IMF paper by Baig et al. (2007) gives a break down by a number of 
selected countries of projected fuel subsidies in 2006. They provide estimates of explicit 
and implicit subsidies.  Explicit subsidies are compensation to the national energy 
company for the difference between the wholesale domestic price and the world price.   
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Implicit subsidies according to Baig et al. (2007) are more difficult to measure since they 
are often not reported. They include costs borne by public entities, such as national oil 
and energy companies that are not reported in the budget, tax expenditures, such as tax 
exemptions for oil products and the difference between retail prices and import parity 
prices. Table 4.1 shows explicit fuel subsidies as a per cent of GDP.  The selected 
countries show that the level of fuel subsidies ranges from a low of 0.2 per cent of GDP 
for Argentina and to as high as 8.5 per cent for the Republic of Yemen.  Implicit 
subsidies which are more difficult to measure mostly account for a higher percentage of 
GDP.  For example the implicit subsidies in Azerbaijan and Cameroon were 10.4 per cent 
of GDP and 6.6 per cent of GDP respectively this contrasts with explicit subsidies of 1.9 
per cent and 0.3 per cent for Azerbaijan and Cameroon respectively.   
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Table 4.1 Fuel Subsidies as a per cent of GDP 
Country 2006 Explicit  2006 Implicit  
Argentina 0.2  
Armenia  1.0 
Azerbaijan 1.9 10.4 
Bolivia 1.3 6.6 
Cameroon 0.3 6.6 
Cong, Republic of 1.0  
Dominican Republic 0.4 0.3 
Egypt  6.2 
Gabon  2.8 
Ghana 0.7  
Honduras 0.6  
Indonesia 2.0  
Jordan 1.2  
Lebanon 0.1  
Nigeria 1.0  
Senegal 0.8  
Yemen, Republic of 8.5  
Source: Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2010) 
 
Often, subsidies can be as large  as or larger than public expenditure of education or 
health. 
 
Although fuel subsidies are politically popular, they can impose severe strains on 
government budgets and often provide little incentive for fuel efficiency. Fuel subsidies 
also redirect public expenditure away from more productive uses. 
  
Furthermore, since the demand for fuel is often inelastic and there are negative 
consumption externalities associated with its use, taxation of petroleum subsidies can be 
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an efficient way to raise government revenues. Moreover, for petroleum-exporting 
countries, fuel subsidies impose an opportunity cost on the subsidising country and are 
often not a cost-effective way of protecting the real incomes of poorer households since 
fuel subsidies lead to substantial benefit leakages to higher-income households. If fuel 
subsidies are removed, the effects can often be regressive; however, the savings 
generated by the removal of the subsidies could be targeted at lower-income households 
through subsidies, transfers and social expenditures (Coady et al., 2006). 
 
The literature on the resource curse also suggests that countries with windfall resource 
revenues do not utilise the resources appropriately and rent-seeking behaviour could also 
lead to inefficient uses of the rents, such as that used on subsidies – see, for example, 
Auty (2009), Auty (2007) and Seers (1964). 
 
Furthermore rent seeking behaviour encourages the government to spend resource rents 
on items that lead to an accumulation of resource rents among higher income groups.  
Research by Birdsall et al. (2001) and Birdsall et al (1999) also finds that governments in 
resource abundant countries try to pacify poorer members of society who might not be 
gaining directly from a resource boom by spending on consumptive goods which could 
include fuel subsidies. This entire virtuous circle as discussed earlier and in the next 
chapter where countries invest  for the future and ensure there is productive growth could 
be disrupted by un-productive consumptive uses of the resource rents. 
 
The focus in this chapter is therefore to examine the opportunity cost associated with fuel 
subsidies particularly for an energy exporting country and to estimate the distributional 
outcomes associated with these subsidies. 
 
3.1 The case of T&T 
T&T as with other oil and gas producing nations has a fiscal budget that is heavily reliant 
on the revenues from the oil and gas sector. The overall premise of the fiscal and 
economic policy is to extract as much revenues as possible from the oil and gas sector, 
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provide a reasonable level of public goods, subsidised energy products, imports of 
essential goods and services and a fairly low level of domestic taxation, World Bank 
(2003).  Energy revenues in T&T were approximately 21 per cent of GDP in 2008 and 58 
per cent of total government revenues, compared to 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1999.  The 
intervening decade has seen a sharp rise in crude oil, natural gas and by-product prices 
and together with large increases in natural gas production (235% increase from 1999 to 
2008). This has led to windfall energy revenues for the government. These increases in 
revenue have led to a massive expansion in government expenditure including on 
transfers and subsidies. If T&T is to be transformed into a sustainable economy it 
requires a different fiscal policy with a sustained fiscal surplus where funds are 
channelled into effective savings and investment. World Bank (2003) explains, this is 
important since much of the islands’ revenues come from the oil and gas sector, which is 
exhaustible therefore optimal management of resource revenues are essential to ensure a 
sustainable flow of income. This requires limiting consumption from this wealth and 
shifting savings towards investment. With the oil and gas sector accounting for 
approximately 46 per cent of GDP in 2008, optimal management of the oil and gas 
resources are also important for overall economic growth and multiplier employment 
effects. Therefore the optimum use of the rents from natural resources is extremely 
important for sustainable development, as suggested by Hartwick (1977), Hicks (1946), 
Solow (1992) and Pearce and Atkinson (1993). 
 
Energy subsidies, which encourage over consumption of energy products and that have 
previously been shown (in other countries) to be unevenly distributed, may be possible 
sources of savings for economic reform and investment and for efficiency gains from 
deadweight losses associated with energy subsidies; Coady and Newhouse (2006) and 
World Bank (2003). In developing countries where poverty is still endemic and might 
lead to downside risks for development, regressively distributed benefits such as from 
untargeted subsidies may also hamper prospects for sustainable development. Therefore 
who benefits from savings and investments associated with the expenditure of resource 
rents and the subsequent intergenerational economic growth might also be an important 
considerations for sustainable fiscal policy, sustainable development and political 
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institutions as suggested by Barbier (2005), Best (2007 republished),  Lange & Motinga 
(1997) and Seers (1964). 
  
What has been the trend in subsidies? Transfers and subsidies (T&S) as a per cent of 
T&T’s GDP have been on an upward trend since 1999. Table 4.2 shows the increase in 
T&S since 1999 along with other economic data for T&T. 
 
 
Table 4.2  T&T: Aggregate economic data as % of GDP 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Revenue 23.6 23.7 25.8 24.6 24.4 25 29.5 31.9 29.1 36.7 
Of which: 
Non-energy 
20.6 17.2 16.7 18.7 14.9 14.7 14 12.2 12.6 15.5 
Energy 2.7 6.4 9 5.8 9.4 10.3 15.5 19.7 16.5 21.2 
Expenditure 24.5 23.5 25.2 24.8 22.6 22.8 24.1 25.5 27.5 30.2 
Current 23.3 21.1 23.8 23.5 21.1 20.9 21.3 21.8 21.8 23.6 
Transfers 
and 
subsidies 
7.6. 7.7 8.5 8.9 8.3 7 10.3 12.2 12.2 13.6 
Capital 
expenditure 
0.7 2.8 1.9 1.7 1.4 2.2 3.1 4 5.7 6.6 
Source: IMF 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows that T&S as a per cent of GDP has increased from 7.6 per cent in 1999 
to 13.6 per cent in 2008. At the same time, government revenue as a per cent of GDP 
from the energy sector (oil and natural gas) has increased from 2.7 per cent in 1999 to 
21.2 per cent in 2008, while non-energy revenue has been in decline. This chapter 
examines one component of the T&S budget item; energy subsidies, which includes a 
detailed examination of petroleum subsidies and their distribution as well as a general 
review of electricity subsidies. These assessments are meant to show how effective 
government expenditure is in distributing natural resource rents and its impact on savings 
distribution within the economy. 
 
The chapter will therefore focus on two important considerations of subsidies: 
opportunity costs and distribution. For a small open petroleum-exporting country like 
T&T, subsidies for domestic consumption of petroleum products could impose an 
opportunity cost on the economy, since the subsidy could encourage higher domestic 
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consumption of petroleum products that otherwise could have been exported to earn 
foreign exchange revenue.  
 
Internationally domestic petroleum prices are set in three main ways.  The first is by the 
market where it is completely liberalised, secondly it can be set by the government on an 
ad hoc basis and finally it can be set by the government using automatic price formulas. 
Of the 44 countries surveyed by Baig et al. (2007), 21 used ad hoc pricing policies, while 
8 countries and 15 countries used automatic price mechanism and liberalised pricing 
mechanism respectively.  
 
 The fuel subsidy regime in T&T operates as a constant price set by the government. This 
pricing mechanism could be considered to be ad hoc since there is no formula to calculate 
the price.  The ad hoc price mechanism used in Trinidad and Tobago has led to long 
periods where the price does not vary.  Prolonged price freezes are symptomatic of ad 
hoc pricing regimes, for example in Indonesia prices were frozen from the end of 2002 to 
March 2005 and in Ecuador prices were frozen since mid-2003, Baig et al. (2007). The 
policy rationale in Trinidad and Tobago is for there to be stable domestic fuel prices, 
although international prices may be fluctuating. Consumers therefore benefit when 
international prices rise since their fuel expenditure remains constant. However, since the 
domestic prices are not tweaked often, when international prices fall below the domestic 
price, consumers do not benefit from these reductions or savings unless the government 
lowers the official price. However, it is seldom that international prices fall below the 
official fuel price. The analysis shows that this has only happened twice since 1990: in 
1992 and 1999. 
 
Subsidies are meant to smooth the consumption of households within society by 
protecting their real income from price volatility within the market. As the price of crude 
oil is highly volatile, it can have a significant impact on real incomes via the related 
prices on petroleum products and other products that require petroleum products as an 
input. However, since petroleum subsidies are usually not targeted at any particular 
household type, their distribution may be less than ideal. By examining this line item of 
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expenditure, which will inevitably increase as the price of crude oil increases and 
therefore as rents and government revenue also increase, this analysis would allow an 
examination of the beneficiaries of government expenditure, savings and investment 
within the economy and to help discern policy implications, if any.  
 
Therefore, the first step of the analysis is to examine the extent and scale of the 
opportunity cost of petroleum subsidies within the T&T economy. 
 
4.2 Calculating the opportunity cost of petroleum subsidies in T&T 
Both the IMF and World Bank have been responsible for most of the research that 
assesses the economic impacts of fuel subsidies. An IMF staff working paper (WP/07/71)  
found that only half of developing and emerging market economies allowed for 
international price increases to fully pass through to domestic prices. Their survey found 
that this limited price pass through reflected controls on retail prices and reductions of 
fuel taxes which resulted in explicit and implicit fuel price subsidies.  
 
Baig et al (2007) define price pass through as the ratio of absolute changes in retail price 
of fuel and the local currency price of the relevant fuel import product over a period of 
time. 
 
iceice
iceice
WorldTWorldT
DomesticTDomesticTthroughPass
PrPr
PrPr
12
12


  
 
Where PDomestic and PWorld are the domestic and world prices respectively and T1 and T2 
refer to the years of analysis. 
 
Baig et al. (2007) analysis of the pass thorough for the period 2003-2006, found that in 
general the pass through was less in oil exporting countries, at the time averaging 0.46, 
while in oil net importing countries it was 1.09. 
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Coady et al. (2010) present estimates of pass-through for different country groupings.  
Their definition of pass-through is similar to the formula above.  However they define 
pass-through as the absolute change in the domestic retail (tax inclusive) price to the 
absolute change in the benchmark price. Table 4.3 gives a break-down of these results 
which covers the period end of 2003 to mid-2008. The results show that there is 
considerable pass-through of price changes among advanced countries and oil importers. 
Not surprisingly oil exporters heavily subsidise domestic petroleum consumption. 
 
Table 4.3 Median pass-through, end 2003 to Mid-2008 (in per cent) 
 Gasoline Diesel Kerosene 
All Countries 85 95 53 
Advanced 102 120  
Emerging 57 70 19 
Developing 77 78 59 
Net oil importer 96 106 79 
Net oil Exporter 35 46 11 
Source; Coady et al. (2010) 
 
The analysis of fuel subsidies in T&T does not use the pass-through formula to assess the 
extent of fuel subsidies.  Instead a variation of the pass-through formula to estimate the 
absolute opportunity cost of domestic price subsidy is used.  This is explained further 
later on in the chapter.  However using the above formula for the period 2000-2008 and 
data presented in table 4.6, T&T had an estimated price pass-through of 0.51 for all 
petroleum products.  This implies that almost half of the price is subsidised. 
 
To examine the possible opportunity cost of petroleum subsidies, an important first 
question is: how does T&T’s fuel consumption compare to other countries with similar 
incomes since income is an important factor which determines consumption rates?  
 
When compared to all countries, T&T does not have very high consumption rates of road 
fuel. However, where data are available and when compared to other countries with 
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similar income per capita, residents of T&T tend to consume more fuel. For example, in 
2007, the per capita consumption of gasoline for road vehicles was 0.32 litres in T&T, 
while in other countries with similar per capita incomes (where data are available) such 
as Malta and Croatia the per capita consumption of gasoline were 0.16 litres and 0.19 
litres respectively. In Jamaica, a Caribbean country for which data are available, but with 
per capita GDP in Jamaica less than in T&T, its gasoline fuel consumption was also 
lower.  Table 4.4 shows statistics on road fuel usage for countries with comparable per 
capita GDP statistics in 2006. Data on income comparator Caribbean countries are very 
limited and therefore Jamaica has been included in the Table, since data are available for 
Jamaica, although its income per capita is much less than T&T. If we look at the data in 
Table 3.2 and compare T&T with countries for which comparable data is available, most 
countries have lower per capita gasoline usage (gasoline prices are also higher in these 
countries). In Czech Republic, for example, gasoline fuel consumption is about one third 
less than in T&T (the price is three times as high in Czech Republic). However, in 
countries where fuel subsidies are evident, such as Oman, Saudi Arabia and T&T, fuel 
consumption is relatively high. Although there may be many other factors that contribute 
to the level of per capita fuel consumption, such as the availability of alternative modes 
of transport, non-fuel costs associated with driving and physical geography of the nation, 
using income as the main factor contributing to fuel use is relevant as showed by Uusitalo 
and Djerf (1983). 
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Table 4.4  Gasoline fuel consumption and prices of countries with similar incomes per capita (2006 unless 
stated) 
Country Current US$ per 
capita GDP 
Per capita Gasoline 
Consumption (litres) 
Price of Gasoline US$ 
per litre 
Motor vehicles per 
1000 people (2007) 
Antigua and Barbuda 11,859  0.97 - 
Barbados 12,568  1.11 405.9 
Croatia 11,045 0.16 1.34 377.1 
Czech Republic 13,887 0.20 1.3 469.9 
Estonia 12,360 0.23 1.23 444.4 
Hungary 11,220 0.15 1.3 383.9 
Malta 15,733 0.19 1.38 557.6 
Oman 13,784 0.44 0.31 225.3 
Saudi Arabia 15,061 0.57 0.16 - 
Slovak Republic 12,809 0.11 1.35 281.5 
T&T 13,916 0.30 0.43 351.3 
Jamaica 4,502 0.20 0.82 - 
Source: World Bank 
 
In a small open economy like that of T&T, export earnings of foreign exchange are 
important for the purchase of imports since many products are not made domestically. 
Therefore, foregone export earnings should be avoided at all costs. If there is domestic 
overconsumption of fuels in T&T, the opportunity costs are foregone foreign exchange 
revenues and the use of government expenditure on subsidies rather than on other goods 
and services. Therefore, subsidies lead to both economic and allocative inefficiencies. 
4.3 Opportunity costs of petroleum product usage in T&T 
The methodology to assess the opportunity costs of petroleum product subsidies is taken  
from World Bank (2003). The economics associated with the analysis is best described 
diagrammatically as shown in Figure 4.1. It is assumed that T&T sets the domestic price 
pd at the marginal cost of production mc (assumed to be constant). This results in demand 
qd in the domestic market. Resource rents on oil destined for the domestic market are 
equal to zero. 
 
If the price were set at the world price pw, two things would happen: (i) domestic demand 
would fall to qw, and (ii) the quantity qd – qw could be exported. Therefore, the total 
increase in resource rents from pricing reform would be (pw – pd)*qd. Since (pw – 
pd)*qw of these rents are simply transferred from consumers to the producer, the 
opportunity cost of subsidised energy is, 
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OC = (pw – pd)*(qd – qw). 
 
The total welfare gain associated with moving to world prices and increasing exports is 
the triangle W. 
 
Figure 4.1  Economics of subsidised petroleum products usage  
 
 
 
 
To calculate the opportunity costs of petroleum products usage in T&T, we need to 
compare the fuel usage and prices in the domestic market with the petroleum products 
usage in similar income countries at international prices. The rationale for this calculation 
is that there are foregone foreign exchange earnings in T&T if petroleum products are 
over consumed in the domestic market, which otherwise could have been exported at 
international prices. The methodology for the assessment is adapted from World Bank 
pw 
pd = mc 
qw qd 
W 
Demand 
Supply 
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(2003), which sets out the calculation of the opportunity costs of fuel subsidies in Iran. 
The adopted methodology for T&T is described below. 
 
The steps in the analysis for T&T are: 
 
1. Identify the per capita use of petroleum products in T&T and other similar 
income countries. Data on petroleum products usage and population have been 
collected for T&T and other countries. Petroleum products refer to refined 
petroleum products. In T&T, domestic use of refined petroleum products include: 
liquefied petroleum gas, motor gasoline, aviation gas, kerosene/jet fuel, diesel, 
lubes and waxes, fuel oil, naphtha and asphaltic products. Four petroleum 
products; LPG, motor gasoline, kerosene and diesel, typically make up over 95 
per cent of domestic use of petroleum products. Total annual usage of petroleum 
products (mboe)
22
 is divided by total population to get annual per capita usage of 
petroleum products. Comparable data from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) for annual petroleum product usage and UNSTATS data on mid-year 
population estimates have been used. These products will therefore be the focus of 
the analysis. 
2. Determine price differential of petroleum products in domestic market and 
international prices. Data was collected on domestic and international retail 
prices for the four petroleum products that are the focus of this analysis. A 
weighted average domestic and international price of petroleum products based on 
the refined output from a barrel of crude oil was assessed. From these weighted 
prices, annual ratios of international to domestic prices have been determined. 
Since the majority of petroleum products usage is concentrated in the above four 
focus products, an international price of petroleum products per barrel of oil 
equivalent (boe) based on the weighted average of these prices has been 
estimated. It is also assumed that if these products are not consumed domestically 
then the unrefined barrel of crude oil would be exported. The ratio of domestic to 
international prices gives a domestic yield price compared to if the barrel of crude 
                                                 
22 Barrels of oil equivalent (millions). 
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oil was exported. For example, in the year 2000, the international crude import 
price was US$28.13, while the ratio of international to domestic prices was 1.24, 
which therefore gives a domestic yield price of US$22.64 (28.13/1.24). The 
difference, US$5.49 per boe, between the international price and the domestic 
yield price is the opportunity cost of domestic overconsumption. The international 
price for T&T’s crude oil has been calculated as an average of the crude oil 
import prices in major metropolitan markets.
23
 It should be noted that the nature 
of the fuel subsidy in T&T is a flat price set by the government in the annual 
national budget. The domestic price of fuel has sometimes remained constant for 
many years, e.g. the price of unleaded gasoline remained at TT$2.85/litre from 
1997 to 2002. The fuel subsidy is therefore meant to maintain predictable prices 
within the economy. This, however, implies that during years when the 
international price of fuel is very low (1992 and 1999), the price of domestic fuel 
may be higher than international prices. This results in a ‘negative’ subsidy where 
consumers do not benefit from lower fuel prices and the government does not 
have a large fuel subsidy bill. Table 4.5 shows the difference between domestic 
prices and international prices for petroleum products during the study period. 
3. Determine implied elasticity. If prices in T&T were to increase to international 
prices, then there will be an expected adjustment in domestic demand to the 
higher prices. Therefore, it is assumed that demand in T&T would adjust to a per 
capita level that is comparable to other countries with similar income levels. It is 
assumed that the demand would adjust to the average of Lower Middle Income 
countries (LMC). Although income per capita in T&T has increased significantly 
within the last five years of the analysis, this has been due primarily to an increase 
in commodity prices and windfall revenues from petroleum and natural gas 
exports. This increase in GDP per capita does not necessarily reflect an increase 
in real purchasing power for the entire population. It is therefore assumed that 
demand would be similar to those in LMC. Given these assumptions, it is possible 
to calculate implied demand elasticities within the T&T domestic market 
{(Change in demand/Original demand) divided by (Change in price/Original 
                                                 
23 Source: IEA and includes import prices in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Canada and USA. 
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Price)}.  For example in 2008 this gives an implied price elasticity of -1.24.  This 
compares to estimates in the US since 1990 of between -0.5 and -1.1. 
4. Opportunity cost. The implied crude oil savings in domestic consumption of 
petroleum products are now assumed to be exported at the international price. 
These possible additional revenues represent the opportunity cost of subsidies in 
the domestic petroleum products market. This is shown as actual US$ amounts in 
Tables 4.6a and 4.6b below and as a per cent of government oil revenues in figure 
4.2. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Weighted average of domestic and international prices of petroleum products (USD/litre) 
 Domestic International Ratio 
1990           0.28            0.36            1.28  
1991           0.28            0.35            1.25  
1992           0.36            0.35            0.99  
1993           0.33            0.35            1.04  
1994           0.30            0.34            1.13  
1995           0.31            0.35            1.10  
1996           0.31            0.36            1.17  
1997           0.31            0.36            1.17  
1998           0.31            0.33            1.08  
1999           0.31            0.29            0.94  
2000           0.31            0.38            1.24  
2001           0.31            0.37            1.18  
2002           0.31            0.34            1.11  
2003           0.32            0.39            1.22  
2004           0.34            0.47            1.37  
2005           0.34            0.60            1.74  
2006           0.34            0.67            1.96  
2007           0.34            0.72            2.12  
2008           0.35            0.59            1.69  
Petroleum products refer to: petrol (gasoline), diesel, kerosene and LPG 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
Table 4.6a  Opportunity cost of petroleum products usage in T&T (1990 – 1999) 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GNI USD 
Billion 
            
4.7  
            
4.9  
            
5.0  
            
4.2  
            
4.5  
            
4.8  
            
5.2  
            
5.3  
            
5.7  
            
6.4  
Price 
(USD/b) 
22.7 19.6 18.7 16.4 15.7 17.2 20.7 19.3 12.6 17.4 
Ratio of 
Domestic 
prices to 
World prices 
(%) 
1.28 1.25 0.99 1.04 1.13 1.1 1.17 1.17 1.08 0.94 
Implied 
Domestic 
Price USD/b) 
17.74 15.66 18.93 15.75 13.95 15.63 17.73 16.46 11.66 18.49 
Price 
difference 
4.98 3.95 -0.28 0.63 1.79 1.6 2.96 2.8 0.89 -1.07 
Petroleum 
Products 
Consumption 
(Mboe) 
4.99 5.5 5.34 4.65 4.71 4.84 5.13 5.37 5.66 5.41 
Petroleum 
Products 
Consumption 
(boe per 
capita) 
4.1 4.48 4.31 3.73 3.75 3.83 4.03 4.2 4.41 4.19 
Petroleum 
Products 
Consumption 
(boe per 
capita) 
1.23 1.24 1.47 1.44 1.46 1.52 1.59 1.66 1.67 1.67 
Opportunity 
cost M USD 
17.43 15.73 -0.98 1.81 5.16 4.66 9.21 9.1 3.13 -3.48 
Opportunity 
cost as % of 
GNI 
0.40% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.10% -
0.10% 
Opportunity 
cost as % of 
Government 
Oil Revenues 
 2% 0% 1% 2% 1% 2% 3% 2% -1% 
 
118 
 
Table 4.6b Opportunity cost of petroleum products usage in T&T (2000–2008) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GNI USD 
Billion 
            
7.5  
            
8.3  
            
8.5  
          
10.6  
          
12.9  
          
15.2  
          
18.4  
          
20.8  
          
23.1  
Price 
(USD/b) 
28.1 24.0 24.4 28.7 36.9 51.7 62.9 70.4 97.8 
Ratio of 
Domestic 
prices to 
World prices 
(%) 
1.24 1.18 1.11 1.22 1.37 1.74 1.96 2.12 1.69 
Implied 
Domestic 
Price 
(USD/b) 
22.64 20.29 22.00 23.54 26.88 29.73 32.00 33.18 57.86 
Price 
difference 
5.49 3.69 2.42 5.16 10.02 21.96 30.87 37.24 39.96 
Petroleum 
Products 
Consumption 
(Mboe) 
5.56 5.56 5.33 5.21 5.35 5.90 6.90 7.03 7.63 
Petroleum 
Products 
Consumption 
(boe per 
capita) 
4.30 4.28 4.08 3.98 4.07 4.48 5.21 5.29 5.72 
Petroleum 
Products 
Consumption 
(boe per 
capita) 
1.73 1.76 1.79 1.83 1.87 1.91 1.95 1.99 2.03 
Opportunity 
cost M USD 
18.26 12.12 7.24 14.51 28.97 74.23 133.28 163.38 196.84 
Opportunity 
cost as % of 
GNI 
0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 
Opportunity 
cost as % of 
Government 
Oil Revenues 
3% 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 5% 
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Figure 4.2 Opportunity cost of petroleum subsidies as a per cent of government oil revenues 
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On average, the calculated opportunity cost of petroleum products subsidy due to 
domestic overconsumption has been US$37.4 million or 0.3 per cent of GNI over the 
period 1990 to 2008. However, the opportunity cost has varied significantly with a 
standard deviation of about US$ 58.3 million. The range has been from US$(3.5) million 
to US$196.8 million.  Although the calculated opportunity costs have risen significantly 
by about 1000 per cent from 1990 to 2008 in current values, as a per cent of GNI, it has 
only doubled since GNI has risen by five-fold in current value terms from US$4.7 billion 
to US$23.1 billion. There have been some years when the opportunity cost has been 
negative, particularly in 1992 and 1999 when the price of crude oil was very low, which 
meant that the government effectively did not have to provide a subsidy to the State oil 
company (Petrotrin) for the supply of fuels to the domestic market.  
 
As a per cent of government revenues from the oil industry, the subsidy has risen 
significantly since 1991. In 1991 the estimated opportunity cost of the subsidy was 
approximately 2 per cent of government oil revenues and rose to 5 per cent in 2008.  
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Although the opportunity cost as a per cent of government oil revenue undulated over the 
study period, from 2002 to 2008 there was a steady increase each year, reflecting the rise 
in international oil prices. Admittedly, the opportunity cost as a per cent of GNI does not 
appear to be significant, but when opportunity costs are compared to government oil 
revenues, which can be used as a proxy for the proportion of oil sector rents collected by 
the government, the level of dissipation of oil rents via fuel subsidies becomes clearer.  
Total subsidies (which are greater than the opportunity costs – price differential 
multiplied by total consumption) as a per cent of total government oil revenues are also 
very high – as much as 8.5 per cent in 200724.  
 
As comparators, the World Bank has also produced opportunity cost estimates for Iran 
and Ecuador. With respect to Iran, the Bank estimates that the opportunity cost of energy 
subsidies equate to about 10 per cent of GDP per annum, with electricity subsidies 
accounting for about one third or up to about 3 per cent of GDP. This is primarily the 
result of domestic prices being relatively low when compared to border prices. In 
Ecuador, petroleum product subsidies have been estimated to be about 2.6 per cent of 
GNI in 2005. 
4.4 Opportunity costs associated with subsidised domestic electricity 
consumption 
Energy subsidies extend beyond the direct consumption of petroleum products and also 
include electricity consumption. In T&T, electricity use is also subsidised.  The following 
brief section provides an evaluation of the opportunity costs of domestic electricity 
consumption in T&T. To calculate the opportunity cost of electricity usage in T&T, 
World Bank data on per capita electricity consumption are used. There is also an 
assumption that without electricity subsidies per capita electricity assumption would be 
similar to that in Jamaica and Venezuela (countries within close proximity of T&T and 
with similar climates). The average electricity usage of both countries has been used as 
the reference. Electricity in T&T is generated using natural gas. To estimate the natural 
                                                 
24 Author’s estimates. 
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gas that could be sold externally if electricity usage was at the reference points for 
Jamaica and Venezuela, data on natural gas consumption for the generation of electricity 
in T&T was gleaned from the Regulated Industries Commission of T&T. 
 
If electricity consumption was lower and closer to that of the reference countries, it is 
estimated that over the period 1995 to 2002 (available data points), per capita electricity 
consumption would have been on average 32 per cent less. It is assumed that less 
electricity consumption would have released excess natural gas to be sold on the 
international market.  It is assumed that this gas would have fetched an international price 
based on the Henry hub prices in the United States. The summary calculations are shown 
in the table below. The analysis using the limited data available on electricity 
consumption and gas used for electricity generation shows that for the period 1995 to 
2002, the domestic overconsumption of electricity (due to price subsidies) ranged from 
0.5 per cent to 1.7 per cent of GNI. When these estimates are added to the previous 
opportunity cost estimates for petroleum products for these years, total opportunity cost 
of energy subsidies ranges from 1 per cent to 2.2 per cent of GNI. Petroleum product 
subsidies increased significantly over the period 2005 to 2008. Unfortunately, data was 
not available for these years to estimate the opportunity cost of electricity subsidies. 
However, if it is assumed that electricity subsidies increased by the same magnitude as 
petroleum subsidies from 2002 to 2008, then total energy subsidies in 2008 could have 
been as much as 11 per cent of GNI. 
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Table 4.7  Opportunity costs associated with domestic electricity overconsumption due to price subsidies 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
T&T per 
capital 
electricity 
usage kWh 
3,077.60 3,216.20 3,587.60 3,698.80 3,735.90 3,907.00 4,012.30 3,998.10 
Reference 
per capital 
electricity 
consumption 
kWh 
2,366.80 2,402.30 2,445.30 2,468.40 2,451.80 2,487.60 2,529.00 2,594.30 
% 
Difference 
23.10% 25.30% 31.80% 33.30% 34.40% 36.30% 37.00% 35.10% 
Population 1,264,623 1,272,004 1,278,582 1,284,486 1,289,934 1,295,100 1,299,999 1,304,624 
Total GWh 
savings 
         899        1,035        1,460        1,580        1,656        1,838        1,928        1,831  
Henry Hub 
prices / 
mmbtu 
1.69 2.76 2.53 2.08 2.27 4.23 4.07 3.33 
Opp cost US 
$ m 
24.3 43.8 52.7 43.2 52.5 128.3 121 88.8 
Opp cost as 
% of GNI 
0.50% 0.84% 0.99% 0.76% 0.82% 1.70% 1.46% 1.01% 
 
Table 4.8  Opportunity cost of total energy subsidies (% of GNI) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Petroleum 
product  
0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.10% -0.10% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 
Electricity 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 
Total 
Energy 
1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 2.2% 1.1% 1.1% 
 
The analysis has shown that the opportunity cost of subsidised petroleum products 
consumption in T&T’s domestic market has risen significantly. This has correlated with 
rising petroleum prices and hence rising government revenues. As a percentage of GNI, 
the opportunity cost stood at close to 1 per cent of GNI in 2008 and 5 per cent of 
government oil revenues. These subsidies are meant to smooth the real purchasing power 
of domestic households when there are rising fuel prices, effectively protecting the most 
vulnerable in society. Subsidised electricity prices also result in domestic 
overconsumption leading to high opportunity costs. The limited data on electricity 
consumption and natural usage for electricity generation show that the opportunity costs 
associated with subsidised electricity prices are higher than the opportunity costs 
associated with petroleum product usage, e.g. in year 2000, the opportunity costs 
associated with petroleum products and electricity were 0.2 per cent and 2 per cent of 
GNI respectively. 
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However, since subsidies impose an opportunity cost in terms of foregone foreign 
exchange earnings and utilised resource rents which could be invested elsewhere in the 
economy and are not targeted, the question becomes: who is benefiting from the 
government’s untargeted expenditure decisions? Total subsidies expended on petroleum 
products were on average estimated at 6 per cent of government oil revenues between 
2004 and 2008. These are significant uses of revenues which could otherwise have been 
invested or saved.  However, these expenditures on fuel subsidies would provide 
household budgetary benefits, but which households have benefited may provide a clue 
as to their relative welfare efficiencies. The following section examines the distributional 
impacts of petroleum products subsidies in T&T and why do governments subsidise fuel 
use, which is a less than ideal use of resource rents. 
 
4.5 Fuel subsidies and distributional impacts 
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to assessing how fuel subsidies are distributed 
in T&T. Using the methodology set out in Coady et al. (2006), El Said and Leigh (2006), 
Coady and Newhouse (2006), and IMF (2006) this section attempts to show the fiscal 
distributional allocation of fuel subsidies in T&T.  Fuel subsidies are used as a case study 
to examine the distribution of government expenditure of resource rents which are not 
targeted. The steps are set out below.  However, it should be noted that this is a static 
analysis that examines current household budget benefits of the subsidy. By doing this it 
is possible to determine the amount that each household would lose if fuel subsidies are 
removed. 
 
The steps in the analysis are as follows: 
 
1. Identify the price increases to be analysed for each petroleum product. Price 
changes should reflect the necessary increases to bring domestic fuel prices to 
international prices and cost recovery prices or formula prices that add taxes to 
the formula price. For the purpose of this chapter, the relevant price increase 
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necessary in order to bring prices to international prices and to remove the 
subsidy will be calculated. This will be consistent with the earlier analysis. From 
the previous analysis in Section 4.3, during the period 1990 to 2008, on average 
the ratio of international prices to domestic prices was 1.3 with a standard 
deviation of 0.33. It therefore means that on average prices need to rise by 30 per 
cent to be at international levels. However, in the main years of analysis, years 
2000 and 2008, the ratios were 1.24 and 1.69 respectively.   
 
2. Estimate the direct impact on each household as a result of these price 
increases. Depending on the data, this can be done separately or for a group of 
products. The analysis will once more focus on four products; gasoline, diesel, 
kerosene and LPG. The use of these products comprises the majority of household 
consumption of petroleum products in T&T excluding electricity.  For example in 
1997/98 , the consumption of these four products accounted for 99 per cent of the 
consumption of fuel products (excluding electricity) in households. 
 
The impact of the resulting price increases on different household income groups will 
then be analysed based on income distribution data. This data is taken from the 
Household Budget Survey 1997/1998. The focus will be on fuel and light (excluding 
electricity) and gasoline and oil for cars expenditure. Table 3.7 shows the percentage of 
total monthly household expenditure spent on these fuels. The simple average amount 
spent on these fuels based on the household budget survey data is 2.92 per cent with a 
standard deviation of 0.01 and a weighted average of 2.5. Table 4.9 shows the 
distribution of households within the different income brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Table 4.9  Monthly expenditure on fuels for different types of households 
 Total monthly 
Expenditure 
Kerosene Progas (LPG) Gasoline & Oil 
for cars 
Total monthly 
expenditure on 
petroleum 
products 
All Income 
Groups 
3157 0.02% 0.35% 2.63% 2.99% 
<500 943 0.12% 0.68% 0.79% 1.59% 
500–999 914 0.09% 1.00% 0.51% 1.59% 
1000–1999 1436 0.04% 0.52% 1.11% 1.66% 
2000–2999 2154 0.02% 0.55% 1.60% 2.17% 
3000–3999 2847 0.02% 0.34% 2.42% 2.78% 
4000–4999 3191 0.01% 0.35% 2.65% 3.01% 
5000–5999 3886 0.03% 0.40% 2.69% 3.11% 
6000–6999 4558 0.00% 0.27% 2.90% 3.17% 
7000–7999 5253 0.00% 0.36% 3.11% 3.47% 
8000–8999 5515 0.00% 0.21% 3.13% 3.34% 
9000–9999 5564 0.13% 0.15% 3.48% 3.76% 
10000–10999 6366 0.00% 0.19% 2.89% 3.09% 
11000–11999 6377 0.00% 0.14% 2.16% 2.30% 
12000–12999 6902 0.00% 0.34% 4.28% 4.62% 
>12999 10847 0.00% 0.14% 3.96% 4.10% 
Source: Central Statistical office of Trinidad and Tobago.1997/1998 Household Budget Survey 
 
 
Table 4.10  Distribution of Households by income groups 
Income Group of Household Per cent distribution of households Average size of households 
All Income Groups 100 3.76 
<500 2.98 2.69 
500–999 7.53 2.4 
1000–1999 19.01 3.18 
2000–2999 18.29 3.77 
3000–3999 13.53 4.23 
4000–4999 9.74 4.24 
5000–5999 6.68 4.03 
6000–6999 5.57 4.31 
7000–7999 3.57 4.39 
8000–8999 2.98 4.44 
9000–9999 1.96 4.04 
10000–10999 1.45 4.09 
11000–11999 1.36 4.19 
12000–12999 0.94 4.95 
>12999 4.42 3.98 
Source: Central Statistical office of Trinidad and Tobago.1997/1998 Household Budget Survey 
 
For the purpose of this chapter, the distributional impacts in year 2000 and 2008 are 
examined. It is assumed that the income distribution in year 2000 remains constant since 
the available household budget data refers to 1997/98. The year 2000 scenario shows the 
direct impact of a price increase of 24 per cent since it was found that the price ratio 
between international and domestic prices were 1.24 in 2000 (see Table 4.6). Table 4.11 
shows the direct distributional impacts of a 24 per cent increase on different income 
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groups and this is calculated by multiplying the monthly expenditure on fuels (excluding 
electricity) by the price increase required.   
 
An increase in fuel prices and its impact on household incomes can be estimated by 
multiplying the budget shares of each fuel product by its percentage price increase.   
 
Direct impacts of increasing fuel prices by the 24 per cent (removal of subsidies) means 
that real incomes for the lowest income group (<TTD500 per month) would decrease by 
0.7 per cent and the highest income groups’ real incomes would decrease by 1.0 per cent.  
These percentages suggest that, in monetary terms, the direct fuel subsidy was worth 
about TT$3.60 per month for the lowest income household group and TT$106.80 per 
month for the highest income household groups. The direct real income distributional 
impacts of the subsidy in per cent and monetary equivalents have been shown to be 
regressive. 
 
Table 4.11  Direct distributional impact of removal of fuel subsidies 
 Total Monthly Expenditure Direct Real Income Effects 
Total monthly exp on 
petroleum products (24 per 
cent price rise) 
All Income Groups 3,157 0.7% 
<500 943 0.4% 
500–999 914 0.4% 
1000–1999 1,436 0.4% 
2000–2999 2,154 0.5% 
3000–3999 2,847 0.7% 
4000–4999 3,191 0.7% 
5000–5999 3,886 0.7% 
6000–6999 4,558 0.8% 
7000–7999 5,253 0.8% 
8000–8999 5,515 0.8% 
9000–9999 5,564 0.9% 
10000–10999 6,366 0.7% 
11000–11999 6,377 0.6% 
>12999 10,847 1.1% 
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3. Estimate the indirect impact on each household income group due to the 
resulting price increases on other goods and services.   
 
Distributional impacts have two components: the direct impact calculated above and an 
indirect impact, which assesses how the prices of all other goods and services are affected 
by an increase in fuel prices and what impact this has on real household incomes. 
 
To do this, a price-shifting model is required, which shows how higher fuel costs are 
passed on to other prices within the economy. The indirect impacts will then be added to 
the direct impacts to show how the total impact varies across different household groups. 
 
Indirect impacts 
 
To calculate the indirect impacts of the removal of fuel subsidies a price-shifting model 
must be constructed. This model utilises an input output matrix for T&T.  The latest 
available I-O matrix is for the year 2000, so any analysis from year to year would assume 
that the structure of and technologies within the economy have remained unchanged. A 
compressed I-O table for T&T is shown in Annex 4.1. Using the technical coefficients 
based on the entries within the I-O table, it is possible to determine the energy intensity 
of different sectors and how an increase in energy prices would affect the prices in all 
other sectors. 
 
Coady et al. (2006) have suggested that the implications for higher costs associated with 
increased fuel prices depends on the structure of the economy and whether commodities 
are traded internationally or non-traded, the nature of commodity taxes, and whether 
prices are controlled by government. They suggest that economic sectors should be 
grouped into three broad categories which reflect the relationship between higher 
production costs and output prices.   
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These groups are: 
 
Cost push sectors, where higher production costs are pushed fully onto output prices. 
These can be considered as non-traded commodities. 
 
Traded sectors, where outputs compete against internationally traded goods and whose 
output prices are determined by world prices and the import or export tax regime.  
Producers are therefore unable to pass on the full cost increase to consumers and must 
bear the brunt of higher costs associated with the removal of the subsidy. 
 
Controlled sectors, where prices are controlled by the government and therefore the 
relationship between prices and costs depends on how the government adjusts controlled 
prices. If controlled prices are not adjusted then the burden of higher costs are borne by 
factor prices, profits or government revenue. 
 
Coady et al. suggest that, for modelling purposes, one must assume that within aggregate 
commodity categories (those in I-O tables), that each is made up of fixed proportions of 
cost push, α, traded, λ, and controlled, β, commodities. These proportions when summed, 
would obviously equate to 1.   
 
To examine the effect of higher costs on all other prices, the technology of domestic 
firms are captured in an input-output coefficient matrix, A, where the typical entry aij 
denotes the cost of input I in producing one unit of output J. It is assumed that unit prices 
are normalised to unity, so that price changes can be interpreted as percentage changes. 
The basic premise is that A captures the underlying Leontief fixed coefficient production 
technology, so that entries (aij‘s) can be interpreted as the change in the cost of producing 
a unit of j due to a price change in input i.  
 
Using the input output coefficient matrix, A, and assuming factor prices are fixed, the 
change in producer prices are derived as follows: 
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*
 
 
where: 
 
c
p  – change in producer prices 
c
q  – change in cost-push prices  
 
*
q  –  change in traded prices 
 
^
q  – change in controlled prices 
 
∆ – 1xn column price change vectors 
 
α, λ, β – nxn diagonal matrices 
 
For the purpose of the analysis and for ease of calculation, the model is transposed and 
column vectors are used. It is also assumed that all price increases are affected through 
the value added component of the model via an increase in taxes (removal of subsidies) 
that brings the controlled prices in the fuel sectors to international prices. Using the 
method outlined in Miller and Blair (2009) this gives:   
 
'vpAp c
cc
  
 
 
which leads to: 
  'vAIp c
c
  
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where  
  LAI  1  is the Leontief Inverse Matrix and 'v c  is the price vector of value added. 
 
If the model is transposed and expressed in terms of column vectors it becomes: 
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c
LAIp ''
1


 
 
 
It is assumed that all changes occur through changes in value added components of the 
sector i.e. taxes. Furthermore, it is also assumed for the purpose of this paper and 
following the logic of Coady et al. (2006), that all price changes occur in the controlled 
sector and that all other sectors are cost-push sectors. This seems to be a reasonable 
assumption since most effects are through distribution and transport costs. 
 
It is also assumed that fuel prices (excluding electricity) would need to increase by 24 per 
cent per cent maintaining the earlier assumption for year 2000 and 69 per cent for 2008. 
 
The price-shifting model predicts the following changes in aggregate sector prices in 
Table 3.10 for the price increase scenario in year 2000. Besides petroleum products and 
oil and gas distribution which have been used as proxies for the increase in prices, the 
most notable shift in prices within other sectors have occurred in; fishing, sugar 
manufacturing, meat processing, fish processing, fruit and vegetables processing, paper 
converters, construction materials, iron and steel, petrochemicals, water construction and 
transport. The price-shifting model predicts that the sector with the largest price impacts 
would be the transport sector, which seems obvious given the high level of petroleum 
products used by this sector. The Direct Requirements Matrix, shows that within the 
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transport sector, for every TT$1 of output, petroleum products account for about 27 per 
cent of costs. Transport costs are also a significant proportion of costs for many other 
sectors. Given the shift in prices predicted by the model, it is possible to calculate the 
distributional impacts of these price increases by examining the spending habits of 
different household groups. 
 
Table 4.12  Changes in aggregate prices due to an increase in selected petroleum product prices 
Sector  Petroleum products price increase = 24 % 
Agriculture 0.2% 
Forestry 0.2% 
Fishing 3.3% 
Oil & Gas Production 0.3% 
Service Contractors 0.6% 
Quarries & Asphalt 0.9% 
Sugar Factories 1.2% 
Meat Processors 0.7% 
Poultry Processors 0.4% 
Dairy Factories 0.6% 
Fruit & Vegetable Processors 0.3% 
Fish Processors 2.5% 
Feed & Flour Mills 0.1% 
Bakeries 0.3% 
Misc. Food Manufacturers 0.6% 
Alcohol/Soft Drinks/Tobacco 0.8% 
Textiles 0.5% 
Printing 0.6% 
Paper Converters 1.5% 
Wood 0.2% 
Construction Materials 1.7% 
H/hold Chemicals 0.1% 
H/hold Appliances 0.3% 
Iron & Steel 1.2% 
Petroleum Products (proxy) 24.3% 
Gas Processing 0.3% 
Petrochemicals 1.1% 
Plastic Products 0.3% 
Other Manufacturing 0.6% 
Electricity 0.1% 
Water 1.0% 
Construction 1.4% 
Oil & Gas Distribution (proxy) 24.7% 
W/sale & Retail Distribution 0.1% 
Restaurants 0.1% 
Hotels & Guest Houses 0.6% 
Transport 6.9% 
Communication 0.3% 
Finance 0.3% 
Insurance 0.2% 
Business Services 0.3% 
Government 0.1% 
Education  0.0% 
Health 0.2% 
Personal Services 0.4% 
 
Once more, using the data from the household budget survey for T&T, it is possible to 
predict how various price increases throughout the economy will affect real incomes. 
Tables 4.13a and 4.13b show the approximate percentage expenditure by various 
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households on different products. The next step, therefore, is to map the predicted price 
increases of the price-shifting model to the household expenditure table to estimate the 
indirect impact on real incomes caused by the removal of petroleum product subsidies 
and an implied petroleum products price increase of 24 per cent in 2000. 
 
Table 4.13a  Household spending categories as a percentage of total monthly household expenditure 
Income 
Group of 
Household 
Total Food Meals 
Out 
Alcoholic 
Drinks 
Tobacco Clothing 
and 
Footwear 
Accommodation Fuel 
and 
Light 
Households 
Supplies 
Transport-
ation 
All 
Income 
Groups 
3,157 16% 3% 1% 1% 7% 22% 5% 10% 17% 
<500 943 28% 2% 2% 2% 7% 18% 8% 7% 8% 
500–999 914 26% 1% 1% 2% 5% 24% 9% 8% 10% 
1000–1999 1,436 23% 2% 1% 1% 7% 23% 7% 8% 11% 
2000–2999 2,145 22% 2% 1% 1% 7% 21% 6% 9% 13% 
3000–3999 2,847 18% 3% 2% 1% 8% 19% 6% 11% 13% 
4000–4999 3,191 17% 3% 2% 0% 8% 21% 6% 11% 14% 
5000–5999 3,886 16% 3% 2% 1% 7% 21% 5% 9% 16% 
6000–6999 46 14% 3% 1% 0% 7% 23% 4% 10% 20% 
7000–7999 53 14% 3% 1% 0% 7% 22% 4% 10% 19% 
8000–8999 5,515 13% 3% 1% 0% 7% 24% 4% 9% 16% 
9000–9999 5,564 10% 3% 2% 0% 7% 24% 4% 10% 20% 
10000–
10999 
6,366 9% 3% 1% 0% 7% 28% 5% 9% 19% 
11000–
11999 
6,377 13% 2% 1% 0% 8% 21% 4% 14% 19% 
12000–
12999 
6,902 14% 3% 1% 1% 5% 29% 5% 9% 16% 
>12999 10,847 8% 3% 1% 0% 5% 24% 4% 11% 24% 
 
Table 4.13b  Household spending categories as a percentage of total monthly household expenditure 
Income 
Group of 
Household 
Total Medical 
Goods and 
Services 
Foreign 
Travel 
Entertain-
ment 
Education Personal 
Care 
Hygiene 
and 
Services 
Miscellaneous 
goods and 
services  
Home 
grown 
Food 
Gifts 
Received 
All Income 
Groups 
3,157 5% 2% 4% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
<500 943 6% 2% 3% 2% 2% 4% 1% 0% 
500–999 914 4% 0% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2% 1% 
1000–1999 1,436 5% 0% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 
2000–2999 2,145 5% 0% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 
3000–3999 2,847 5% 1% 4% 2% 3% 2% 2% 1% 
4000–4999 3,191 4% 1% 4% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 
5000–5999 3,886 5% 2% 5% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 
6000–6999 46 5% 1% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0% 
7000–7999 53 4% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 1% 0% 
8000–8999 5,515 6% 1% 5% 3% 2% 3% 1% 0% 
9000–9999 5,564 3% 2% 4% 5% 2% 2% 1% 0% 
10000–
10999 
6,366 3% 1% 5% 5% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
11000–
11999 
6,377 4% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 
12000–
12999 
6,902 6% 1% 4% 2% 3% 2% 1% 0% 
>12999 10,847 3% 5% 4% 4% 2% 2% 0% 1% 
Central Statistical office of Trinidad and Tobago.1997/1998 Household Budget Survey 
 
The mapping of price-shifting categories to household budget expenditure categories is 
shown in annex 4.1. The increase in food prices based on the price-shifting model was 
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calculated as a weighted average of food purchases for the mean of all households. All 
other consumer products were matched as closely as possible to the price-shifting model 
categories. The price shifting model then translates what the impact of an increase in 
petroleum product prices would be on all other prices. For example, in 2000 it was 
estimated that a 24 per cent increase in the price of petroleum products would increase 
alcohol, tobacco and soft drinks by 0.8 per cent and household appliances by 0.3 per cent.  
These are based on the share of costs that petroleum products account for in each of these 
consumption items. The price shifting model predicts this for all household consumption 
items.  Based on the percentage share of expenditure that all household income groups 
spend on each of the consumption items, it is then possible to estimate what the real 
income effect of the subsidy is for each of the consumption items and aggregate this to 
the total household consumption level.  The price model therefore estimates how prices 
of the goods and services consumed by all households will rise with the removal of the 
subsidy.  For example the removal of the subsidy in year 2000, would have equated to a 
24 per cent increase in petroleum product prices.  This increase leads to an increase in the 
prices of other products and services consumed by households. This means that all 
income groups would have spent an additional TT$48 per month or TT$576 per annum 
on all goods and services excluding direct consumption of petroleum products, this 
equates to 1.5 per cent of total consumption expenditure and therefore 1.5 per cent of real 
income indirect effects of the subsidy in 2000.  This is shown in table 4.14.  The 
percentage real income effect varies by household income group, e.g. the lowest income 
group experiencing an indirect benefit of 1 per cent and the highest income group 
experiencing an indirect benefit of 2.2 per cent. 
 
Table 4.14 shows the indirect impact on real incomes of different household income 
groups from an increase in petroleum prices in year 2000. 
 
Table 4.15 shows the total real income effects of the subsidy in year 2000, when the 
direct benefits and the indirect benefits are added together.  The lowest income group 
received income benefits of 2.2 per cent and the highest income group benefit received 
real income benefits of 3.2 per cent. 
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Table 4.14 Indirect real income effects  (24% increase in the price of petroleum products) (year 2000) 
  24% increase in 
petroleum product prices 
 
Income Group of Household Total Monthly Exp Percentage Real income effect 
of Subsidy 
TT$ Real Monthly income 
effect of Subsidy 
All Income Groups 3,157 1.5% 48 
<500 943 1.0% 10 
500–999 914 1.0% 9 
1000–1999 1,436 1.1% 15 
2000–2999 2,145 1.2% 26 
3000–3999 2,847 1.3% 36 
4000–4999 3,191 1.3% 43 
5000–5999 3,886 1.5% 57 
6000–6999 4,558 1.7% 76 
7000–7999 5,253 1.7% 88 
8000–8999 5,515 1.5% 81 
9000–9999 5,564 1.8% 99 
10000–10999 6,366 1.6% 102 
11000–11999 6,377 1.7% 106 
12000–12999 6,902 1.4% 95 
>12999 10,847 2.2% 240 
 
Evaluate the targeting efficiency of fuel subsidies.   
 
IMF (2006) states that one of the major motivations of fuel subsidies is to protect the real 
incomes of low-income households within the economy. However, it is important to 
understand the ‘targeting efficiency’ of the subsidy, i.e. how much of the total subsidy 
actually accrues to low income groups. The importance of this idea is stated by the 
authors in IMF (2006); they show that, even if the distribution of the subsidies are 
progressive in terms of percentage of household incomes (i.e. as a per cent of income the 
benefits are higher for lower-income households than for higher-income households), the 
subsidies can still be badly targeted, in the sense that lower-income households receive 
less than their population share. 
 
Table 4.15 shows the total real income effects on households from an increase in 
petroleum price subsidies. The estimates suggest that the benefits of petroleum subsidies 
are regressively distributed. The lowest-income household group (<TT$500 per month) 
received between TT$13 per month (TT$156 per annum) in real income benefits from the 
subsidies, while the highest-household income group received about TT$348 per month 
(TT$4,176 per annum) of real income benefits. It is clear that untargeted expenditure of 
rents can be regressively distributed and this may, in the long term, have impacts on the 
sustainability of development in T&T. The expenditure of rents should be targeted 
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towards an increase in investment in alternative forms of capital as the natural capital is 
depleted. While subsidies are meant to smooth real incomes and hence contribute to 
household savings (a form of capital), untargeted subsidies may not be delivering an 
accumulation of wealth that is evenly or equitably distributed. 
 
Table 4.15 Total real income effect of an increase in petroleum product prices in T&T 
  24% increase in 
petroleum product prices 
 
Income Group of Household Total Monthly Exp Percentage Real income effect 
of Subsidy 
TT$ Real Monthly income 
effect of Subsidy 
All Income Groups 3,157 2.21% 70 
<500 943 1.42% 13 
500–999 914 1.41% 13 
1000–1999 1,436 1.46% 21 
2000–2999 2,145 1.72% 37 
3000–3999 2,847 1.98% 56 
4000–4999 3,191 2.03% 65 
5000–5999 3,886 2.17% 84 
6000–6999 4,558 2.47% 113 
7000–7999 5,253 2.48% 130 
8000–8999 5,515 2.28% 126 
9000–9999 5,564 2.68% 149 
10000–10999 6,366 2.30% 146 
11000–11999 6,377 2.26% 144 
12000–12999 6,902 2.47% 171 
>12999 10,847 3.21% 348 
 
 
Distributional effects in 2008 
 
Similar calculations were also conducted for 2008. Using the same input-output table
25
 
and 2008/2009 household budget survey data, Table 4.16 shows the comparison of the 
income effects between 2000 and 2008. In 2008, the ratio between international and 
domestic prices was 1.69 (as shown in Table 4.6).  Therefore as before, in 2008 fuel 
prices needed to rise by 69 per cent to eliminate the subsidy. The direct and indirect 
effects of this price adjustment have been calculated and these are shown juxtaposed to 
the 2000 estimates for ease of comparison. The year 2000 income groups have been 
aggregated for comparison with the year 2008 data. The 69 per cent increase in fuel 
prices in 2008 equates to approximately TT$132 per month in real income benefits for 
                                                 
25 There has not been an updated I-O table since 2000, however, officials at the Central Statistical Office 
have verified that the structure of the economy has not changed significantly since 2000. Therefore, using 
the existing I-O model to calculate indirect income effects in 2008 is justifiable. 
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the lowest income groups and TT$638 per month in real income benefits for the highest 
income groups. In 2008, fuel subsidies had a much higher impact on household real 
incomes, increasing real incomes between 3.6 per cent and 7.3 per cent compared to 1.4 
per cent to 2.5 per cent in 2000.  This increased impact on real incomes is due mainly to 
the higher level of subsidies in 2008 due to higher international prices for fuel products. 
 
This comparative analysis between the year 2000 and 2008 show the greater regressive 
distributions of rents via subsidies when fuel prices and government rent receipts are 
higher. Thus energy revenues as a per cent of GDP were 6.4 per cent and 21.2 per cent in 
2000 and 2008 respectively. This has coincided with the distribution of subsidies 
regressing further over this period (see Figure 4.3 and Table 4.16 below). It should be 
noted that there are two effects driving the analysis. The first is a price increase from year 
2000 to 2008 and the second is the difference in distributions between the years of 
analysis.  
 
 
Figure 4.3  Household income group subsidy distribution 2000 and 2008 (constant 2000 prices) 
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Table 4.16: Total real income effect of an increase in petroleum product prices in T&T (2000 & 2008) 
 2008   2000   
Income Group 
of Household 
per month 
Total Monthly 
Exp TT$ 
69% increase 
in Petroleum 
Products Price 
 Total Monthly 
Exp TT$ 
24% increase 
in Petroleum 
Products Price 
 
  Total 
Percentage 
Real Income 
Effect 
TT$ Real 
Income Effect 
per month 
 Total 
Percentage 
Real Income 
Effect 
TT$ Real 
Income Effect 
per month 
All Groups    7,049  6.7%       469     3,157  2.2%         70  
< 1,000    3,637  3.6%       132        922  1.4%         13  
1000– 2999    2,850  4.0%       114     1,784  1.6%         29  
3000– 4999    3,968  5.0%       197     2,991  2.0%         60  
5000– 6999    5,174  5.6%       291     4,192  2.3%         97  
7000– 8999    6,440  6.1%       394     5,372  2.4%       128  
9000– 
10999 
   7,898  6.7%       532     5,905  2.5%       148  
11000– 
12999 
   8,781  7.3%       638     6,592  2.3%       155  
>12,999       13,022  7.8%           1,018           10,847  3.2% 348 
 
4.5 Discussion 
The methodology used to estimate the opportunity cost of petroleum products 
consumption and electricity consumption in Trinidad and Tobago has followed the 
approach set out in World Bank (2003), where the opportunity cost of fuel subsidies was 
estimated for Iran.  The opportunity cost estimates assume that lower energy domestic 
prices due to subsidies leads to over consumption.  To account for this it is assumed that 
if prices were allowed to rise to world prices then consumption of petroleum products 
would decrease to the average level of lower middle income countries.  This is a 
shortcoming of the analysis which needs further researched in the future.  The analysis 
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could be improved if an actual assessment of the price elasticities was conducted.  This 
would have provided more accurate estimates for T&T energy reform. 
The omission of actual price elasticities for T&T is also a short coming of the 
distributional analysis. However, the analysis of the distributional impacts of energy 
subsidies is meant to be static and in many ways only accounts for the static real income 
effects.  It is possible that the analysis could include a dynamic component to account for 
demand elasticities as prices increase with the removal of subsidies.  However, for the 
purpose of this analysis the results are meant to show the status quo real income effects 
on different household income groups, so the static analytical approach allows us to this. 
 
Another improvement in the analysis could be the inclusion of price assumptions for 
different sectors of the economy to accurately account for controlled, traded and cost-
push sectors of the economy.  Further research on these sectors and the price implications 
is required.   
 
4.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Price subsidies for energy can impose significant opportunity costs and when they are 
untargeted also have regressive distributions. The governments of petroleum and energy-
exporting countries like T&T tend to provide energy subsidies for domestic consumption 
as an avenue for distributing energy rents and for supporting household real incomes. 
Unfortunately, the benefits and costs of fuel subsidies are seldom evaluated. The analysis 
of this chapter has examined the opportunity costs of fuel subsidies and found that there 
are considerable opportunity costs associated with fuel subsidies and electricity.  
Furthermore, the benefits associated with fuel subsidies are skewed towards higher 
income households. By looking at domestic fuel use and prices and comparing these to 
international use and prices, opportunity costs of petroleum products and electricity have 
been estimated. In addition to this, the relative distributional benefits of petroleum 
product subsidies have been assessed for household income groups over two periods.  
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The analysis has shown that the estimated opportunity cost of fuel subsidies can be 
significant. As a percentage of total government revenues from the oil sector, petroleum 
product subsidies rose 5 per cent in 2008. Total subsidies as a per cent of total 
government oil revenues were also high. From 2000 to 2008 the total subsidies have been 
estimated to be on average 5 per cent of government oil revenues, rising to 8.5 per cent in 
2007 and almost 1 per cent of GNI in 2007 and 2008. The opportunity costs associated 
with subsidised electricity prices are even more significant. In year 2000, electricity 
subsidies resulted in an opportunity cost close to 2 per cent of GNI. The overall objective 
of the subsidy has been to smooth the consumption paths of households within T&T and 
to have predictable domestic fuel prices despite international fluctuations. If it is assumed 
that electricity subsidies grew at the same pace as petroleum subsidies, then total energy 
subsidies in 2008 could have been as high as 11 per cent of GNI.  These estimates are 
comparable to the World Bank’s study of energy subsidies in Iran. That study found that 
the opportunity cost of energy subsidies was approximately 10 per cent of GDP.  The 
estimates presented for Trinidad and Tobago are also comparable to the estimates of 
other countries showed in table 4.1.  However it is worth noting that future research is 
needed to estimate the different component of the subsidies, i.e. implicit and explicit 
subsidies. 
 
Subsidies are thought to be mechanisms whereby governments are able to distribute oil 
and gas rents to the population, thereby benefiting households’ real income. However, the 
distribution analysis has shown that wealthier households gain greater benefits from 
subsidies than their poorer counterparts. In 2008, the poorest households received real 
income benefits of 3.6% of income or TT$132 per month while the wealthiest households 
received real income benefits equivalent to 7.8 per cent of income or TT$1,018 per 
month.  Where there is income inequality and wealthier households can use more fuel 
than poorer households, untargeted subsidies may not benefit the most vulnerable in 
society. The real income household impacts and hence household savings from the 
untargeted distribution of rents may allow wealthier households to save more than their 
poorer counterparts.   
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These results are comparable to distributional analyses conducted by other authors. 
Coady et al (2010) found that petroleum subsidies globally are highly regressive and 
most of the benefits accrue to high-income households.  They found that the benefits of 
gasoline subsidies are the most regressive with 80 per cent of total benefits accruing to 
the richest 40 per cent of households.  Similarly for diesel and LPG respectively, 65 per 
cent and 70 per cent of total benefits accrue to the 40 per cent of wealthiest households. 
On average in Latin America the wealthiest 40 per cent of households receive 62.6 per 
cent of the benefits for all petroleum product subsidies, while the poorest 20 per cent 
receives only 6.3 per cent.  In Latin America, the richest 20 per cent receive 37.7 per cent 
of total benefits.  It is similar in Africa, where the richest 20 per cent of households 
receive 44.2 per cent of total benefits and the poorest quintile receives only 7.8 per cent.  
In Africa, the richest 40 per cent of households reap 65.4 per cent of total benefits, Coady 
et al. (2010) 
 
However, it is worth noting from a joint report by the IEA, OPEC, OECD and World 
Bank for the G20 summit of June 2010 reports that subsidy removal had a greater impact 
on expenditure and real income of the poorest households.  For example in Bolivia it was 
estimated that the removal of subsidies on hydrocarbon derivatives would reduce real 
income by 5.4 per cent for the bottom quintile but only by 4.1 per cent for the top 
quintile. In Ghana removal of subsidies on petrol, kerosene and LPG would result in an 
income reduction of 9.1 per cent for the 20 per cent of poorest households and a 
reduction of 8.2 per cent in income for the top income quintile.  
 
This analysis of subsidies shows that expenditure on subsidies is a poor use of resource 
rents, which benefits the wealthiest households more than the poorest.  This research 
provides distributional estimates of fuel subsidies for Trinidad and Tobago which have 
not been estimated before.  However, if wealthier households are receiving relatively 
more of the benefits of the subsidy than others, then it is also possible that there are 
interest groups which might oppose any change in energy pricing.  Poorer households 
unaware of how the benefits are shared may also be opposed to any changes.  However, 
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this analysis should shed new light on this topic and perhaps open the debate to greater 
scrutiny. 
 
The analysis of this chapter therefore leads to further research questions on the 
distribution of all subsidies financed by oil and gas rents. Furthermore, the overall 
benefits and costs subsidies should be assessed to glean the true social rate of return from 
government expenditures.  
 
However, further research questions and recommendations have arisen from this analysis 
and are now presented: 
 
1. Research on price elasticity of fuel subsidies is required to improve the 
analysis 
2. There should be annual or routine reporting of the level and distribution of 
subsidies to assist the government in assessing the efficacy of their subsidy 
regimes. 
3. Research is needed on what policy responses might be the most appropriate to 
help mitigate the impact on the poor if subsidies are removed. 
4. Research on what is the best public information campaigns that can be used to 
overcome any vested interests in maintaining the subsidy; this could be related 
to reporting as suggested in recommendation 2. 
5. Alternative mechanisms for reducing the subsidy should be examined.  If for 
example high price volatility is unwelcome by the government, then an 
automatic pricing mechanism could be used to avoid wild fluctuations in the 
price which could have extremely negative impacts on the real incomes of the 
poorest in society  
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In the next chapter, human capital accumulation will be examined. The major motivation 
here would be to show who benefits from the expenditure, savings and investments 
generated by resource rents on human capital formation (which is considered a better use 
of resource rents). Should there be alternative uses of the savings or natural resource rents 
that are targeted towards low income households, such as targeted social safety nets, or 
more desirable public expenditures that could directly impact upon low-income 
household groups such as education, health and infrastructure in the poorest 
communities? The next chapter will focus specifically on human capital accumulation 
and its distribution and education expenditure. 
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Annex 4.1 Direct Requirements Matrix 
 Agriculture  Forestry  Fishing 
 Oil & Gas 
production 
 Service 
Contractors 
 Quaries 
&Asphalt 
 Sugar 
Factories 
 Meat 
Processors 
 Poultry 
processors  Dairy factories 
 Fruit & 
Vegetable 
processors 
 Fish 
processors 
 Feed & flour 
mills  Bakeries 
 Misc. Food 
Mfgrs. 
 Alcohol/Soft 
Drinks / 
Tobacco  Textiles  Printing 
 Paper 
Converters  Wood 
 Construction 
Materials 
 H/hold 
Chemicals 
 H/hold 
Appliances  Iron & Steel  Petroleum & Gas Refineries / Refined Petroleum Products 
 Gas 
Processing 
 Petrochem -
icals 
 Plastic 
Products  Other Mfng  Electricity  Water  Construction 
 Oil & Gas 
Distribution 
 W/sale & Retail 
Distribution  Restau-rants 
 Hotels & Guest 
Houses  Transport 
 Communi-  
cation  Finance  Insurance 
 Business 
Services  Govern -ment  Educa -tion  Health 
 Personal 
Services 
Agriculture 0.02            -         -       -             -              -          0.73        0.09            0.92           0.22                 0.03           -             0.02             0.01        0.06            0.02              -        -        -             -      -                 0.00          0.01            -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          0.00            -           -      0.00               -             -                    0.01                0.01                  0.00         -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      0.00        
Forestry -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             0.12    -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                0.02        -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           0.00           -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
Fishing 0.00            -         -       -             -              -          -          0.04            -             -                   -             0.70           -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 0.02                  0.00         -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
Oil & Gas production -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 0.24          -             0.09            0.79                                                                                          0.36            0.37              -          -              0.23         -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
Service Contractors -             -         -       0.17           -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
Quaries &Asphalt -             -         -       0.00           0.01            0.06        -          -             -             -                   -             -             0.00             -          0.00            0.00              -        -        -             -      0.01               0.00          0.00            0.00            -                                                                                            -             0.00              -          0.00            0.00         -      0.02               -             -                    -                 -                    0.00         -             -         -            0.00         -                  -               0.00    -          
Sugar Factories -             -         -       -             -              -          0.13        -             -             0.03                 0.00           -             -               0.04        0.07            0.09              -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          0.00                 -               -      -          
Meat Processors 0.00            -         -       -             -              -          -          0.19            -             -                   0.00           -             -               -          0.00            -                -        0.00      -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          0.00            -           -      0.00               -             -                    0.01                0.06                  -           -             -         -            -          0.00                 -               -      -          
Poultry processors 0.00            -         -       -             -              -          -          0.13            -             -                   -             -             -               -          0.00            -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          0.05            -           -      -                 -             -                    0.05                0.03                  -           -             -         -            -          0.00                 -               0.00    -          
Dairy factories 0.00            -         -       -             -              -          -          0.00            -             0.16                 -             -             -               0.03        0.02            -                -        0.00      -             -      -                 0.00          -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          0.00            -           -      0.00               -             -                    0.00                -                    -           -             -         -            -          -                  0.00             0.01    -          
Fruit & Vegetable processors 0.00            -         -       -             0.00            -          -          0.00            -             0.01                 0.05           -             0.01             0.05        0.10            0.01              -        -        -             -      -                 0.00          -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          0.00            -           -      -                 -             -                    0.03                0.00                  0.00         -             -         -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.00    -          
Fish processors 0.00            -         -       -             -              -          -          0.00            -             -                   0.00           -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          0.00            -           -      -                 -             -                    0.00                -                    -           -             -         -            0.00         -                  -               -      -          
Feed & flour mills 0.42            -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             0.02                 -             -             0.16             0.36        0.03            0.01              -        -        -             -      -                 0.00          -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          0.00            -           -      0.00               -             -                    0.00                -                    -           -             -         -            0.00         -                  -               -      0.00        
Bakeries -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    0.00                0.01                  -           -             -         -            -          -                  0.00             0.01    -          
Misc. Food Mfgrs. 0.00            -         -       -             -              -          -          0.02            0.00           0.04                 0.00           -             0.00             0.02        0.06            0.00              -        -        0.00           -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    0.01                0.01                  0.00         -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      0.00        
Alcohol/Soft Drinks / Tobacco -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             0.13                 -             -             -               -          0.00            0.05              -        -        0.00           -      -                 -            0.00            -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      0.01               -             -                    0.01                0.04                  0.00         -             0.00       -            0.01         -                  -               -      -          
Textiles 0.00            -         -       0.00           0.00            -          -          -             -             0.00                 -             -             -               -          0.00            0.00              0.18      0.00      -             0.00    0.00               0.00          0.00            0.00            -                                                                                            -             0.00              -          0.00            -           0.00    0.00               -             -                    0.00                0.00                  0.00         0.00           0.00       -            0.00         0.00                 -               0.00    0.00        
Printing -             -         -       0.00           0.00            -          0.00        -             -             0.00                 -             -             -               -          0.00            0.00              0.00      0.00      0.00           -      -                 0.00          0.00            -              -                                                                                            -             0.00              -          0.00            -           -      0.00               -             -                    0.00                0.00                  0.00         0.00           0.01       -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.00    0.00        
Paper Converters 0.00            -         -       0.00           0.00            0.00        0.00        0.10            -             0.00                 0.00           -             0.00             0.00        0.03            0.01              0.00      0.25      0.82           0.00    0.00               0.00          0.00            -              -                                                                                            -             0.00              0.00        0.06            -           -      0.00               -             -                    0.00                -                    0.00         0.00           0.00       -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.00    0.00        
Wood -             -         -       0.00           0.01            0.01        0.00        0.00            -             0.00                 -             -             0.00             0.00        0.00            0.00              0.01      0.00      0.00           0.15    0.00               0.00          0.04            0.00            0.00                                                                                          -             0.00              0.01        0.01            -           -      0.07               -             -                    0.00                0.04                  0.00         0.00           0.00       0.00          0.00         0.00                 0.00             0.00    0.00        
Construction Materials 0.00            -         -       0.00           0.00            -          0.00        -             -             0.08                 0.00           -             0.00             -          0.00            0.03              0.00      0.00      0.00           0.00    0.22               0.00          0.01            0.03            -                                                                                            -             0.00              0.01        0.00            0.00         0.00    0.15               -             -                    0.00                0.01                  0.00         0.00           0.00       -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.01    0.00        
H/hold Chemicals 0.01            -         -       0.01           0.07            -          0.01        0.00            -             0.00                 0.00           -             0.00             0.01        0.03            0.02              0.01      0.01      0.01           0.01    0.02               0.12          0.04            0.01            -                                                                                            0.01            0.05              0.04        0.04            0.00         0.02    0.04               -             -                    0.00                0.00                  0.00         0.00           0.00       0.00          0.00         0.00                 0.00             0.01    0.00        
H/hold Appliances 0.00            -         -       0.01           0.01            0.00        -          0.00            -             0.00                 0.00           -             0.00             -          0.00            0.01              0.00      0.00      0.02           0.00    0.00               0.01          0.02            0.00            -                                                                                            0.00            0.00              0.00        0.01            -           0.01    0.05               -             -                    -                 0.00                  0.00         0.00           0.00       -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.00    0.00        
Iron & Steel -             -         0.00     0.03           0.02            0.00        0.00        -             0.00           0.00                 0.00           -             0.00             0.00        0.00            0.01              0.00      0.00      0.02           0.02    0.01               0.00          0.10            0.48            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.00              0.02        0.00            0.00         0.11    0.01               -             -                    0.00                0.01                  0.00         0.00           0.00       -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.00    0.00        
Refined Petroleum Products 0.01            0.01       0.14     0.00           0.01            0.03        0.00        0.00            0.00           0.00                 0.01           -             0.00             0.01        0.00            0.01              0.01      0.01      0.00           0.00    0.04               -            0.00            -              0.00                                                                                          0.01            0.02              0.01        0.02            -           0.03    0.03               0.02           -                    -                 0.01                  0.27         0.01           0.00       0.01          0.00         -                  0.00             0.01    0.02        
Gas Processing 0.00            -         -       0.00           0.00            0.00        0.00        0.01            -             0.00                 0.00           -             0.00             0.00        0.02            0.01              -        0.01      -             0.01    0.00               0.02          0.00            0.00            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.01              0.00        0.00            -           0.00    0.00               -             -                    -                 -                    0.00         -             -         -            -          -                  0.00             0.00    -          
Petrochem -icals -             -         -       0.00           0.00            -          0.00        -             -             0.00                 -             -             0.00             0.00        0.00            0.00              -        -        -             0.00    0.00               0.01          0.02            0.00            -                                                                                            0.00            0.00              0.01        -              -           0.00    0.00               -             -                    -                 -                    0.00         -             0.00       -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.00    -          
Plastic Products -             -         -       0.00           0.00            -          -          0.01            0.00           0.00                 0.01           -             0.00             0.00        0.04            0.00              0.00      0.06      0.01           0.01    0.00               0.00          0.00            0.00            0.00                                                                                          -             0.00              0.01        0.07            -           0.01    0.00               -             -                    0.00                0.00                  0.00         0.00           0.00       -            0.00         -                  0.00             0.00    -          
Other Mfng 0.00            -         0.00     0.00           0.01            0.00        0.00        0.01            0.00           0.01                 0.00           -             0.00             0.02        0.22            0.03              0.02      0.01      0.00           0.00    0.00               0.01          0.03            0.00            -                                                                                            0.00            0.00              0.01        0.02            0.00         0.00    0.00               -             0.06                  0.00                0.01                  0.00         0.00           0.00       0.00          0.00         0.00                 0.00             0.01    0.00        
Electricity 0.00            -         -       0.00           0.00            -          0.00        0.01            0.01           0.01                 0.00           0.00           0.00             0.01        0.01            0.01              0.01      0.01      0.00           0.01    0.04               0.01          0.01            0.07            0.01                                                                                          -             0.02              0.01        0.00            -           0.05    0.01               -             -                    -                 0.05                  0.00         0.01           0.00       0.01          0.00         0.01                 0.01             0.01    0.00        
Water -             -         -       0.00           0.00            -          -          0.00            0.00           0.00                 0.00           0.01           0.00             0.00        0.00            0.00              0.00      0.00      0.00           0.00    0.00               0.00          0.00            0.01            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.01              0.00        0.00            0.00         -      0.00               0.00           0.00                  0.00                0.01                  0.00         0.01           -         -            0.01         0.00                 0.00             0.00    0.00        
Construction -             -         -       0.01           0.03            0.01        -          0.01            0.01           0.00                 0.02           -             0.01             0.01        0.01            0.01              0.02      0.02      0.01           0.01    0.01               0.00          0.01            0.02            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.01              0.00        0.02            0.02         0.07    0.08               0.08           0.00                  0.00                0.06                  0.03         0.04           0.10       -            0.04         0.01                 0.01             0.01    0.00        
Oil & Gas Distribution -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
W/sale & Retail Distribution -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
Restau-rants -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          0.03                 -               -      -          
Hotels & Guest Houses -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
Transport -             -         -       0.01           0.02            -          0.11        0.01            0.01           0.01                 -             0.02           -               -          0.02            0.06              0.01      0.00      0.02           -      0.05               -            -             0.07            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.08              -          -              -           -      0.02               0.03           0.01                  -                 0.01                  0.03         0.01           0.01       0.00          0.01         0.00                 -               -      -          
Communi-  cation -             -         -       0.00           0.00            0.00        -          0.00            0.00           0.00                 0.00           0.00           0.00             0.00        0.00            0.00              0.00      0.00      0.00           0.00    0.00               0.00          0.00            0.00            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.00              0.00        0.00            0.00         0.00    0.00               0.00           0.00                  0.00                0.01                  0.00         0.00           0.01       0.01          0.02         0.00                 0.00             0.00    0.00        
Finance -             -         -       0.01           -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          0.11            -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             0.06            0.01                                                                                          0.03            0.02              -          -              0.07         0.27    0.02               -             0.02                  -                 -                    0.06         0.03           -         -            -          0.19                 -               -      -          
Insurance -             -         -       0.00           0.01            0.00        -          0.00            0.00           0.00                 0.00           -             0.00             0.00        0.00            0.00              0.01      0.01      0.01           0.00    0.00               0.00          0.01            0.00            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.01              0.00        0.00            0.01         0.00    0.01               0.01           0.00                  0.00                0.01                  0.01         0.00           0.00       0.00          0.01         0.00                 0.00             0.00    0.00        
Business Services -             -         -       0.01           0.05            0.00        -          0.01            0.00           0.01                 0.02           0.01           0.00             0.02        0.04            0.02              0.03      0.03      0.01           0.01    0.01               0.00          0.04            0.01            0.00                                                                                          0.00            0.04              0.01        0.02            0.01         0.05    0.02               0.03           0.01                  0.00                0.08                  0.04         0.04           0.04       0.05          0.20         0.07                 0.06             0.02    0.00        
Govern -ment -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          0.12                 -               -      -          
Educa -tion -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            0.00         -                  -               -      -          
Health -             -         -       -             -              -          -          -             -             -                   -             -             -               -          -             -                -        -        -             -      -                 -            -             -              -                                                                                            -             -                -          -              -           -      -                 -             -                    -                 -                    -           -             -         -            -          -                  -               -      -          
Personal Services -             -         -       0.00           0.01            -          -          0.00            0.00           0.00                 0.00           -             0.00             0.00        0.00            0.00              0.01      0.00      0.00           0.00    0.00               0.00          0.00            0.00            -                                                                                            0.00            0.00              0.00        0.00            -           -      -                 0.02           0.00                  0.00                0.00                  0.13         0.00           0.00       -            0.02         0.00                 0.00             0.01    0.00         
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Annex 4.2 Mapping of price increase indirect impacts 
 
Food Weighting 
Price shifting model category Household food expenditure items Weighting
Bakeries Bakery products 7%
Miscellaneous Cereal products 12%
Miscellaneous Breakfast foods 1%
Miscellaneous Prepared cereal mixes 0%
Meat processors Beef 2%
Meat processors Pork 1%
Meat processors Mutton 1%
Meat processors Other meat 0%
Meat processors Preserved meats 3%
Poultry processors Poultry 15%
Fishing Fish 4%
Fish processors Fish salted etc. 2%
Dairy factories Milk products 9%
Dairy factories Butter 1%
Dairy factories Cheese 3%
Agriculture Eggs 1%
Miscellaneous Fats and oils 6%
Agriculture Fresh fruits 3%
Fruit and vegetable processors Canned fruits 0%
Miscellaneous Dried fruits 1%
Miscellaneous Fruit juices 1%
Miscellaneous Juice concentrate 0%
Miscellaneous Packed juices 2%
Agriculture Green and other vegetables 8%
Agriculture Vegetables 0%
Fruit and vegetable processors Dried vegetables/pulses 1%
Fruit and vegetable processors Tea/cocoa/coffee 2%
Miscellaneous Condiments and sauces 3%
Miscellaneous Prep and partially prep foods 4%
Alcohol/soft drinks and tobacco Non-alcoholic 8%  
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Annex 4.3 Expenditure item (excluding food) mapping 
Price Shifting Model category Household expenditure item
Restaurants Meals out
Alcohol/soft drinks and tobacco Alcoholic drink
Alcohol/soft drinks and tobacco Tobacco
Textiles Clothing and footwear
Accommodation
Fuel and light
Other manufacturing Households supplies
Transport Transportation
Health Medical goods and services
Transport Foreign travel
Personal services Entertainment
Education Education
Personal services Personal care hygiene and services
Other manufacturing Miscellaneous goods and services 
Home grown food
Gifts received  
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Chapter Five: Education expenditure, human 
capital accumulation and distribution with 
resource abundance 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
Given the need to save or invest rents from natural resources for sustainable 
development, important questions are: Who benefits from these savings or rents, and 
does this matter for sustainable development? What is/are the major factor(s) 
influencing distributional outcome? Undoubtedly expenditure in education should be 
considered a good use of resource rents unlike expenditure on fuel subsidies.  
However, is expenditure on education alone enough for sustainable and equitable 
growth? This chapter examines in detail the accumulation of human capital and its 
distribution in T&T in an attempt to answer these questions. 
 
Differences in human capital accumulation not only between countries but also 
between groups within countries play an important part in distributional outcomes and 
also lead to the perpetuation of poverty traps. Many theorists such as Matsuyama 
(1995) and Acemoglu (1997) also predict that multiple equilibria occur within society 
due to differences in human capital investment. Ravallion (1998) found that in China, 
initial asset distribution had a significant impact on individuals’ consumption growth. 
Birdsall (1997), and Deininger & Squire (1998) have also suggested that growth is 
more negatively affected by unequal distribution of assets such as human capital than 
by income inequality. 
 
Furthermore, Santos (2009) has provided evidence which suggests that poverty traps 
will persist when unequal initial income and human capital distribution exists and in 
particular when the quality of education received by poorer and wealthier individuals 
differ.   
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This has significant policy implications for sustainable development. The poverty trap 
lowers current and steady state output as well as the growth rate and this, in turn, 
hinders the ability of the economy to lift individuals and households out of poverty.  
Therefore, human capital is an important household asset, which has a direct bearing 
on the size of household income. 
 
Birdsall et al (2001) provide a framework and proof of the negative effects that 
resource abundance, inequality and low quality human capital accumulation can have 
on growth. Birdsall et al. (1999) have also argued that countries can achieve more 
equitable and faster growth if the poor are encouraged to invest in the assets they 
control, which includes their human capital.  They argue that if returns on human 
capital are increased, then this leads immediately to increased work effort, higher 
savings higher investment, higher productivity and lower inequality in the future.  It is 
this virtuous circle of human capital accumulation, with equitable growth that helps 
explain the rapid development of most East Asian countries.  Figure 5.1 shows what 
this virtuous circle looks like. Unfortunately in resource abundant countries this 
virtuous circle is broken as Dutch disease effects and rent seeking reduce the rate of 
return on agriculture and human capital investments that are available to the poor.  
Thus where resource rents are accumulated by the government and a small number of 
business men, this leads to higher inequality and lower growth.  Birdsall et al. (2001) 
then argue that in this environment, the government attempts to assuage the poor by 
directing some of the resource rents to populist programmes including education.  
However, in this context education becomes a consumption good and not an 
investment good since the quality of education is likely to be inferior.  
 
Resource abundance has several impacts on the virtuous circle.  In resource abundant 
countries, governments focus on development strategies that are capital intensive and 
are  not dynamic outside of the natural resource sector.  The level of inequality tends 
to be higher due to Dutch disease effects and rent seeking impacts.  There are also few 
incentives for investment in education and the government builds a welfare state to 
support this.  This is very important for Birdsall et al. (2001) since if the poor have no 
incentives to invest in education due to low returns then the virtuous circle is broken.  
For the poor with only few assets under their control, primarily labour and agricultural 
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land, then investing in these might be limited due to low rates of return or lack of 
capital. For poor households considering investing in education, two variables are 
important, the rate of return, r, and the discount rate, d.  Since households prefer to 
consume today rather than save or invest for the future, if d > r, then they will not 
invest for the future.  To encourage poor household to invest for the future, r must be 
greater than d. This could come about from an improvement in local schools, or 
changes in agricultural pricing policy. 
 
However, if poor household cannot borrow, how are they expected to invest for the 
future even if r>d?  Reducing consumption to fund savings and investment might not 
be viable for many poor households that already consume a limited basket of goods 
and services.  Thus for this to happen, poor households must reap significant returns 
from working harder.  For policy makers, this means that the marginal product of 
labour must rise rapidly as labour supply increases.  Thus governments must raise the 
return on the assets held by the poor and continually increase the returns to both 
labour and skills investment, Birdsall et al. (2001).  Figure 5.1 shows what positive 
impact the government could have on the virtuous circle.  If the government provided 
quality education for the poor and at the same time pursues an export driven growth 
strategy that is labour demanding then this provides the necessary incentives for 
investment that leads to equitable development in the future. 
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Figure 5.1 Government’s impact on the virtuous circle 
 
 
 
  
Source: Birdsall et al. (2001) 
 
However, in resource abundant countries these incentives may not exist, primarily 
because rents are concentrated particularly if it is point source, Dutch disease effects 
take hold and reduces the export driven dynamism of the economy. At the same time 
education is perceived as a consumption good and not an investment.  These effects 
are shown in Figure 5.2, which shows how typical political economy considerations 
erode human capital investment incentives, by reducing returns on this type of 
investment and the export driven nature of the economy and equitable growth of the 
future are sacrificed. 
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Figure 5.2 Impact of resource abundance on virtuous circle 
 
 
Source: Birdsall et al. (2001) 
 
I now examine T&T’s experience of human capital accumulation and to assess the 
distribution of this asset and the applicability of the virtuous circle to T&T.  
 
Since T&T gained independence from Great Britain in 1962, successive governments 
have given precedence to educational attainment. The first Prime Minister, Dr. Eric 
Williams, famously said in 1960 (before becoming PM) that the future of the nation 
was carried in the school bags of children.
26
 Although expenditure on education has 
always been seen as a priority and as critical for development, relative educational 
attainment measured as mean school years is on average only about 9 years.
27
 Adult 
literacy, another crude measure of educational attainment, was fairly high at 98.8 per 
cent in 2008.  However, these crude measures of educational attainment tell us very 
little about labour market outcomes and the links between education and income.  
                                                 
26
 On August 30th, 1962, the eve of T&T’s Independence from Britain, Williams famously exhorted: 
“You, the children, yours is the great responsibility to educate your parents…you carry the future of 
[the Nation] in your school bags.” 
27 See Section 4.2. 
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Human capital measurement attempts to understand these linkages. In T&T, income 
distribution is unevenly distributed and wealthier households tend to benefit 
disproportionately more from untargeted government expenditure such as fuel and 
energy subsidies. Does the accumulation of human capital by different household 
income groups contribute to these disparities and what of the virtuous circle? To 
answer this question, policy makers need to know the levels of human capital 
accumulated by different household groups.  However, explicit estimates of human 
capital have not been calculated previously for T&T. Furthermore, the distribution of 
that human capital has not been estimated previously. 
 
There has been no previous estimate of human capital for Trinidad and Tobago.  
There are numerous methodologies that have been articulated for assessing human 
capital.  This chapter uses two methodologies to estimate the level of human capital 
for Trinidad and Tobago.  These methods are modifications of conventional 
approaches for estimating human capital.  The methods are less data intensive and are 
applicable to developing economies where all of the required data might not be 
available.  However, by using modified approaches, that are less data intensive, 
estimates of human capital can be produced where there were none previously. 
 
This chapter will therefore explore the links between human capital investment and 
distributional outcomes and assess the level of human capital investment being made 
by the Government and its overall impact on the distribution of resource rents, 
investment benefits and savings. This chapter will therefore also explore the 
relationship of T&T’s resource abundance on the virtuous circle discussed earlier. The 
quality of human capital and investments will be discussed later in the chapter. The 
following section examines general government expenditure and expenditure on 
education. 
 
 
5.1 Government expenditure and analysis of education expenditure 
Given the arguments presented above, the government’s expenditure on education 
could therefore provide an important opportunity for the accumulation of human 
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capital assets in households throughout the economy. This section examines trends in 
government expenditure over the period 1997 to 2010 
28
 and, in particular, education 
expenditure and what impact this might have on human capital accumulation. 
 
During the period 1997 to 2010, T&T’s current government expenditure rose by 250 
per cent. The largest percentage increases occurred in general public services (329 per 
cent), health/social security welfare affairs and services (229 per cent) and other 
economic services (355 per cent), while expenditure on education and transport & 
communication affairs and services increased by only 144 per cent and 115 per cent 
respectively. 
 
Table 5.1  Selected expenditure items as a share of current expenditure (constant 2000 prices) 
  1997 2000 2005 201029 
 Education Affairs  15% 14% 14% 15% 
 Health/Social 
Security Welfare 
Affairs and Services  
18% 19% 22% 24% 
Other 68% 66% 65% 61% 
Total TT$ billions 
(current) 
10.4 11.2 18.0 26.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
On average, total expenditure increased by 9 per cent per annum. However, the 
composition of expenditure has changed from 1997 to 2010. There have been 
considerable increases in the share of spend on general public services and health and 
social welfare services, while expenditure on education increased by 8 per cent per 
annum, with the largest increases occurring in tertiary education at 14 per cent per 
annum. However, the increases in primary and secondary education were on average 
only 4 per cent and 5 per cent per annum, with major increases occurring during the 
years 2001 and 2002. However, since 2002 expenditure in constant dollars on primary 
and secondary education has since levelled off, with large percentages being spent on 
tertiary education. In fact, current account expenditure on primary education has 
fallen on average in real terms by 1 per cent per annum.  
 
                                                 
28 1997–2010 detailed data on expenditure is available for this period and it covers the period of 
analysis. 
29 Estimate. 
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The share of primary and secondary education has also fallen, e.g. primary education 
expenditure has fallen to 19 per cent of total education expenditure in 2010, down 
from 33 per cent in 1998. Secondary education expenditure has also fallen, e.g. from a 
high of 31 per cent in 2003 to an estimated 21 per cent in 2010. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Education expenditure (2000 prices) 
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However, it should be noted that current expenditure in real terms per student enrolled 
in primary school has increased by 110 per cent from 1997 to 2006, since there were 
significant declines in the number of children enrolled in primary school. In 1997 
there were 181,030 students enrolled in government and government-assisted primary 
schools and this fell to 123,199 in 2006 (the latest period for which data are available) 
which is a 32 per cent reduction. The reasons for this decline in enrolment are unclear 
since enrolment in private primary schools also fell from 8,654 in 1998/99 to 6,217 in 
2005/06 (periods for which relevant data are available). There was also a decline in 
secondary school enrolment from 105,994 in 1998/99 to 96,046 in 2005/06. Exploring 
the reasons for the declines in pupil enrolment is not the focus of this chapter, 
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although these are trends that need to be explored against the backdrop of a growing 
population and the future competitiveness of the economy. 
 
Figure 5.4 Education expenditure items as a per cent of total education expenditure 
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Capital expenditure (2000–2008) 
 
Using capital formation expenditure as a proxy for investment expenditure, education 
seems to have benefited significantly from government capital investment, although 
investment expenditure on education did not grow at the fastest pace of all 
government functional areas. For the period 2000 to 2008, investment in the education 
sector grew at an annual pace of 34 per cent. However, investment in all other 
categories except public order and safety and transport & communication grew faster. 
As a share of total investment expenditure, education expenditure rose by 8 
percentage points from 14 per cent in 2000, to 23 per cent in 2008.  However, the 
housing, social security and social services functional area increased from 7 per cent 
in 2000 to 16 per cent in 2008. Interestingly, although crime and anti-social behaviour 
has risen over this period, capital expenditure on public order and safety fell from 41 
per cent of total capital formation in 2000 to 18 per cent in 2008. 
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The analysis of expenditure has shown that the spend on education has increased on a 
per capita basis due to significant declines in enrolment. The pace of increase in 
tertiary level education expenditure has been the fastest. However, an important 
policy question is how are the benefits of this expenditure distributed?  This question 
will hopefully be answered by measuring human capital accumulation later in the 
chapter.  
 
Table 5.2 Capital formation percentage of total  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Education 14% 16% 28% 31% 34% 14% 15% 24% 23% 
Health 0% 1% 7% 10% 11% 6% 2% 3% 5% 
Other 86% 84% 65% 60% 55% 80% 83% 73% 73% 
Total TT$ 
M (2000 
prices) 
        
971  
        
641  
        
802  
         
998  
      
1,343  
        
1,563  
        
1,137  
       
1,986  
        
1,789  
 
5.2 Comparing T&T’s basic educational measures with that of other 
countries 
Another pertinent question is how does T&T’s educational attainment compare to 
other countries with similar national income, location and/or economies?  Table 4.3 
shows data taken from the UN’s Human development report (UNHDR 2009) with 
2008 data for countries with similar levels of GNI per capita and which are either 
Caribbean or petroleum-based economies. Data from the UNHDR allows for easy 
comparisons between countries by using data from one source. The table refers to data 
for 2008 and shows data comparing T&T with seven countries with similar GNI per 
capita. The indicators compared are adult literacy rates, expected school years and 
mean school years. 
 
While T&T has superior adult literacy rates compared to the average of the group 
(98.8 compared to 92.8), T&T lags behind in expected school years and mean school 
years. The average expected school years are 12.6 while in T&T the score is 11.4. 
Mean school years in T&T in 2008 were 9.1 compared to the average of 9.3. Direct 
comparisons with comparator countries that are also exporters of oil and natural gas 
(Oman and Saudi Arabia) show that T&T has performed better than these countries in 
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adult literacy but is on par with Oman on expected school years and is less than Saudi 
Arabia. Data on mean school years are not available for Oman. However, mean 
school years in T&T were higher than in Saudi Arabia by about 1.5 years. 
 
A further comparison of T&T with another Caribbean country, Barbados, shows that 
T&T lags in educational attainment. Although Barbados’ GNI per capita, US$22,711, 
was less than T&T’s US$24,245 in 2008, that country has outperformed T&T in 
expected school years and is on par on adult literacy and mean school years, despite 
having fewer natural resources. 
 
 
Table 5.3  Basic education data of comparator countries (2008) 
Country Adult literacy 
rates 
Expected School 
years 
Mean school 
years 
GNI per capita 
US$ (2008) 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
99     19,661 
Bahamas   11.6 11.1 26,649 
Bahrain 89.2 14.3 9.3 33,427 
Barbados 99 13.4 9.3 22,711 
Oman 85 11.1   24,821 
Saudi Arabia 85.6 13.5 7.6 24,504 
T&T 98.8 11.4 9.1 24,245 
Average 92.8  12.6   9.3   25,145  
Standard 
Deviation 
 6.9   1.3    1.2   4,246  
Source: UN 
 
Although T&T has experienced a boom in revenues from its main natural resource 
sectors (oil and natural gas), gaps remain in human capital attainment and the labour 
force is still relatively unskilled since there have been labour force shortages in 
energy and finance, although labour surpluses exist elsewhere (Auty, 2009).  The 
following section examines these outcomes and the interaction between human capital 
distribution, education, the virtuous circle and sustainability. 
 
5.3 Measuring human capital  
Given the levels of government education expenditure in T&T over the last decade 
and a half, what impact has this had on human capital formation? 
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Measuring human capital is a notoriously difficult task and usually involves many 
assumptions. The least complicated estimates rely on years of schooling for the 
working age population and multiply this number by a mean estimate value of human 
capital. The World Bank uses an approach based on its wealth of nation estimates 
which calculates human capital as part of intangible capital, a residual component of 
total capital. The theory underlying these conclusions is the same as Hicksian theory 
of wealth and income, whereby income is assumed to be a rate of return on 
comprehensive wealth/capital within society. According to the World Bank’s 2006 
report on “Where is the wealth of nations?”, comprehensive wealth is measured as the 
present value of future consumption and intangible capital is, in effect, the residual 
that is derived when physical wealth, natural wealth and financial assets are 
subtracted from total wealth.  Thus comprehensive wealth could either be derived by 
adding up the individual components of wealth or by measuring the present value of 
consumption along a competitive development path, meaning that future consumption 
must be bound by current wealth. 
 
Since intangible capital is measured as a residual of total wealth, there are many 
missing asset values bound up within intangible wealth including, for example, 
human capital, the rule of law and some missing natural resource values. The authors 
of the World Bank’s 2006 report attempted to dissect intangible capital by examining 
the other factors that may explain the total variation in intangible capital namely 
social capital or the rule of law and human capital. They used a simple measure of 
human capital – average years of schooling per capita – but this measure had admitted 
flaws, namely that it did not account for the quality of education received and the 
apparent decline in marginal returns to education. A later World Bank report in 2011 
attempts to address these shortcomings by using a more consensus approach to 
measuring human capital, which uses a log-linear relationship between years of 
schooling and earnings.
30
 
 
The alternative methods for calculating human capital can be categorised into three 
distinct approaches according to Greaker (2008). These are: 
 
                                                 
30 First formulated by Mincer (1974). 
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1. The cost-based method which measures human capital from the input side. 
2. The revenue-generating method which measures human capital from the 
output side. 
3. The current stock characteristics method. 
 
The input side approach measures human capital by summing all expenses that 
contribute to human capital, such as public and private direct expenses related to 
education and foregone income while individuals are engaged in education. A 
comprehensive input side approach should also include employer-financed training 
and on-the-job training. Greaker, however, explains that the input side methodology 
should include a component for depreciation of human capital, since this would 
prevent the measure from becoming bigger and bigger with time. This deprecation 
component should include allowances for the long-term unemployed, people leaving 
the labour force and people beginning new careers, which all imply a reduction in the 
stock of human capital. 
 
The output side methodology estimates human capital based on the expected wages 
that a person with a particular level of education could expect to receive in the future.  
Becker (1964) calculated the rate of return on education by examining wage 
differentials between workers of different education levels. The Jorgensen and 
Fraumeni method, which is adapted and used later in this chapter, takes Becker’s 
approach further by calculating the stock of human capital through an expected wage 
approach. The Jorgensen and Fraumeni approach is discussed below with 
modifications for its adaptation to T&T’s data availability. Greaker (2008) suggests 
that the output side approach does not separate adequately human capital from social 
capital, since he assumes that a country with higher social capital may presumably 
have higher wages obtainable in the labour market. Greaker also suggests that the 
output side approach does not quantify the non-market benefits of education, such as 
the intangible yields related to higher education which are resistant to measurement. 
 
The current stock characteristics approach attempts to construct a comprehensive 
measure for the current state of human capital by including metrics on average years 
of schooling, literacy rates, unemployment rates and the health status of the general 
population. Unfortunately, an index of this type, which measures human capital, is 
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difficult to convert into a monetary measure and this makes it difficult to use with 
national wealth estimates according to Greaker (2008).
31
     
 
However, Arrow et al. (2010) use a simple Mincerian method adapted from Klenow 
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). They calculate the amount of human capital per worker 
as proportional to exp(rT), where r is the appropriate rate of interest and T is the 
average number of years of educational attainment. 
 
In theory, all three approaches should yield the same result, i.e. the cost approach 
should equal the present value sum of expected wages/returns and this should be 
equal to an estimated value of current characteristics. Greaker suggests that there are 
many reasons why this might not occur, including the intangible non-market benefits 
of education. Most measures of human capital within the sustainable development 
literature have tended to use the input side approach, such as World Bank (2006), 
while the economic growth literature has used the output side approach (Becker, 1964 
and Jorgensen & Fraumeni, 1989 and 1992). The analysis of this chapter attempts to 
use the more conventional growth theory approaches for the sustainable development 
debate and to show the trends in human capital accumulation in T&T. 
 
Two approaches are used due to data availability. The simple Mincerian approach is 
used to assess the trends in human capital accumulation from 2000 to 2008, while a 
modified Jorgensen-Fraumeni approach is used to estimate the size and distribution of 
human capital in 2008. To estimate the distribution of human capital requires more 
data such as educational attainment amongst different household income groups. The 
2008 household budget survey was the first time this level of data was collected by 
the Central Statistical Office of T&T. Therefore, trends in distribution cannot be 
estimated. The simple Mincerian approach is less data intensive and allows for the 
examination of aggregate human capital trends from one period to the next (here 2000 
to 2008). Estimating human capital using two methodologies also allows for a 
comparison of estimates between methods. 
                                                 
31 However, a monetised stock approach is used later in the chapter to estimate the trends in human 
capital accumulation due to the relatively fewer data requirements of this method and the lack of data 
for T&T. 
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5.4 Human capital estimates 
A human capital account for T&T is now presented along with an estimate of the 
distribution of human capital. 
 
Some capital stocks can be given an economic value more easily than others.  In 
Chapter 3, an attempt was made to estimate the asset value of oil and natural gas 
resources of T&T, and this was done using market prices and available data on 
resource stock and utilisation values. However, placing an economic value on human 
capital, one component of national wealth, is difficult and is very data intensive. In 
addition to ascertaining the level of human capital in T&T, an additional reason for 
calculating human capital is to assess how this critical component of capital is 
distributed, and whether the current policy of converting natural resource capital into 
human capital is having the desired outcome on sustainable development. 
 
Two methods are used to calculate estimates of human capital in T&T. The first 
method is that proposed by Arrow et al. (2010) and the second is the Jorgensen-
Fraumeni lifetime income approach. The Jorgensen-Fraumeni lifetime income 
approach is very data intensive and requires data on educational attainment and 
expected income levels for different age groups (data which has not been routinely 
collected for T&T). The first method is less data intensive than the second method 
and therefore allows for comparison of human capital accumulation over two periods 
using available data.  
 
Arrow et al. (2010) first assume that there is a steady state and, as discussed earlier, 
that the amount of human capital per worker is proportional to exp(rT). Like Arrow et 
al. (2010), it is assumed that the appropriate rate of interest, r, is 8.5 per cent per 
annum and T is average number of years of educational attainment.
32
 The stock of 
human capital is simply the per worker human capital multiplied by the total number 
of workers in the economy. This is a simplification of the Mincer model,
33
 so that the 
stock of human capital, H, is: 
                                                 
32 This is based on global estimates on the return on education estimated by Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997). 
33 Mincer (1974). 
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  LrEALHCWH  exp  
 
Where HCW is human capital per worker, EA is the weighted average years of 
educational attainment and r is rate of interest {which is taken as 8.5 per cent as per 
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997)} and L is the working age population. 
 
The human capital per worker estimate is then multiplied by the total population of 
the country that is old enough to have obtained the average level of education. 
According to Arrow et al., all adults, irrelevant of whether they are working or not, 
have human capital. For this method, the total stock of human capital increases if the 
average level of education increases or the adult population increases. 
 
The shadow price of human capital can also be calculated as the discounted sum of 
the wages that the stock of human capital would receive over the expected number of 
working years remaining. According to Arrow et al. (2010), this is the rental price of 
human capital and is calculated as the total wage bill divided by the stock of human 
capital. For the current analysis, the wage bill is taken as the compensation of 
employees from the national accounts. This figure is divided by the stock of human 
capital for the employed labour force to get an average rental price of human capital 
for each year. The average rental price is then multiplied by the total stock of human 
capital for the 15+ population to get estimates of the value of human capital. 
 
Using the Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare simple Mincer approach, estimates of human 
capital are provided for 2000 and 2008. Human capital has increased by 85 per cent 
from 2000 to 2008 in current prices. This increase has been driven mainly by the 
significant rise in average educational attainment (19 per cent) and the increase in the 
rental price of human capital (43 per cent) and to a lesser extent by the 4 per cent 
increase in population over the period. 
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Table 5.4  Human capital estimates 2000 and 2008 
 2000 2008 % change 
Average 
educational 
attainment (years) 
9.8 11.7 19% 
15+ population 942,429 976,936 4% 
Rental Price (USD) 6,027 8,684 43% 
Human Capital 
(USD billions) 
13.2 24.4.0 85% 
 
 
The second method uses an adjusted version of the Jorgensen-Fraumeni lifetime 
income approach measure of human capital for a given education/age group within 
society. This method is used to assess the distribution of human capital in 2008, the 
only year for which sufficient data is available to calculate human capital and its 
distribution using the Jorgensen-Fraumeni approach.  
 
The lifetime labour income approach, as set out by Jorgensen and Fraumeni (1989) 
and Jorgensen and Fraumeni (1992), measures human capital embodied in individuals 
as total discounted present value of expected income that could be generated in the 
labour market over their lifetime. This is considered an ‘output-side’ method of 
measuring human capital. 
 
There are three major steps in the calculation: 
1. A database is constructed of the economic value of market labour activities for 
different categories of individuals. This database contains information on 
various categories such as labour income, labour market participation rates, 
survival rates, school enrolment rates and the number of people in each 
category all cross-classified by age, sex and educational attainment level. 
2. An algorithm is constructed to calculate the lifetime incomes for 
representative individuals for each classified category in the database.  The 
major assumption behind the algorithm is that an individual with a certain age, 
sex and educational attainment level will in the next year obtain the same 
labour income and have similar other characteristics (such as labour 
participation rates, survival rates and school enrolment rates) as an individual 
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who is one year older this year but with the same age, sex and educational 
attainment level. 
3. Representative per capita human capital for each category of individuals is 
applied to all individuals in that category. This is then summed to estimate the 
aggregate human capital stock. 
 
To utilise the Jorgensen-Fraumeni approach for T&T, the methodology has been 
adjusted for data availability.  
 
The modifications and the adjusted Jorgensen-Fraumeni approach are detailed below:   
 
1. Expected income streams are derived using current cross-sectional information 
from the latest available household budget survey and labour market surveys 
as well as demographic and mortality data for T&T. These data sources 
provide the required data on labour incomes, educational attainment, 
employment rates and expected mortality/survival rates from year to year 
depending on an individual’s age. 
2. Lifetime labour incomes are projected by backward recursion. Thus an 
individual’s present value lifetime income is equal to the current period 
income plus the present value of income in the next period. However, since 
data on next period income is not readily available, it has to be estimated. The 
approach therefore works backward from the lifetime income of individuals 
with the highest level of education and oldest working age to derive the next 
period income of an individual. 
3. For T&T, the retirement age is 60 as opposed to 75 in the Jorgensen and 
Fraumeni example. Thus by holding age and educational attainment constant, 
for example, the lifetime income of an individual aged 59 is just his or her 
current period’s labour income.34 Then this individual’s present value of 
lifetime labour income can be used to estimate the next period’s present value 
of lifetime labour income for a 58-year-old with the same age and educational 
attainment. By working backward in this way, it is possible to calculate all 
                                                 
34 Human capital by sex has not been estimated. 
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combinations of next period’s labour income for all age groups and 
educational attainment. 
4. Due to the reliability of the data, these estimates are not gender differentiated. 
Further modifications to the Jorgensen and Fraumeni method have been made 
to adopt it to T&T and data availability. Some of these modifications follow 
those undertaken by Wei (2008) in his estimation of human capital for 
Australia and include: 
 
 The estimates focus on working age population. The justification for this is 
that this component of human capital has the most important impact on market 
economic activities. By confining the study to working-age population does 
not imply that other age groups have no human capital, but that the working-
age population is most directly related to economic activities. The working-
age population also has different age cohorts and educational attainment which 
allows the analysis to show how human capital has been distributed from one 
generation to the next and what policy conclusions can be drawn for achieving 
the desired outcomes in the future. 
 The current analysis has excluded non-market activities and focused only on 
labour market incomes. Valuing non-market activities has raised many 
contentious issues with the Jorgensen-Fraumeni model, such as how it should 
be valued and that it might not add value to the current analysis. 
 Educational attainment is measured as highest qualification completed and for 
this analysis it refers to “none”, “pre-primary”, “primary”, “secondary”, 
“university” and “other”. 
 The analysis uses a cohort-based estimation of future earnings. This is similar 
to the approach used by Wei (2008). However, for each age cohort with 
similar educational attainment it is assumed that there is a moving average age 
and lifetime incomes are derived by current labour market incomes and 
current labour incomes of older age groups plus a uniform real income growth 
rate of 5.9 per cent which is the annual average growth rate in the weekly 
earning index for the period 1996 to 2009, all calculated to present value 
incomes. 
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 Unlike the Jorgensen-Fraumeni model which tries to determine the likelihood 
of an individual enrolling in an additional year of education, the current model 
for this analysis assumes that the current educational attainment remains 
constant. 
 
The lifetime labour income for a representative worker becomes: 
 

PLIage
edu  EMPRage
edu Wage
edu 
t1
  EMPRage tedu  SRage t Wage1edu 1 r / 1  
t1




 
 
where: 
 

PLI age
edu
 
Present value of lifetime labour income for a representative individual with 
educational attainment level edu (none, pre-primary, primary, secondary, university 
and other) and age (17–60). 

EMPRage
edu
 
Employment rate by age and educational attainment level 

Wage
edu
 Annual market wage rate 

SRage t  
Survival rate age + t 
r = 5.9% Annual growth rate in wages
35 
 = 8.75% Annual discount rate
36 
 
 
Therefore, the stock of human capital, HK, becomes: 
 

HK  PLIage
edu
edu

age
  WPOPLN ageedu  PLM ageedu 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 5.9 per cent, which is the average annual increase in the weekly earnings index from 1996 to 2009. 
36 Discount rate: 8.75 per cent, which is the average government borrowing cost on bonds from 1991–
2009 
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where: 
 

WPOPLN age
edu
 Working age population in labour force 

PLM age
edu
 Probability of participating in the labour market at a given age and 
educational attainment level 
 
How are the HC estimates calculated? 
 
Given disaggregated household data on educational attainment and earnings for each 
age group (15–29, 30–39, 40–49 and 50–59), the model calculates an expected 
income for individuals in each age group and educational attainment for 2008. As 
mentioned previously, the focus is only on working-age population, which in T&T is 
15–60 year olds since the retirement age is 60. The estimates of expected income in 
2008 for each age group and educational attainment level (shown in Table 55) are 
adjusted for each year in the future assuming that incomes grow by 5.9% per annum 
given the assumptions above. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Market labour income in year t=0 (2008) by age group and educational attainment 
 None Pre-school Primary Secondary University Other 
15–29 32,851 21,026 28,436 31,464 53,992 47,874 
30–39 13,624 60,188 36,669 49,791 116,844 72,118 
40–49 26,784 29,125 36,240 52,462 141,917 90,264 
50–59 25,702 27,823 34,281 52,396 148,068 79,384 
 
 
Estimates of the working population for each age group are calculated using 
2008/2009 data on working-age population and labour force participation rates. These 
figures are adjusted to get population forecasts into the future using average mortality 
rates as survival rates. Given the data, those individuals aged 15–44 have a 0.998 
chance of surviving to the next year and from age 45–60 the survival rate decreases 
slightly to 0.990. Therefore, the population estimates are only for those participating 
in the labour force and of working age and assumed to be still alive based on average 
survival rates.  Thus, for example, as individuals get older their probability of 
participating in the labour market changes. Therefore, for 15–19 year olds the labour 
force participation rates are low at first and then increases as these individuals get 
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older (the appendix shows these estimates for each age cohort). The years of 
calculation are 2008–2051. The model uses age groups and not individual ages so a 
reference median year for each age group is used to help calculate the population 
numbers. Thus, for example, for 15–19 year olds the median age is 17 so it is assumed 
on average the working population for this age group are aged 17 and will retire at age 
60, which is in year 2051. 
 
The population estimates are then multiplied by the appropriate year of expected 
earnings, given age and qualifications. These estimates are then discounted to get the 
final expected incomes over their lifetime.   
 
Human capital estimates are now provided for 2008. The estimated per capita human 
capital of T&T is TT$433,754 or US$68,850. Total human capital of the working age 
population is TT$567.6 billion or US$90.1 billion. This compares to GNI of 
TT$157.7 billion (US$25 billion) in 2008.
37
 The following table shows the human 
capital estimates broken down by age group and educational attainment. Over half of 
human capital is within the youngest three age groups since, as to be expected, they 
have the most amount of working years ahead of them. The majority of human 
capital, 62 per cent, is within secondary school attainment level and 11 per cent is of 
primary school attainment, while 19 per cent is university. Although this may suggest 
that the population is relatively unskilled, this is a marked improvement from the 
oldest age cohorts (50–54 and 55–59), where only 37 per cent of human capital is of 
secondary attainment and 35 per cent is of primary school educational attainment.  
However, while it would seem that progress has been made in improving the 
educational attainment levels of human capital through the generations, the 
percentage of university level human capital has been stagnant at around 19 per cent 
of total human capital across all age groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Source: Central Statistical Office. 
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Table 5.6  2008 human capital by age group and educational attainment (TT$ billion) 
  None Pre-
school 
Primary Secondary University Other Total 
15–19 0.1 0.1 5.2 58.6 16.4 7.4 87.7 
20–24  0.1 0.1 6.3 72.5 20.7 9.2 108.9 
25–29 0.1 0.1 5.9 69.2 20.4 8.8 104.4 
30–34 0.1 0.1 7.4 49.3 14.7 6.9 78.4 
35–39 0.1 0 6.2 42.5 13.1 6.1 68.1 
40–44 0.1 0.1 10.2 26.5 8.8 4.3 50.1 
45–49 0.1 0.1 8 21.1 7.1 3.3 39.8 
50–54 0.1 0.1 8 8.4 4.5 1.7 22.8 
55–59 0 0 2.6 2.7 1.4 0.5 7.3 
Total HC 0.8 0.7 59.8 350.8 107.1 48.2 567.6 
Percentage 
of Total 
0% 0% 11% 62% 19% 8% 100%  
 
 
Further analysis of the distribution of human capital by income group of head of 
household
38
 suggests an uneven distribution in human capital. Most income groups 
have per capita human capital levels above the national average (TT$433,754). 
However, the lowest two income groups (by head of household) have on average 
about 60 per cent of the national average. 
 
Given the earlier discussion on the virtuous circle described by Birdsall (2001), how 
does the rate of return on education compare across different income groups?  The 
virtuous circle theory suggests that the poor need to invest and education must not be 
considered a consumption good. Government must also ensure that the marginal 
product of labour is not falling.  The debilitating effects of rent seeking and Dutch 
disease type effects must also be limited. An estimate of the returns on human capital 
measured as household income from employment (since this aspect of employment is 
closely linked to human capital) divided by per capita human capital shows that 
households on incomes of less than TT$13,000 per month have less than the simple 
national average of 14 per cent rate of return. However, these figures show some 
significant disparities; with the four highest income groups (representing 1.7 per cent 
of households) having returns on human capital of about 28 per cent on average. The 
two lowest income groups, by contrast, have on average less than 60 per cent of the 
national average of human capital and an average rate of return of just 1 per cent. This 
suggests that, although some income groups have significant human capital, the 
                                                 
38 The population distribution by income groups of head of household is used since the human capital 
refers primarily to working age population and those in employment. 
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quality of the human capital, or the ability of the individuals within the income groups 
to transform their human capital into income and wealth via the labour market, is 
uneven. This suggests that uneven distribution in other forms of wealth and the 
quality of the education and educational attainment of lower income groups needs to 
be examined in greater detail. The structure of the economy might also be affecting 
these outcomes, a topic discussed and analysed in the next chapter. 
 
The rate of return on human capital estimated in table 5.7, should be taken as 
indicative since it only refers to income from employment and does not account for 
other incomes such as property income.  However, there are low rates of return 
associated with human capital at low income groups 
 
Table 5.7 Distribution and rate of return of human capital  
Income group of head 
TT$ per month 
Average Household 
Income from 
employment per 
annum TT$ 
TT$ Human capital 
per capita 
Rate of return on 
human capital 
Less than 1,000 116 272,888 0% 
1,000–2,999 6,494 235,697 3% 
3,000–4,999 18,985 448,601 4% 
5,000–6,999 33,128 583,665 6% 
7,000– 8,999 49,398 736,919 7% 
9,000–10,999 66,190 753,813 9% 
11,000–12,999 81,287 677,492 12% 
13,000–14,999 98,980 700,854 14% 
15,000–16,999 120,604 927,906 13% 
17,000–18,999 128,050 970,603 13% 
19,000–20,999 150,000 572,637 26% 
21,000–22,999 162,602 616,021 26% 
23,000–24,999 174,815 548,627 32% 
25,000 and Over 255,152 899,668 28% 
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The trends in educational expenditure and human capital have been assessed in this 
chapter. In real terms over the period 2000 to 2008, government current account 
education expenditure has almost doubled and capital expenditure on education has 
more than tripled. Over the same period, there were large real increases in expenditure 
on pre-primary/primary education (19 per cent) and on secondary (51 per cent).  
However, the largest real term increase was on tertiary level education (133 per cent).  
Over the period there seems to have been a concerted effort by the government to 
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transform additional revenues from the oil and gas sector into human capital via its 
expenditure on education, particularly on tertiary education. 
 
To examine the possible outcome from the additional expenditure on education, two 
estimates of human capital have been assessed using two approaches. The first 
approach is a simple Mincerian method outlined in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) which assesses human capital for the 
years 2000 and 2008 using average educational attainment, population and labour 
force data and a rental price of human capital. The second uses an adapted version of 
the Jorgensen-Fraumeni lifetime income approach to mainly assess the distribution of 
human capital among household income groups in 2008. 
 
The simple Mincerian method estimates that human capital increased by about 85 per 
cent during the period 2000 and 2008 in current values. Much of the increase was a 
result of the rise in years of education and the increase in population. In current 
values, the rise in the rental price of human capital (compensation of employees) rose 
by 43 per cent.
39
 However, if the rental value is converted to constant 2000 prices, the 
rental price falls by 15 per cent and human capital in constant values increases by 
only 4 per cent over the period despite the rise in schooling years. In constant terms, 
the rental value or shadow price of human capital decreased significantly over the 
period resulting in a less than expected rise in human capital. If these numbers are 
credible, then transforming natural capital into human capital requires not only heavy 
investment in education but also simultaneous policies that improve educational 
quality and protection against wage erosion from inflation. 
 
The second approach at estimating human capital using the Jorgensen-Fraumeni 
lifetime income approach was conducted for 2008, and assesses the distribution of 
human capital among household income groups. Only one year of analysis is possible 
due to the data intensity of this method and the availability of this data for T&T. This 
approach gives an estimate in 2008 of human capital (USD92.2 billion) that is 
approximately 3.8 times the estimate of the simple Mincerian approach (USD23 
billion). It should be noted that the Mincerian approach was used to give an indication 
                                                 
39 2008 is an estimate based on trends in compensation of employees from 2000–2006 
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of the trend in human capital since it requires less data than the Jorgensen-Fraumeni 
lifetime income approach. 
 
The Jorgensen-Fraumeni lifetime income approach estimates for 2008 show that most 
of the human capital embedded in the T&T population is comprised of secondary 
school level education (62 per cent) and most human capital (80 per cent) resides 
within the 15–39 age group. Tertiary level human capital accounts for only 19 per 
cent of total human capital. However, most of this university education resides with 
the younger age groups. Human capital of individuals with only primary school 
education accounts for about 4 per cent of the total, but most of this resides with older 
individuals. The results for 2008 which show human capital estimates by age groups 
for that year suggest that the level of human capital is improving from older age 
groups to younger age groups, suggesting that educational attainment and labour 
market outcomes may be improving with each generation.  
 
Although estimating the distribution of human capital for only one year does not 
allow for the analysis of distributional trends over a period of time, the human capital 
distribution for 2008 still gives a worrying outcome. Lower-income households have 
considerably less human capital than the richest households in T&T.  However, an 
estimate of the rate of return associated with human capital using income from 
employment (the source of income most closely related with human capital 
accumulation) shows that the rates of return diverge remarkably from higher-income 
households to lower-income households. The average rate of return for the three 
lowest income groups was about 2 per cent, while the rate of return for the three 
highest income groups was about 29 per cent. The median rate of return was about 13 
per cent for all households. Lower-income households seem to have two problems, 
the first being an inability to accumulate sufficient quality human capital and the 
second being to make human capital pay or provide a meaningful return.   
 
The two approaches used to estimate human capital provide diverging outcomes. The 
Jorgensen-Fraumeni approach provides an estimate of human capital in 2008 that is 
about four times (3.8) higher than the estimate provided by the simple Mincerian 
approach for the same year. The Jorgensen-Fraumeni approach uses more detailed 
survey-based data to produce an estimate of human capital, while the simple 
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Mincerian approach uses average international and national estimates, particularly on 
rates of return and rental values respectively. For this reason, the Jorgensen-Fraumeni 
approach should provide a more accurate description of human capital in T&T. It is 
possible that if the simple Mincerian approach used actual weighted rental values and 
actual weighted interest rates for T&T then the estimate of human capital could be 
higher and closer to the estimate provided by the Jorgensen-Fraumeni approach. 
However, for the purpose of this chapter, the levels of human capital determined by 
the simple Mincerian is not important but rather the trends. If, as mentioned 
previously, human capital has only risen by 4 per cent in real terms then it is possible 
that human capital distribution might not have changed drastically over this period. 
 
Due to the methodological adjustments required to gain the human capital estimates, 
comparison of the results from other countries might not be entirely feasible.  
However, it is worth noting Greaker and Liu (2008) have also produced human capital 
estimates for Norway for one year.  They produced an estimate for 2006 using the 
lifetime labour income approach in order to provide an indication of how statistics 
available at Statistics Norway could be used to estimate human capital. Similarly, Li, 
Fraumeni, Liu and Wang (2009) have also produced estimates of human capital for 
China for the years 1985 – 2007 also using the lifetime labour income approach. Wei 
(2009) has also used an adjusted lifetime labour income approach to estimate human 
capital for Australia. 
 
The following table gives an indication of the level of per capita human capital 
estimates for different countries including those estimated for Trinidad and Tobago. 
As to be expected the estimate of human capital for Trinidad and Tobago is lower 
than that for Australia and Norway but more than China’s.  The estimates of human 
capital for Trinidad and Tobago using the adjusted lifetime labour income approach 
seem reasonable given the estimates for other countries and the comparison of per 
capital GNI figures.  It should be noted that the estimates provided in table 5.8 are for 
different years and the data used for each estimate are not exactly the same.  
However, the estimates for Trinidad and Tobago seem reasonable and would be 
within in the range of what would be expected for a country of its income level. There 
are improvements that could be made regarding these estimates and these are 
discussed below.  However, future research should focus on constructing annual 
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human capital accounts to compare these with annual accounts of fixed assets 
accumulation. 
 
Table 5.8 Comparison of human capital estimates 
Country Per capita US$ GNI per capita 
US$ 
Year of estimate 
Australia              263,318  19,719 2001 
China                13,990  2,711 2007 
Norway              513,048  72,176 2006 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
               68,850  18,839 2008 
 
 
The results of this chapter also suggest that the negative effects of resource abundance 
have ‘broken’ the virtuous circle of equitable growth for Trinidad and Tobago.  
Although, there has been significant expenditure on education by the government, 
lower income households do not seem to benefit significantly from their human 
capital accumulation, indicating that the quality might not be high and that there 
might be a concentration of rent among high income groups (this is examined in 
greater detail in chapter six).  It is also possible that Dutch disease effects are having a 
negative impact on export driven labour intensive growth, with subsequent impacts on 
human capital returns for the poorest in society. 
 
A prerequisite for sustainable development among natural resource-exploiting 
economies is to transform the wealth from natural resources into alternative forms of 
capital such as human capital to ensure that the level of total capital is rising or 
remains constant. This analysis has shown that simply increasing expenditure on 
education does not translate into an immediate and like-for-like increase in human 
capital. The quality of education attained is also important. Improving the return on 
education is also important for the incentive to accumulate human capital. Therefore, 
access to the labour market and the protection of real wages from inflation are also 
important policy considerations. Therefore, policies that target human capital 
development amongst lower-income households might also be an important policy 
implication since the distributional analysis has also shown that lower human capital 
accumulation and lower rates of return for poorer households are a particularly 
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worrying problem for T&T.  The analysis raises further research questions that may 
be explored in the future such as: 
 
1. Examine the possibility of constructing a simple human capital model for 
resource-dependent economies and explore the linkages with the expenditure 
of natural resource rents on education. 
 
2. Explore the importance of the quality of education and the protection of real 
wages on human capital accumulation. 
 
3. Identify the number of human capital asset poor households and the level of 
human capital accumulation required to reduce the disparity in asset and 
capital wealth among different households. 
 
4. Determine a human capital poverty threshold, which may be a percentage of 
the median or average human capital.
40
 A similar measure for human capital 
may be required for resource dependent countries like T&T where disparities 
across income groups affect human capital accumulation and income levels 
directly. There should then be appropriate policies formulated to raise all 
households to or above this threshold. 
 
5. Explore the theoretical construction of a model with more equal human capital 
distribution and how this might be related to sustainable development. 
 
6. Examine the returns on human capital for the poorest within the context of the 
virtuous circle hypothesis and whether rent seeking and Dutch disease impacts 
need to be mitigated to encourage investment and not consumption in human 
capital to help drive equitable export driven growth led development. 
 
7. Furthermore accounting for education expenditure alone in genuine saving 
calculations might say very little about sustainable growth.  More detailed 
                                                 
40 This would be similar to the official income poverty thresholds used in Europe, which is currently 60 
per cent of median income. 
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measures of human capital and its return especially for the poor might be a 
better indicator for sustainability. 
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Annex 5.1 Working population estimates (at current age in 2008 to retirement age of 
60) 
 Current Age 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 
2008  23,438   84,760   93,215   75,422   74,686   71,644   72,872   62,569   38,322  
2009  23,392   84,591   93,029   75,271   74,536   71,500   72,151   61,950   37,942  
2010  23,345   84,422   92,843   75,120   74,387   71,357   71,437   61,337   37,567  
2011  72,288   94,912   93,113   75,072   73,460   68,031   64,554   54,125   37,195  
2012  72,144   94,722   92,927   74,922   73,313   67,357   63,915   53,589    
2013  71,999   94,532   92,741   74,772   73,166   66,690   63,282   53,059    
2014  71,855   94,343   92,555   74,623   73,020   66,030   62,656   52,534    
2015  71,712   94,154   92,370   74,474   72,874   65,376   62,036   52,014    
2016  80,622   94,429   92,311   73,545   69,476   59,078   54,742   51,499    
2017  80,461   94,240   92,127   73,398   68,788   58,493   54,200     
2018  80,300   94,051   91,942   73,251   68,107   57,914   53,664     
2019  80,139   93,863   91,759   73,105   67,433   57,340   53,132     
2020  79,979   93,676   91,575   72,959   66,766   56,773   52,606     
2021  80,212   93,616   90,433   69,557   60,333   50,098   52,085     
2022  80,052   93,429   90,252   68,869   59,736   49,602      
2023  79,892   93,242   90,072   68,187   59,145   49,111      
2024  79,732   93,055   89,892   67,512   58,559   48,625      
2025  79,572   92,869   89,712   66,843   57,979   48,143      
2026  79,522   91,711   85,530   60,403   51,163   47,667      
2027  79,362   91,528   84,683   59,805   50,656       
2028  79,204   91,345   83,844   59,213   50,155       
2029  79,045   91,162   83,014   58,627   49,658       
2030  78,887   90,980   82,193   58,047   49,167       
2031  77,904   86,738   74,274   51,222   48,680       
2032  77,748   85,879   73,539   50,715        
2033  77,592   85,029   72,811   50,213        
2034  77,437   84,187   72,090   49,716        
2035  77,282   83,354   71,376   49,224        
2036  73,679   75,323   62,984   48,736        
2037  72,950   74,578   62,361         
2038  72,228   73,839   61,743         
2039  71,513   73,108   61,132         
2040  70,805   72,385   60,527         
2041  63,983   63,874   59,928         
2042  63,350   63,242          
2043  62,723   62,616          
2044  62,102   61,996          
2045  61,487   61,382          
2046  54,258   60,775          
2047  53,721           
2048  53,189           
2049  52,662           
2050  52,141           
2051  51,625                  
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Chapter Six: Economic structure and the 
distribution of natural resource rents 
6.0 Introduction 
Disparities in the apparent rate of return on human capital between low-income, 
middle-income and higher-income households seem to suggest that there are 
discrepancies in the quality and level of human capital accumulated at different 
household income groups. However, the literature review on the relationship between 
growth and inequality also suggests that disparities in household wealth (other than 
human capital) may also have a negative impact on labour market outcomes and 
national growth rates. 
 
During the early development phases of countries, there is an expectation for some 
increase in inequality.  Early work by Kuznets (1955) confirmed that there was a 
relationship between inequality and rising per capita income.  Kuznets found that 
there was an inverted U-shape relationship which suggested that inequality at first 
increases with rising per capita income but then declines at higher income levels. The 
usual explanation is that inequality results from the workforce moving away from 
agriculture, which tends to provide relatively egalitarian income outcomes and into 
other sectors which are characterised by far greater income variations. However, as 
countries get richer there is an apparent narrowing of income differences as workforce 
productivity between sectors converges, property income as a share of household 
income declines. Governments also aim for full employment and provide greater 
social security.  
 
Although some research has since confirmed the existence of the Kuznets curve such 
as Adelman and Morris (1973) and Williamson (1965) there have been others that 
have rejected the results.  Auty and Kiiski (2001) identified that cross sectional data 
for some countries used by Williamson and Adelman and Morris rather than time-
series data may have been the reason for the confirmation of the Kuznets curve.  Thus 
studies that have used inter-temporal data such as Fields (1989) and Bowman (1997) 
and others that have used cross sectional data such as Anand and Kanbur (1993) and 
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Deininger and Squire (1996) have rejected the Kuznets curve hypothesis. The 
research by Fields shows that income inequality is just as likely to increase as it is to 
decrease.  However, Fields confirms that income inequality is associated with natural 
resource abundance.  Auty and Kiiski (2001) also suggest that Fields’ conclusions 
confirm the Kuznets-curve among resource abundant countries since at the time of its 
construction, mid-income countries were dominated by Latin America which was a 
resource abundant region with high income inequality.   
 
There is therefore an acknowledged presence of income inequality within resource 
abundant countries.  Auty (1997) sees the persistence of income inequality in resource 
rich countries when compared to resource-poor countries since there is no early 
redistribution of land or the rapid elimination of surplus labour as labour intensive 
manufacturing expands.  In resource-poor countries this leads to rapid accumulation 
of human capital, which eventually narrows the wage premium of skilled labour, 
Londono (1996).  In resource abundant countries, there is a lag in land reform and 
later urbanisation maintains surplus labour longer and reduces the incentive for skill 
accumulation.   Resource abundant countries also follow a more capital intensive 
industrialisation trajectory which leads to higher income inequality.  A World Bank 
report of 1993 shows that resources abundant Southeast Asian countries skipped the 
labour intensive manufacturing phase of development, which helped to reduce income 
inequality in less resource dependent Southeast Asian countries. 
 
However the work by Seers (republished in 2005) drawing upon his research in 
Venezuela until 1958, found that higher wages in the petroleum sector drives the 
demand for higher wages in the rest of the economy although productivity in these 
higher sectors may not be as high as in the petroleum sector. So it is likely that in 
petroleum economies like Trinidad and Tobago, unemployment will be found side by 
side with high wages.  Seers found that changes in employment depend on trends in 
exports but also equally trends in wage rates; ‘the pace at which employment grows 
depends in fact on the difference between the trends in exports and wage rates’, Seers 
(2005).  Thus there is a ‘wages fund’ financed primarily from export revenues and the 
level of employment depends on the level of wages and salaries with the higher the 
average wage rate the smaller the number employed primarily by the government.  
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For Seers, the mechanism of the open petroleum economy comprises of foreign 
owned companies exploiting domestic resources.  These companies, because they feel 
politically vulnerable pay high wages when they are demanded.  Higher wages in the 
petroleum sector causes envy in other sectors and this leads to higher wage demands 
which are met by the government and other sectors.  So that increased revenue from 
the export sector is absorbed by higher wages of those already in employment rather 
than by increase in employment.  Disguised unemployment is revealed as rural 
workers are attracted to urban areas in search for work.  Wages in the country become 
high by international standards, making imports fairly cheap; increasing the 
propensity to consume imports and at the same time eroding competitive advantages.  
Inequality tends to increase as only part of the population benefits from petroleum 
booms.  The pattern of consumption weighs heavily in favour of imports even for 
items that could easily be produced locally. More over, developing new exports 
becomes increasingly difficult as costs rise. 
 
During the late 1990s there was a resurgence of interest in the relationship between 
growth, equity and inequality. The literature at the time pointed to the negative impact 
that inequality could have on growth and the persistence of poverty traps. Even the 
multilateral institutions such as the Inter American Development Bank and the World 
Bank began to focus on polices that could foster growth and equity at the same time 
(see, for example, Birdsall (1997) and Solimano, Aninat & Birdsall (1999). This 
concern has since led to the establishment of national poverty reduction strategies 
promoted by the World Bank. 
 
Imperfections within the insurance and capital markets mean that the poor are very 
susceptible to risk and volatility. Safety nets could therefore play an important role to 
help prevent irreversible losses in times of crises. A minimum level of ownership of 
assets could also provide self-insurance against idiosyncratic risk. 
 
While human capital is a growth enhancing asset, the negative interaction between 
education and asset ownership “also suggest[s] that educational expansion alone may 
not be sufficient to achieve the social transformation needed as a basis for sustainable 
development” (Deininger and Olinto, 2000). Therefore, along with education 
enhancement, policy makers must also focus on innovative programs that target the 
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acquisition of productive assets that provide investment incentives and encourage the 
poor to utilise their labour in a more productive way. The authors suggest that more 
research is required on the feasibility of such programs and their scope to replace 
recurrent transfers may be desirable. 
 
As mentioned previously, the analysis by Birdsall and Londono (1997) of asset 
inequality in Latin America suggests that the effect of income inequality on growth 
reflects differences in a fundamental element of economic structure – the access of 
different groups to productive assets. Birdsall and Londono’s analysis, including 
regressions of the factors affecting growth, have shown that asset inequality effects on 
growth tend to dominate income inequality effects and that the effects of education 
distribution tend to persist even when other traditional variables affecting growth are 
included. Furthermore, in natural resource intensive countries, where growth has 
lagged, natural resource intensity is positively correlated with land inequality. 
Deininger and Olinto (2000) have also suggested, where the link between growth and 
inequality has been confirmed, the policy implications arising out of the link between 
growth and inequality will differ depending on whether inequality of income or 
inequality of assets is the underlying factor. Thus for Deininger and Olinto (2000), if 
inequality of assets is the underlying factor, policies should focus on ex-ante equality 
of opportunity, such as incentives for the creation of new physical and human capital 
assets, definition, protection and enforcement of property rights to assets held by the 
poor, and one-time measures of redistribution. By contrast, they suggest that if 
income inequality is to be blamed, then more direct redistribution of current income 
or consumption might be appropriate. 
 
Income inequality seems to be a perennial problem of resource abundant countries, 
although the exact mechanism that causes it is still in some dispute. However, unequal 
distribution of assets and of income could have negative consequences for sustainable 
development. Governmental efforts, therefore, at using resource rents for investing 
and saving for sustainable development should also be mindful of how the benefits of 
these investments are distributed if there is to be meaningful sustainable development. 
This chapter therefore attempts to examine the distribution and how the structure of 
the economy may be leading to the maldistribution of rents from the natural resource 
sectors (oil and gas) via payments to central government in the form of taxes and 
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backward and forward linkages within the local economy. I will also examine how the 
disbursements of rents from central government to business and households are 
distributed and suggest scenarios to improve these outcomes.  The previous chapter 
has shown that human capital and the return on human capital is unevenly distributed 
Earlier research on resource abundant countries showed these countries experience 
higher income inequality than their resource-poor counterparts for a number reasons 
including political economy and the ‘leapfrogging’ of the labour intensive 
manufacturing phase of development.  However, it is not entirely clear if income 
inequality is a symptom some of the ills that affect resource abundant countries or if 
income inequality is actually a major reason for some the negative political economy 
consequences of resource abundance.  This is a valid question since although Trinidad 
and Tobago’s has achieved increases in per capita income, significant income 
inequality and poverty still exists and much of the political economy considerations 
that are expected with resource abundant countries still exist.  Although inequality in 
Trinidad and Tobago persists measured by the Gini coefficient of 40.3 in 2007
41
, it is 
unclear what the level of uneven distribution of resource rents are as the rents are 
passed through the economy.  Is this ‘rent pass through’ symptomatic of human 
capital accumulation, and what does it actually mean for the distribution of revenues 
from the resource sector? 
 
If Trinidad and Tobago is compared against other resource abundant countries, its 
level of income inequality is relatively not high.  As mentioned above, Trinidad and 
Tobago’s Gini coefficient was 40.3 this compares to 52.1 in Chile and 51.7 in Mexico 
for example.  Table 6.1 shows a comparison of income inequality among selected 
resource abundant countries. The Gini index and quintile income ratio (ratio of 
income going to the first quintile and the last quintile) show that Trinidad and Tobago 
performs relatively well  when compared to other countries. However, these measures 
alone do not tell us about the pass through mechanisms of resource rents and its actual 
utility to different income groups. The answer to income inequality may not only be 
about government transfers to the least well off but also require policies that tweaks 
the structure of the economy and encourages more domestic linkages 
 
                                                 
41 Source: UNDP 
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Table 6.1: income distribution in selected resource abundant countries 
 
Country* Gini Index 
Quintile income 
ratio 
Angola 58.6 31 
Argentina 45.8 12.3 
Bolivia 57.3 21.8 
Chile 52.1 3.6 
Cote d’Ivoire 46.1 11 
Ecuador 49 12.8 
Ghana 42.8 9.3 
Iran 38.3 7 
Jamaica 45.5 9.8 
Mexico 51.7 14.4 
Nigeria 42.9 9.5 
Norway 25.8 3.9 
Peru 48 13.5 
Russia 37.5 8.2 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
40.3 8.3 
Uzbekistan 36.7 6.2 
Venezuela 43.5 8.9 
   
Source: UN HDI 
*Latest available year of data 
 
 
Although the Gini coefficient provides some indication of the level of income 
inequality, the analysis of this chapter is an attempt to trace the actual usage of 
resource revenues from the petroleum sector, to the government and to households 
and to assess if structural changes to the economy are required or if some households’ 
ability to capture rents needs to be augmented 
 
The next section examines in greater detail how oil and natural gas revenues are 
distributed throughout the economy 
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6.1 Tracking the distribution of rents through the economy 
The analyses of excessive depletion of oil and natural gas resources, distribution of 
the benefits of fuel subsidies, and the uneven distribution of quality human capital 
measured as returns on human capital suggest that the economic structure does not 
allow for greater equity in savings distribution. The analysis of the distribution of jobs 
and income group multipliers also points to structural inequalities within the 
economy.  The analysis now focuses on tracing how rents from the oil and gas sectors 
are distributed to the various income groups.   
 
To track how rents from the oil and gas sectors are distributed, the incomes of 
household income groups and the government sector from all industrial sectors, 
including the petroleum sectors, are modelled within the input-output framework 
introduced in chapter four. To do this, households and the government sector which 
are usually part of final demand and value added of input-output tables are 
endogenised within the input-output matrix, using Miyazawa’s methodology first set 
out by Miyazawa (1976) and summarised in Hewings et al. (1999).  The derivation set 
out in Miller and Blair (2009) is used to build the model. 
 
The model consists of augmenting the year 2000 45x45 matrix of coefficients by 
adding government and disaggregated household sectors. The disaggregation of 
households uses the household budget survey (HBS) 2008 data on household income 
and consumption so the model makes the assumption that the structure of the 
economy remains constant from 2000 to 2008, an assumption confirmed by the 
Central Statistical Office of T&T to be valid in 2010.
42
 Household income and 
consumption have been disaggregated into 14 household income groups based on the 
income groups provided in HBS 2008. The aggregated amount paid to households is 
taken as compensation of employees in 2000 and disaggregated among income groups 
using the employment multipliers for all forty-five industries and 14 income groups.  
Details of how output and employment multipliers have been calculated are provided 
in the Appendix.  The general assumption is that 14 distinct household income groups 
are paid wages by producers from each of the 45 industrial sectors as compensation of 
                                                 
42 Personal communication in April 2010 with Mr. Clifford Lewis Director of National Accounts at the 
Central Statistical Office, T&T. 
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employees. The total compensation of employees indicated in the national accounts 
for each of the forty-five sectors is therefore distributed among the fourteen income 
groups.  Compensation of employees is usually considered to be exogenous to the 
main matrix of coefficients as a value added component, but here it is being 
endogenised within the model to assess distributional activity within the economy. 
 
This therefore leads to the addition of a 14 x 45 matrix of wage earners or 
compensation of employees matrix: 
 
 gj
x
vV 
4514
 
 
where vgj is the income paid to wage earners in income bracket or household income 
group, g (g=1,……14) per dollar’s worth of output of sector j (j=1,….45). Thus a 
single row of household input coefficients usually represented as compensation of 
employees is now generalised to 14 household income group rows. 
 
Similarly, household final consumption expenditure is endogenised by generalising 
the column (total household final consumption) to 14 household income groups. Thus 
a 45x14 household consumption matrix is added: 
 
 jg
x
cC 
1445
 
 
where cjg is the amount of sector j’s (j= 1,…..45) product consumed per dollar of 
income of households in income group g (g = 1,……14). Consumption is 
disaggregated into household income groups using consumption data from HBS 2008. 
 
Similarly, government income as taxes and duties and government final consumption 
expenditure are endogenised to the model as 1x45 and 45x1 matrix respectively.
43
 
 
                                                 
43 Although the general structure of the economy has not changed considerably, for the purpose of this 
analysis, I have updated the model to reflect the higher levels of income that the government received 
from the oil and gas sector in 2008. Since 2000, there have been three further LNG trains 
commissioned together with new tax policies which have increased government revenues from the oil 
and gas sector.  
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 j
x
giGI 
451
 
 
where gij is government income as taxes and duties from sector j (j=1…..45) and 
 
 
 j
x
gcGC 
145
 
 
where gcj is government final consumption expenditure on goods from sector j 
(j=1,…….45) 
 
By incorporating government coefficients into the household sector, thus adding a 
row and column to V and C respectively, the augmented partitioned matrix of 
coefficients becomes: 
 
 

A


A
45x45
C
45x15
V
15x45
0
15x15








 
 
The Miyazawa system for extending the input-output formulation is derived as 
follows: 
 

X
Y






A C
V 0






X
Y






f
g





 
 
where X is a vector of output, Y is a vector of total income for 15 groups (14 income 
groups of households and 1 group for government), A is the matrix of direct input 
coefficients, V is the 15x45 matrix of value added for (14 income groups plus 
government) and C is  a corresponding matrix of consumption coefficients, f is a 
vector of final demands without household consumption and for the purpose of this 
chapter without government consumption since the government sector has also been 
endogenised within the model and g is a vector of exogenous income for the 14 
income groups and the government sector. 
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Solving the system according to Miyazawa leads to: 
 
 

X
Y






1 A C
V 1






1
X
Y






f
g





 
 
and this is denoted as: 
 

X
Y






B(1CKVB) BCK
KVB K






f
g





 
 
 where: 
 
B=(I-A)
1
 is the usual Leontief inverse matrix. 
BC is a matrix of production-induced consumption. 
VB is the matrix of endogenous income earned from production. 
VBC is a matrix of endogenous income from production that is induced by 
expenditure. 
K=(I-VBC)
-1
 is a Keynesian multiplier matrix or the Miyazawa interrelational income 
multipliers.  K represents the total increase of direct, indirect and induced impacts. 
This is the increase of direct and indirect impacts on the income of one income group 
as a result of the expenditure from an additional unit of income by another group (see 
Miller and Blair, 2009 and Trinh et al., 2008). 
 
Miyazawa’s methodology is used to calculate the inverse of 

A

 to get an inverse 
partitioned matrix. The elements of each of the matrices in the aggregate partitioned 
matrix provide useful interpretations, which describe how income and output are 
distributed throughout the economy. Using Miyazawa’s notation, the inverse 
partitioned matrix is depicted as: 
 

(I  A

) 
B(I CVB)1
45x45
BCK
45x15
KVB
15x45
K
15x15








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The interesting and additional insight provided by the Miyazawa inverse matrix is the 
interpretation of the elements in K, which becomes the ‘interrelational income 
multiplier’ matrix. K= (I-L)-1 and L is described by Miyazawa as the matrix of  ‘inter-
income group coefficients’ so that the typical element of L shows, for example, the 
direct increase in the income of group 1 resulting from the expenditure of an 
additional unit of income by group 2. Thus the elements in matrix K indicates the total 
increase (direct, indirect and induced) income of one group that results from 
expenditure of an additional unit of income by another group (Miller and Blair, 2009).   
 
Miyazawa further denotes that KVB is the ‘multi-sector income multiplier’ matrix,44 
which indicates the direct, indirect and induced incomes for each income group 
generated by the initial final demand. 
 
Furthermore, from the above derivation, B of course is the usual (I-A) Leontief 
inverse matrix and BC is a matrix of production induced by consumption. Thus BCK 
is an amalgamation of the Keynesian multiplier matrix, K, described above, and the 
production-induced consumption of BC. Annex B provides further details of the 
Miyazawa partitioned matrix system. 
 
6.2 Indicative results of the Miyazawa distributional outcomes 
The results and their interpretation are now presented for T&T, mainly with respect to 
the output from the main natural resource sectors; oil and natural gas.  The results of 
the KVB matrix, the ‘multi-sector income’ matrix gives the direct, indirect and 
induced income associated with an increase in final demand for the products of a 
particular sector.   
 
Table 6.2 gives the total income distribution predicted by the model for output of 
TT$45.7 billion
45
 in the oil and gas production sector for 2008.  The output of 
TT$45.7 billion is the actual output of the sector for 2008 and is introduced to the 
model as a positive shock via a column vector. The entire Miyazawa matrix is 
                                                 
44 Also referred to as the matrix multiplier of income formation. 
45 The output of the oil and gas production sector in 2008 is consistent with the actual output of the 
sector in 2008. 
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multiplied by the positive shock which then produces the incomes associated with this 
positive shock. The results show that for the oil and gas production sector, the total 
revenues generated for the government is about TT$17 billion.
46
    
 
 
Table 6.2  Total income distribution from TT$45.7 billion in 2008 output from the oil and gas 
production sector 
 Oil and Gas Production sector TT$ 
million 
< 1,000 104 
1000 – 2999 271 
3000 – 4999 700 
5000 – 6999 1,361 
7000 – 8999 1,695 
9000 – 10999 2,402 
11000 – 12999 2,684 
13000 – 14999 3,321 
15000 – 16999 3,196 
17000 – 18999 3,753 
19000 – 20999 5,132 
21000 – 22999 4,363 
23000 – 24999 6,275 
25000 and over 6,475 
Government 17,043 
 
 
However, the outcome throws up some surprising results, in particular the low levels 
of incomes received by lower income groups compared to that received by higher 
income group households. For example, from the TT$45.7 billion output from the oil 
and gas production sector, the richest income group receives in aggregate 62 times the 
income of the poorest households. For example, the 2008 output of TT$45.7 billion in 
the oil and gas production sector leads to an estimated compensation income of 
TT$104 million for the lowest income group and income of TT$6,500 million for the 
highest income group. Using the latest available population estimates and household 
distribution data from the HBS, it is estimated that the highest earning income 
households receive approximately 35 times more income per household than the 
lowest income households from the oil and gas production. 
 
                                                 
46 Total petroleum sector output was TT$70 billion and government revenues from the sector was 
TT$34 billion. 
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Examining earnings in the K matrix (“interrelational income multiplier” matrix) gives 
an indication of how income is distributed throughout the economy when one income 
group spends an extra unit of income. Expenditures by each income group and the 
government are also introduced in to the model via a column vector matrix which 
multiples the Miyazawa matrix by indicative expenditures for each income group or 
the government sector. The model then produces the economy-wide outcomes 
associated with the indicative expenditures. Expenditures by the lowest income 
groups generate significant multiplier incomes for the government and higher income 
groups, while at the same time expenditures by the highest income groups generate 
very little income for lower income groups and proportionally less income for the 
government than that generated by additional expenditure from the lowest income 
groups. Interestingly, an additional unit of expenditure by the government generates 
fairly low income for lower income groups and considerably more income for higher 
income groups. Table 6.3 shows the “interrelational” income multipliers if each 
household income group and government spends an additional TT$100 million. 
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Table 6.3  “Interrelational” income multipliers (shows effects of additional expenditure of TT$100 
million by each household income group and government) 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N Govt 
A                          
104.5  
            
4.4  
            
2.5  
            
3.0  
            
1.9  
            
1.3  
            
1.2  
          
0.7  
          
0.6  
          
0.4  
          
0.2  
          
0.2  
          
0.1  
                 
0.4  
                            
0.6  
B                           
11.2  
        
111.0  
            
6.4  
            
7.5  
            
4.8  
            
3.3  
            
3.0  
          
1.8  
          
1.6  
          
1.1  
          
0.6  
          
0.5  
          
0.2  
                 
1.0  
                            
1.6  
C                           
26.1  
          
25.7  
        
115.1  
          
17.9  
          
11.3  
            
7.9  
            
7.3  
          
4.4  
          
3.8  
          
2.6  
          
1.5  
          
1.3  
          
0.5  
                 
2.6  
                            
4.2  
D                           
50.2  
          
49.6  
          
29.0  
        
134.4  
          
21.8  
          
15.2  
          
13.9  
          
8.4  
          
7.2  
          
4.9  
          
2.9  
          
2.5  
          
1.0  
                 
4.9  
                            
8.0  
E                           
55.5  
          
55.0  
          
32.3  
          
38.5  
        
124.4  
          
17.1  
          
15.7  
          
9.5  
          
8.2  
          
5.6  
          
3.3  
          
2.8  
          
1.1  
                 
5.6  
                          
10.1  
F                           
77.2  
          
76.7  
          
45.0  
          
53.7  
          
34.1  
        
123.9  
          
21.9  
        
13.3  
        
11.4  
          
7.8  
          
4.5  
          
3.9  
          
1.6  
                 
7.8  
                          
14.2  
G                           
82.8  
          
82.6  
          
48.5  
          
57.9  
          
36.8  
          
25.7  
        
123.6  
        
14.3  
        
12.2  
          
8.4  
          
4.9  
          
4.2  
          
1.7  
                 
8.4  
                          
16.2  
H                          
103.4  
        
102.8  
          
60.3  
          
72.2  
          
45.9  
          
32.2  
          
29.6  
      
117.9  
        
15.3  
        
10.6  
          
6.1  
          
5.3  
          
2.1  
               
10.6  
                          
19.5  
I                           
73.2  
          
73.4  
          
43.4  
          
52.3  
          
33.4  
          
23.5  
          
21.6  
        
13.2  
      
111.2  
          
7.9  
          
4.5  
          
3.9  
          
1.5  
                 
7.8  
                          
15.6  
J                           
87.9  
          
88.3  
          
52.1  
          
62.7  
          
40.1  
          
28.2  
          
26.0  
        
15.8  
        
13.5  
      
109.4  
          
5.4  
          
4.7  
          
1.9  
                 
9.3  
                          
17.5  
K                          
118.2  
        
118.4  
          
69.8  
          
84.0  
          
53.5  
          
37.6  
          
34.6  
        
21.0  
        
17.9  
        
12.5  
      
107.2  
          
6.3  
          
2.5  
               
12.4  
                          
24.3  
L                          
106.9  
        
106.8  
          
63.0  
          
75.8  
          
48.5  
          
34.1  
          
31.3  
        
19.1  
        
16.3  
        
11.3  
          
6.5  
      
105.7  
          
2.2  
               
11.1  
                          
18.6  
M                          
177.3  
        
176.7  
        
104.0  
        
125.0  
          
79.8  
          
56.0  
          
51.6  
        
31.3  
        
26.8  
        
18.5  
        
10.8  
          
9.4  
      
103.7  
               
18.6  
                          
36.1  
N                          
169.1  
        
169.5  
          
99.7  
        
120.0  
          
76.8  
          
54.1  
          
49.9  
        
30.3  
        
25.9  
        
18.0  
        
10.5  
          
9.0  
          
3.6  
              
117.9  
                          
30.6  
Govt                          
339.3  
        
355.1  
        
207.3  
        
247.8  
        
153.7  
        
106.2  
          
96.5  
        
58.0  
        
49.6  
        
34.2  
        
19.5  
        
17.5  
          
6.3  
               
32.9  
                         
142.1  
 
Key: (Monthly Income TT$) 
A: < 1,000 
B: 1000 to 2999 
C: 3000 to 4999 
D: 5000 to 6999 
E: 7000 to 8999 
F: 9000 to 10999 
G: 11000 to 12999 
H: 13000 to 14999 
I: 15000 to 16999 
J: 17000 to 18999 
K: 19000 to 20999 
L: 21000 to 22999 
M: 23000 to 24999 
N: 25000 and over 
Govt: Government 
 
The results shown in Table 6.3 show the disparities in the “interrelational” multipliers. 
Column A of Table 6.3 shows the additional expenditure of TT$100 million by the 
lowest income group (those households with incomes less than TT$1,000 per month) 
generates income of TT$169.1 million for the highest income group and TT$339.3 
million in income for the government. This expenditure also generates income of 
TT$104.5 million for the income group making the initial expenditure. Contrast this 
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with additional expenditure by the highest income group shown by column N in Table 
6.3. TT$100 million in additional expenditure by the highest income group (those 
with monthly income in excess of TT$25,000 per month) generates TT$0.6 million in 
income for poorest households and only TT$32.9 million in income for the 
government. This additional expenditure by the richest households leads to multiplier 
income of TT$117.9 million for the highest income earners. 
 
The beneficiaries of additional government expenditure (column labelled “Govt” in 
Table 6.3) are also skewed towards the richest households. TT$100 million in 
expenditure by the government generates only TT$0.6 million in income for the 
lowest-income households but TT$30.6 million for the highest-income households. 
Table 6.4 shows the outcomes if the government spends the TT$17,043 million 
additional income it earned from the oil and gas production sector’s output in 2008. 
This generates income of TT$5,220 million for the highest-income households and 
additional income of TT$103 million for the lowest-income group households, and 
multiplied income of TT$24,219 million for the government. Thus the structure of the 
economy suggests that higher-income groups have a larger accumulation of higher 
quality assets such as human capital, greater access to resource rents and possibly the 
government which allow them to earn higher rates of returns and to collect a larger 
share of the direct income benefits from government expenditure. 
 
Table 6.4  Estimate of the interrelational income effects, from government expenditure of TT$17,043 
million in 2008 
 Interrelational income effects from 
government expenditure  
< 1,000 103 
1000 -2999 276 
3000 – 4999 710 
5000 – 6999 1,368 
7000 – 8999 1,716 
9000 – 10999 2,425 
11000 – 12999 2,769 
13000 – 14999 3,326 
15000 – 16999 2,661 
17000 – 18999 2,985 
19000 – 20999 4,139 
21000 – 22999 3,178 
23000 – 24999 6,149 
25000 and over 5,220 
Government 24,219 
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6.3 Discussion and conclusion  
The Miyazawa approach used in this chapter to help account for the distribution of 
resource rents within the domestic economy assesses how government expenditure is 
distributed and how household incomes are impacted by the resource sector.  The 
analysis examined the direct, indirect and induced domestic petroleum sector rents, 
and how it is distributed among household given the structure of the economy.  The 
Miyazawa partioned matrix method provides policy makers with a less data intensive 
method that can easily assess the outcomes of policy and the impacts of economic 
production on the entire economy by incorporating the necessary factors of 
production given  the current structure of the economy.  The alternative approach 
would have been to construct a social accounting matrix (SAM) for Trinidad and 
Tobago, which is more data intensive and costly to construct.   
Although a SAM, could have provided details of other impacts within the economy 
such as the relationship that the domestic economy has with the rest of the world and 
the distribution of savings and investment as well as the impacts of transfers and 
subsidies, the Miyazawa approach was sufficient for the analysis under consideration 
for this chapter.  It is also possible that the Miyazawa model developed for this thesis 
could be expanded to include the rest of the World, transfers and subsidies and all of 
the interactions of welfare state and capital accounts to develop a fuller picture of the 
economy.  The assumptions associated with leakages with the current model such as 
taxation, and imports could have been better analysed had these accounts been 
included in the Miyazawa model. This is an area for further research, to expand the 
Miyazawa model developed for T&T so it provides a fuller picture of the economy. 
 
Another possible improvement to the model could have been the inclusion of welfare 
payments or transfers from government to the neediest in society.  This account could 
give a fuller picture of the actual benefits that all household income groups receive 
from government and by extension the petroleum sector. Admittedly these are 
improvements that could be made to the model but which are areas for future 
research. 
However, the above analysis still clearly shows  that higher-income groups gain 
proportionally more direct and indirect income from additional expenditures by 
different social groups including government expenditure. The Miyazawa partitioned 
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matrix constructed for the analysis, suggests that lower-income households are at 
considerable disadvantage from the distribution of incomes and wealth within the 
economy. The sectoral direct, indirect and induced incomes generated by the oil and 
gas sectors are unfortunately regressive due to the structural and household linkages 
to the sectors. 
   
Figure 6.1 below gives a graphical representation of the “interrelational income” 
associated with the constructed Miyazawa portioned matrix of the economy. The 
outcomes shown in Figure 6.1 are for the lowest and highest income groups and the 
government sector. The “interrelational” income multipliers for each of these income 
groups (including government) shows that additional income spent by lower-income 
groups delivers much higher multipliers, meaning that the entire economy and all 
income groups benefit substantially more from additional expenditure by lower-
income households. Thus the “interrelational” income multipliers for households 
earning less than TT$1,000 per month, greater than TT$25,000 per month and 
government is 15.2, 2.1 and 2.5 respectively. Figure 6.1 shows that expenditure by 
lower-income groups leads to higher overall economy-wide income multipliers, which 
suggests that lower-income groups spend on items that have greater linkages within 
the economy and therefore generates more income for other groups within the 
economy. By contrast, expenditure by higher income groups seem to lead to greater 
leakages, do not have significant linkages to other parts of the economy and therefore 
do not lead to substantial benefits for other income groups.
47
 This is also true for 
government expenditure, which benefits higher-income groups more than lower-
income groups, which in turn leads to greater leakages and therefore the multiplied 
effect is not as large as policy makers might hope. 
 
These results are significant for a natural resource-based economy like T&T where 
the government collects most of the domestic revenues from the exploitation of 
natural resources. The model estimates that the government collected TT$17 billion in 
revenues in 2008 from the oil and natural gas production sectors. The government 
then disburses this revenue to the rest of the economy either directly via wages, 
transfers and subsidies or indirectly through capital investment including 
                                                 
47 It has not been examined here, but richer households may spend additional income on imports and on 
savings, which constitute leakages from the domestic economy. 
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infrastructure and education, to name a few.  However, the analysis shows that when 
the government spends an additional unit of revenue, the beneficiaries are 
predominantly the wealthier households in society. The current structure of the 
economy, the government’s expenditure patterns and the negligible returns from the 
human capital accumulated by poorer households are likely to continue the regressive 
distributions revealed by this analysis. Therefore, if government is the largest re-
distributor of rents from the natural resource sector, its current expenditure patterns 
are not going to have the desired impact of stimulating sustainable growth, income 
and savings that benefit a wider distribution of the population. 
 
These results are similar to the conclusion drawn by Buccellato and Mickiewicz 
(2008) who found that in Russian regions that oil and gas have benefited the highest 
quintile of the population the most. Freije (2006) has also confirmed that wealthier 
households have benefitted more from the hydrocarbon resources in Venezuela.  
However, Berry (2006) assessments have found the results to vary for countries.  
Indonesia has been relatively successful in securing growth and equity.  This was due 
primarily to good luck in the form of available new agricultural technology which 
improved productivity and created jobs and in good management which allowed for a 
stable macro economy and the investment of much of the oil rents in infrastructure 
rather than on consumption.  Major devaluations of the currency also allowed 
Indonesia to move into a manufactured exports phase. This is in contrast to Nigeria 
where it seems that ‘oil has impoverished’ the society according to Berry (2006).  In 
Nigeria, inequality has increased alongside no increase in per capita income meaning 
a significant rise in poverty.  Nigeria’s fate was sealed by the discouragement in 
agricultural production and manufacturing caused by the oil bonanza. A high degree 
of exchange rate appreciation would also have been a death knell for other industrial 
activities.  Furthermore, industries chosen for favourable treatment in both Nigeria 
and Venezuela were bad choices and their management ineffective.  
 
The example of Kuwait as analysed by El–Katiri et al. (2011) have also shown that an 
unequal outcome is not the only fate of an oil producing or resource abundant 
country. Significant government policies aimed at reducing inequality are also 
feasible in helping to spread the benefits of the hydrocarbon rents.  These policies 
include generous social programmes and public employment.  However, it is worth 
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noting that the policies undertaken by Kuwait might not be sustainable in other 
countries with less natural resource wealth per capita.  However, the Kuwaiti system 
is not merely about adjusting existing income distribution but ensuring that all 
Kuwaitis benefit from the oil rents.  This could sometimes lead to regressive subsidies 
for utilities but which overall has led to a relative egalitarian economic structure, El- 
Katiri et al. (2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1  “Interrelational” income distribution for selected income groups and government  
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The analysis of this chapter has shown that most of the rents from the oil and gas 
sector that are spent domestically are distributed towards higher-income groups. In 
addition to this, the structure of the economy means that government expenditure of 
rents benefits higher-income groups disproportionately more than lower-income 
groups. If the expenditure of rents is to improve intragenerational equity, then 
inevitably there needs to be a shift in what the rents are spent on and on whom. 
 
However, there are additional research questions emanating from this analysis. 
Expenditure by lower income households lead to higher interrelational income 
multipliers, suggesting that their expenditures have greater linkages to the domestic 
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economy, thus benefiting the economy more as opposed to the expenditures by higher 
income groups and the government. The economic linkages associated with lower-
income group expenditures needs to be examined so that the mechanisms of these 
linkages can be replicated throughout the economy to improve economic benefits 
associated with expenditures of rent from the natural resource sectors, all income 
groups and the government. 
 
The analysis has also revealed that lower income groups derive relatively few benefits 
from the expenditures of higher income groups and the government. This suggests 
that the ability of lower income groups to capture income from the expenditure of 
other groups needs to be analysed. The inability of lower income groups to capture 
rents from the oil and gas sector may be related to their low accumulation of human 
capital and their inability to earn a significant rate of return on their human capital as 
shown in chapter 5.   
 
Further research on extending this type of analysis to other resource abundant 
economies might also reveal some useful insights.  Table 6.1 and earlier research has 
shown that generally income inequality is a problem for these types of economies. 
Theories of the rentier state and political economy have attempted to explain this 
phenomenon.  However, in order to improve genuine saving rates in resource 
abundant countries, the pass through mechanisms of resource rents should also be 
examined further.  The analysis of this chapter shows that  in order to improve saving 
rates, policies that directly boost savings, such as investments in other forms of 
productive assets and structural reforms of the economy might also be needed that 
reduce leakages from the economy and foster greater linkages. 
 
Conventional measures of sustainable development, such as genuine savings rates, 
suggest that T&T is on an unsustainable path, since the country is consuming and not 
saving enough of the proceeds from the exploitation of its natural resources. However, 
these measures tell us nothing about how the rents from natural resources are 
distributed. The results of the partitioned matrix show that the allocation of these rents 
throughout the economy may also have an impact on the level of savings and 
ultimately the possibility of attaining sustainable development. A significant 
proportion of the domestic rents from the oil and gas production sectors are collected 
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by wealthier households. The “interrelational” multipliers and matrix shows that when 
wealthy households spend additional income, the rest of the economy does not benefit 
considerably, suggesting that this expenditure leads to many leakages rather than 
domestic economic linkages. Further research is required to determine why there is an 
apparent weak linkage between the spend of higher-income households and the 
domestic economy and to ascertain if this is having a negative impact on genuine 
savings.   
 
For the country to achieve sustainable development, the distribution of savings may 
be just as important as the level of savings. The analysis of the distribution of rents 
from the oil and gas sector directly and by the government shows that the allocation is 
fairly regressive. The lack of domestic economic linkages by expenditures of the 
wealthy with the rest of the economy, measured by the inter-relational matrix and the 
share volume of the rent accumulated by these household groups, suggests that 
distribution may also be a cause for the lack of adequate savings and investment 
within the economy. Measures of sustainable development should therefore not only 
be concerned with intergenerational equity but also with intragenerational equity, 
since ultimately the intragenerational distribution may play a pivotal role in the ability 
of the economy to save for the longer term. 
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Appendix 6A Structure of the economy and distribution of rents and 
opportunities 
 
Type I multipliers and distributional profiles of jobs within the economy were 
constructed. The calculations involve using the 45 x 45 industry Leontief inverse 
matrix (L) as set out in Chapter 3 to construct estimators of output and employment 
effects and multipliers when an economic shock confronts the economy. These shocks 
may be malign or benign. However, for the purpose of this analysis, I am interested in 
positive shocks to the economy, which are examined to see how, for example, natural 
gas or petroleum output affects the economy and how these effects, including jobs, 
are distributed among different income groups. The educational outcomes in Chapter 
five may help explain, in part, the distribution of savings. However, the structure of 
the economy may also explain relative distribution outcomes. The model uses the L 
matrix to calculate the direct and indirect output effects to the economy. To calculate 
the output effects, the L matrix is multiplied by a column vector S to get the output 
effects from a shock or output effect to one sector in the economy. 
 
Output Effect = L X S 
 
where: 
 
S – 45 x 1 shock column vector and  
  LAI  1  or the Leontief inverse 45 x 45 matrix of coefficients. 
 
Employment effects are then calculated by multiplying the output effects by estimates 
of output/employment ratios for each of the 45 industrial sectors. 
 
The model then calculates total type I employment and output multipliers. Type I 
multipliers estimate the multiplied effect of the output or shock by dividing the total 
employment effects and total output effects by the direct employment effect and 
output effect respectively.
48
 
 
                                                 
48 Total effects refer to direct and indirect effects. 
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The model then predicts the distribution of employment among different income 
groups using employment distribution among industry of household members 15 
years old and over from the Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2008. Separate income 
group employment multipliers are also calculated within the model. 
 
An example is now examined. Using actual industrial data for 2008, where it was 
estimated that the output from the oil and gas production sector was TT$45.7 billion, 
the model predicts that this led to an overall economy-wide output multiplier of 1.44 
and overall economy-wide employment multiplier of 4.6. The 1.44 output multiplier 
means that TT$45.7 billion in output within the oil and gas industry leads to a total 
economy-wide increase of TT$65.7 billion and the employment multiplier of 4.6 
means that for every direct job created in the oil and gas industry, 4.6 times jobs are 
created throughout the economy. Given the structure of the economy, this output 
produces about 22,000 direct jobs and total jobs of about 101,000 within the economy 
distributed among aggregate industries as shown in Table A6.1. 
 
Table A6.1 Aggregate industrial sector jobs from $TT45.7 billion output from the oil and gas 
production industry in 2008 
Industry Jobs 
Sugar 18 
Other Agriculture 2,307 
Petroleum and Gas 30,726 
Other Mining and Quarrying 68 
Other Manufacturing 41,888 
Electricity and water 2,376 
Construction 8,467 
Wholesale and Retail - 
Transport Storage and communication 5,193 
Financing Insurance Real Estate and 
Business Services 
7,701 
Community Social and Personal Services 2,446 
Total 101,192 
 
 
These jobs are then distributed among income groups based on the distributions from HBS 
2008. Individual income group distributional employment multipliers are also calculated. The 
distribution of jobs among household groups is shown in Table 2. As expected, most of the 
direct jobs within the oil and gas industry are distributed among high- and middle-income 
households. Lower-income households benefit from indirect jobs, which lead to very high 
multipliers for these groups (since direct jobs are very low). However, those households with 
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incomes less than TT$5,000 per month (23 per cent of total population) gain about 16 per cent 
of total jobs, while the higher-income groups with incomes TT$23,000 and higher per month 
(6 per cent of total population) gain about 19 per cent of jobs.   
 
 
Table A6.2 Employment distribution and multiplier distribution from TT$45.7 billion output 
from the oil and gas production sector in 2008 
 Total Jobs Direct Jobs Multiplier Job 
Distribution 
All Groups 101,192 22,011 4.60 100% 
< 1,000 4,338 88 49.3 4% 
1000 - 2999 5,281 75 70.0 5% 
3000 - 4999 6,360 239 26.6 6% 
5000 - 6999 6,390 390 16.4 6% 
7000 - 8999 6,077 779 7.8 6% 
9000 - 10999 5,852 817 7.2 6% 
11000 - 12999 5,154 1,018 5.0 5% 
13000 - 14999 7,218 1,119 6.5 7% 
15000 - 16999 6,874 2,916 2.4 7% 
17000 - 18999 8,220 3,143 2.6 8% 
19000 - 20999 9,592 3,645 2.6 9% 
21000 - 22999 10,670 3,432 3.1 11% 
23000 - 24999 9,302 1,571 5.9 9% 
25000 and over 9,866 2,778 3.6 10% 
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Appendix 6B  Miyazawa generalised Keynesian income multiplier in 
the form of interrelational income multipliers 
 
The following explanation of the Miyazawa generalised Keynesian income multiplier in the 
form of interrelational income multipliers was provided by Sonis and Hewings (2000). 
 
To recap, the Miyazawa matrix model has the following form: 
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X
0
       (1) 
 
As usual, A is a matrix of direct input coefficients; X is gross output, f is the final demand, 
the vector Y represents total income, the matrix V is the value added ratios of households, 
vector g is exogenous income and the matrix C represents the consumption expenditures. 
 
How does the Miyazawa matrix model work? 
 
Miyazawa considered a 2x2 block matrix: 
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M          (2) 
This means that the Leontief inverse for the Miyazawa matrix (2) has the following form: 
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Where B = (I-A)-1 is the Leontief inter-industrial inverse matrix, L= VBC is the matrix of 
inter-income groups coefficients, and: 
 
K=(I-L)-1 = (I-VBC)-1 = I+V ΔC        (4) 
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is the Miyazawa interrelational income multiplier or generalised Keynesian multiplier, and: 
 
Δ= (I-A-CV)-1 = B+BCKVB        (5) 
 
is an enlarged Leontief inverse. 
 
There are also Miyazawa fundamental equations of income from capital: 
 




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BCKC
KVBV
         (6) 
 
Sonis and Hewings (2000) add that while there are some differences between the Miyazawa 
approach and the social accounting matrix approach as set out in Pyatt and Round (1985), 
such as the latter containing a more inclusive form of income such as non-wage and salary 
sources, the Miyazawa approach can still handle these differences. However, these 
differences are not relevant for this chapter. 
 
Sonis and Hewings also note that Pyatt (1998) raised the distinction between factor income as 
in the Miyazawa model and institutional income as used in social accounting models. It is 
often not clear in the Miyazawa system what types of other income are included in g in 
equation (1) which is usually referred to as exogenous income.  However, for this analysis I 
have endogenised compensation of employees and government income within the model. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
The analyses contained in the previous chapters have indicated that T&T is on an 
unsustainable path, since it is consuming too much and not investing enough of the 
proceeds from the depletion of its non-renewable natural resources; oil and natural 
gas.  The analyses of chapters four, five and six have also shown that proceeds 
channelled to the domestic population, either through fuel subsidies, education 
expenditure or general government expenditure have distributions that are regressive.  
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 of chapter one showed World Bank estimates of adjusted net 
savings rates for Trinidad and Tobago.  These showed that ANS rates for T&T have 
consistently been negative.  Why are these savings rates negative? How are savings 
distributed?  Using the distributional estimates obtained in the previous chapters, this 
concluding chapter provides a partial distribution adjusted 2008 ANS rate for 
Trinidad and Tobago and overall conclusions drawn from the thesis. It is also 
apparent that simply trying to redistribute savings to bring about greater equality will 
not bring about the desired benefits unless political economy inertias or providing the 
correct incentives for individual investment in for example education are also 
addressed. 
 
 
7.1 Partial Distributional adjusted ANS rate for Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 
In chapter one it was shown that the ANS rate for T&T was negative 19 per cent of 
GNI in 2008 based on World Bank estimates, World Bank (2011).  This was 
approximately US$4.4 billion or US$3,427 per capita
49
. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the composition of this estimate, which for the purpose of this 
analysis excludes pollution from particulate matter. This measure of ANS, consists of 
gross national savings, which comprises of public and private savings.  Gross national 
                                                 
49 Based on population estimates of the T&T household budget survey 2008/2009. 
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savings were about 42 per cent of GNI in 2008. Consumption of fixed capital is then 
added (subtracted if negative).  This represents the depreciation of capital throughout 
the economy for that year, such as depreciation of buildings and infrastructure as well 
as the depreciation of private assets.  For 2008, this was about 13 per cent of GNI. 
Next education expenditure is added.  This represents investment in human capital for 
that year and was 4 per cent of GNI in 2008.  Energy depletion is then subtracted 
(added if discoveries are more than the stock extracted).  This is the extraction of non-
renewable resources in Trinidad and Tobago for 2008.  This shows the extent that 
extraction has reduced the stock of non-renewable wealth in 2008.  This was 
approximately 51 per cent of GNI in 2008. Next an estimate of the CO2 produced by 
the economy is subtracted.  This is a proxy measure of the level of pollution produced 
throughout the year from economic activity.  This was approximately 1 percent f GNI 
in 2008.   
 
When all of these components are added together for 2008, the conventional measure 
of savings (gross national savings) of positive 42 per cent of GNI is transformed into 
negative 19 per cent of GNI using the ANS estimates.  This composite measure gives 
a better indication of the sustainability of the economy and suggests that more 
positive savings/investment is required as per the Hartwick rule.    
 
 
Table 7.1: Composition of 2008 ANS estimate for Trinidad and Tobago 
  US$ million Per cent of GNI Per capita US$ 
Gross National 
Savings 9,727 42% 7,540 
Consumption of 
Fixed capital  (3,055) -13% (2,368) 
Education 
Expenditure 932 4% 722 
Energy Depletion (11,753) -51% (9,111) 
CO2 (272) -1% (211) 
ANS (4,421) -19% (3,427) 
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7.2 Estimating the Partial Distribution of Adjusted Net Savings 
(ANS) 
 
To calculate an estimate of how adjusted net savings may be distributed for Trinidad 
and Tobago, the distributions that are most closely associated with each of the above 
components of ANS should be applied to the estimates in table 7.1.  However, 
distributions for each of the components of ANS were not estimated in this thesis.  
Only the distribution of components where applicable distributions were estimated in 
the previous chapters are now presented; resource depletion and education 
expenditure. 
 
 
To estimate the distributions for depletion, the general distributions associated with 
government expenditure are combined with the direct distributions from the oil and 
gas industry to households as estimated in chapter six.  Government distributions are 
important since the majority of the domestic rents from the petroleum sector are 
captured domestically by the government and then redistributed via its general 
expenditures.  How these general expenditures are distributed determine how 
depletion and consumption of the rents are distributed between the different 
households. This analysis shows that wealthier household are benefitting more from 
the depletion of the country’s hydrocarbon resources and so a greater proportion of 
the depletion can be attributed to their consumption patterns or ability to capture the 
rents associated with resource extraction. 
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Figure 7.1: Per capita Distributions of Depletion for Trinidad and Tobago (2008) 
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In the ANS calculations, expenditure on education is used as a proxy for investment 
in human capital.  Although it is difficult to assess fully the distributional 
beneficiaries of education expenditure in 2008, for the purpose of this analysis it is 
assumed that the human capital distributions calculated for 2008 in chapter five are 
also the beneficiary distributions that will arise from the education expenditure in 
2008.  These distributions are in figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: Per capita Education expenditure distribution (2008) 
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Combining the individual distributions for each of the components presented above, a 
partial distributional adjusted per capita ANS estimate for 2008 can be produced.  
This is shown in figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3: Per capita ANS distributions based on household income Groups 
(2008), (depletion and education only) 
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7.3 Conclusion 
Figures 7.3 shows that all household income groups contribute negatively to the 
combination of depletion and education components of ANS.  However, high income 
households contributed significantly more to negative ANS via their consumption 
patterns and entitlements or command of the domestic rents from the exploitation of 
the country’s natural resources.  Lower income and middle income group shares of 
negative savings were far less, mainly due to the fact that they do not command a 
large share of the proceeds from the oil and gas sector and therefore their 
consumption does not contribute significantly to depletion. Their relative investment 
in education has tended to mainly counter their share of depletion on a per capita 
basis. 
 
This is only a partial assessment of the distribution of the ANS rate for Trinidad and 
Tobago and it only portrays part of the ANS distribution story.  Further research on 
the relative distributions associated with savings, depreciation and pollution are 
necessary in order to get a clearer picture of how savings or comprehensive wealth are 
distributed. 
 209 
 
However, these estimates suggest that not only is greater investment and savings 
necessary if T&T is to be placed on a sustainable path, but also how these investments 
and savings are distributed might also be important. The distributions also show that 
while growth may be important to improve the livelihoods of poorer households, their 
emulation of the consumption and saving patterns of richer households may not be the 
desired result. 
 
In fact the structure of the economy, including the existence of monopolies may need 
to be dismantled or reformed.  The consumption and savings patterns of richer 
households may also need to be regulated, to ensure that these household groups 
contribute less to social dis-savings as measured by the ANS. The analysis also 
suggests that there may be structural and consumption/savings patterns within some 
lower and middle income household income groups, which could be replicated to 
improve the sustainability of the economy. 
 
To improve the prospects for sustainability at a macro level, the optimal policy might 
require more than the usual policies that try to break the link between lower income 
households, deprivation and negative incentives for household investment.  It will 
also require policies that tweak or regulate the consumption/savings patterns of the 
better off.  Since the consumption and savings patterns of the richer groups within 
society are having negative impacts on the sustainability of the entire economy and 
society. 
 
These conclusions also seem to mesh with the earlier review of political economy 
considerations, particularly the review of the plantation economy which suggested 
that growth alone might not be an optimal policy unless inter linkages within the 
economy are fostered and where the incentives for greater investment in education by 
lower income households must be encouraged. 
 
The review of depletion estimates for Trinidad and Tobago has shown that the 
country is exploiting its non-renewable resources at a very fast pace.  While from a 
policy perspective all of the user costs associated with this depletion cannot be saved 
since there are also immediate consumption needs,.  However, if some of these 
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proceeds are used for poverty alleviation i.e. the most pressing consumption needs 
articulated in chapter three, then the vast majority should be saved or reinvested to 
help maintain the overall capital stock at the macro level and to improve access to 
capital at the micro level. 
 
The assessment of fuel subsidies, which can be considered a poor use of the resource 
rents, has shown the benefits of these subsidies to be regressively distributed.  This is 
a particular area of policy where expenditure can be retargeted towards individuals 
requiring the most help or towards savings and investment that could help maintain 
the stock of capital. 
 
The analysis of human capital distributions and the rate of return on this human 
capital have also shown this to be regressively distributed. There is considerable 
scope for government policy to address this by among other things encouraging 
human capital investment by poorer households and providing the incentives for that 
investment such as the mechanisms to ensure that quality jobs are available for 
individuals who have invested in education and human capital accumulation. This is 
particularly important to avoid the breakdown in the virtuous circle alluded to by 
Birdsall et al. (2001) and to improve the quality of education received by poorer 
households as suggested by Demas (1971). 
 
The literature on resource abundant countries by for example Auty and Kiiski (2001), 
Birdsall (2001) and van der Ploeg (2011) have all identified income inequality as a 
problem affecting these types of economies.  Work on the plantation economy by 
Beckford (1972), and Demas (1971) and the theory espoused by Seers in (1964) have 
also indicated this to be a problem.  Unfortunately the analysis of the distributions of 
resource rent flows in chapter six has shown that this particular problem still exists in 
Trinidad and Tobago.  This is despite the efforts of governments to spend on 
education and social programmes and to seek full employment through the 
expenditure of resource rents.  The question that arises from this analysis is; why the 
expenditure of resource rents which has contributed to negative ANS rates for 
Trinidad and Tobago not provided lasting benefits for many households in the form of 
their own endowments such as quality human capital, which the sustainable 
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livelihoods framework
50
 suggests is the most important asset for sustainable 
livelihoods.  The answers seem to lie away from simple policies of redistribution and 
more towards structural reforms of the economy and the lingering political economy 
legacies that favour the wealthy and connected over the poor and relatively 
dispossessed.  There is also an urgent need to improve the rate of return on education 
for the poorest households and to also improve the quality of education that these 
households receive, ultimately providing the incentive for quality human capital 
accumulation at all levels. The policy implications of this thesis are all areas for future 
research including a comprehensive assessment of the distribution of ANS to ensure 
that the correct policies can be articulated and implemented.  The consumption 
patterns of some groups which tend to have greater linkages with the domestic 
economy should be emulated and the disproportionate share of negative savings that 
is attributable to some groups should also be regulated. 
 
It is also evident that there should be a separate line of analysis in ANS estimates to 
account specifically for political institutions and to assess their relative effectiveness 
at managing overall wealth for sustainability.  ‘Political capital’ should therefore be 
considered for further analysis and research from a sustainability, resource 
management and equity perspectives. 
 
                                                 
50 DfID 
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